Sammons v. Phila. Gas Works

EMERY M. SAMMONS v. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-2419

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARCH 23, 2016

MEMORANDUM

SURRICK, J.

Presently before the Court are Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 18), Defendant's Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 34), and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 36). For the following reasons, Defendant's Motions will be granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiff's Motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

This action is a dispute over the circumstances under which Plaintiff Emery Sammons' employment from Defendant Philadelphia Gas Works ("PGW") was terminated and the enforceability of a settlement agreement into which the parties allegedly entered.

A. Employment Termination

Plaintiff began working for PGW, a regional municipally owned gas utility company, in 1981. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 27.) Over the course of his approximately 30-year tenure, Plaintiff served in various positions within PGW, including his final position as a non-union call center supervisor. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-13; Webb Aff. ¶ 11, ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff's former direct manager, Joseph Craig, stated that during his three-and-a-half years supervising Plaintiff, he was never aware of Plaintiff leaving work without permission. (Craig Dep. 131:9-21, ECF No. 20.) Nevertheless, on April 8, 2013, Plaintiff met with Mr. Craig and proper clocking in and out procedures were discussed. (Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) Later that day, Craig sent Plaintiff an email informing him that he was "required to punch in and out when [he] leave[s] the building for personal reasons that will clearly exceed a break or lunch period . . . ." (Craig Apr. 8, 2013 email, ECF No. 19, Grant Aff. Ex. L.) Such a Time Labor Management ("TLM") policy was memorialized in a writing dated March 1, 2009. (HR Policies—Electronic Time Recording, Ambrose Aff. Ex. F, ECF No. 19.) It required "[a]ll PGW non-union employees . . . to electronically record work start and stop times . . . ." (Id.)

Even though a TLM policy was in place, it was not always enforced universally throughout PGW. (Pl.'s Opp. Br. 10.) Brenda Torres, a 43-year-old call center "manager," allegedly engaged in regular and known TLM abuse. (Pl.'s Opp. Br. 9.) Craig tried to initiate corrective action against Torres, but according to him, his supervisors did nothing about the complaints during his tenure. (Id. at 9-10.) Even Craig did not clock out and back in every time he left the building for personal reasons. (Craig Dep. 8-12.)

Despite inconsistent enforcement, on October 24, 2013, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave for violating PGW's TLM policy on the dates of August 28, 2013 and September 13, 2013. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-17; Security and Loss Prevention Mem.; Grant Aff. Ex. M.) Plaintiff's absences were allegedly captured on video surveillance. (Security and Loss Prevention Mem.) Plaintiff investigated the matter on his own and determined that he had received permission from Craig for the absences on both dates. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 25.) A meeting to discuss the matter was scheduled for November 7, 2013, at 8:30 a.m. (Webb Aff. ¶ 15.) Ms. Lorraine S. Webb, PGW Vice President for Human Resources, personally called Plaintiff to stress the importance of the meeting and to remind him of the meeting time. (Id. at ¶¶16-17.) Despite the warnings, Plaintiff was allegedly late to the meeting and was seen outside of the building socializing at the time the meeting was to begin. (Cummings Aff. ¶ 19.)

PGW terminated Plaintiff's employment the next day for, among other reasons, failing to "record his absences by clocking 'in' and 'out' . . . ." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27-28.) Plaintiff was 58-years old at the time of his termination and contends that the alleged TLM violations are merely pretext for PGW's underlying age animus and desire to replace Plaintiff with a younger employee. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 67.) He contends that PGW directors had a history of making age-related comments and treating younger employees more favorably than those that were older. (Pl.'s Opp. Br. 9.) As examples, Plaintiff offers that Gary Gioioso, PGW's Director of Organizational Development, once stated that Plaintiff "had been at PGW probably far too long," and another executive once asked "do you know how old [he] is?" about another employee over age 40. (Id.)

B. The Settlement Agreement

In the termination letter that he received from Gioiso, Plaintiff was offered the opportunity to explore his "exit options" from the company. (Am. Compl. ¶ 36.) Shortly thereafter, the parties entered into negotiations for a settlement agreement and release of all claims. (Id. at 40.) By late December 2013, PGW had decided that it would rehire Plaintiff so that he could retire with a "30 and Out" pension, which would have entitled him to receive his vested pension benefits, as well as medical benefits. (Webb Aff. ¶¶ 26-27, 30.) After further negotiations and several written draft settlement agreements, a revised agreement was presented to Plaintiff's counsel by PGW. (Am. Compl. ¶ 44; see also Dec. 31, 2013 Lebofsky email, ECF No. 34-4.) An email sent by PGW's counsel on December 31, 2013 at 7:51 a.m. stated in part: "I need some method for you to review the revised agreement to enable your client to retire today and have it become effective tomorrow, January 1. I will have to have your approvalbefore I present the revised agreement to Mr. Sammons." (Dec. 31, 2013 Lebofsky email.) That same day, Plaintiff met with PGW Benefits Administrators to present required documents and complete all necessary paperwork related to his retirement. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47-48; Dasch Aff. ¶ 8, ECF No. 19.)

The final settlement agreement was to be signed when Plaintiff met with PGW personnel the morning of December 31, 2013. However, the agreement was never fully executed. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49, 54.) PGW contends that because Plaintiff presented a divorce decree with a date that did not coincide with termination of his ex-wife's medical benefits, it decided not to offer Plaintiff the "30 and out pension" plan as it had originally intended. (Dasch Aff. ¶¶ 14, 20-21.) PGW policy required employees to terminate coverage for an ex-spouse within 30 days of divorce and provide a copy of the divorce decree. (June 22, 2003 Mem., Ambrose Aff. Ex. C.) Paperwork subsequently found in Plaintiff's employee file demonstrates that Plaintiff claimed his ex-wife as a dependent on a health care reapplication form in 2003, three months after his divorce was finalized. (See Healthcare Reapplication Form, ECF No. 18, Ex. B.) Plaintiff removed his wife as a medical plan beneficiary beginning September 1, 2006. (Countercl. ¶ 14.) On a 2009 work-related form, Plaintiff indicated that he was divorced. (Ambrose Aff. ¶ 24.) Upon learning that Plaintiff was divorced as of March, 2003, PGW immediately repudiated the settlement agreement and release without further negotiation (Am. Compl. ¶ 54; Dasch Aff. ¶¶ 12, 21.) PGW contends that any settlement agreement was void and/or voidable because it was never memorialized in a signed writing. It also contends that Plaintiff made fraudulent representations on which it relied.

C. Procedural History

In April 2014, Plaintiff filed this Complaint against PGW, alleging violation of the AgeDiscrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (ECF No. 1.) PGW filed an Answer in June 2014, with a counterclaim alleging fraud by Plaintiff for keeping his ex-wife on his benefits plan from 2003 to 2006. (ECF No. 4.) On February 4, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion Pursuant to Rule 15(a) for Leave to File Amended Complaint (ECF No. 16) in which he requested permission to add a claim against PGW for breaching the alleged settlement agreement (Pl.'s Br. 10, Ex. A ¶¶ 90-92). PGW filed a Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion on February 16, 2015. (ECF No. 17.) We issued a Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend on March 20, 2015. (ECF Nos. 25, 26.)¹ On April 13, 2015, PGW filed its Answer to Amended Complaint, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim. (ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses to PGW's Counterclaim to Amended Complaint on July 21, 2015. (ECF No. 41.)

On February 19, 2015, PGW filed its first Motion for Summary Judgment. (Def.'s First Summ. J. Mot., ECF No. 18.)² PGW filed a Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment on May 11, 2015. (Def.'s Supp. Summ. J. Mot., ECF No. 34.) On June 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Response to PGW's Motions and a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 36.) On July 14, 2015, PGW filed a Response to Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 40.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A dispute is "genuine" if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). "[A] factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Id. The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 196 (3d Cir. 2011). However, "unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions" are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Schaar v. Lehigh Valley Health Servs., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 490, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989)).

Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may identify an absence of a genuine issue of material fact by showing the court that there is no evidence in the record...