Sampson Associates, LLC v. Queens Grant Limited Partnership

SAMPSON ASSOCIATES, LLC v. QUEENS GRANT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (QGLP) et al.

No. CV166056762S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Fairfield, Bridgeport

April 9, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

BELLIS, J.

FACTS

The present action stems from a prior action brought by the defendants Queens Grant Limited Partnership (QGLP) and John Harrington, QGLP’s attorney, against the plaintiff, Sampson Associates, LLC (Sampson). The following relevant facts and procedural history are set forth in the memorandum of decision of the trial court in the underlying action, Ray Weiner, LLC v. Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-11-6019100-S (December 4, 2012, Gilardi, J.T.R.), as well as in the decision of the Appellate Court in that case, Ray Weiner, LLC v Bridgeport, 150 Conn.App. 279, 92 A.3d (2014), affirming the trial court’s decision:^[1] The city of Bridgeport (the city) adopted a plan pursuant to General Statutes § 8-191 in the late 1990s to redevelop the East End. The city implemented the plan, which was known as the " Seaview Avenue Industrial Park project." Ray Weiner, LLC v Bridgeport, supra, Superior Court, Docket No CV-11-6019100-S. Through this project, the city acquired abandoned and blighted properties and reassembled them for industrial use. The city first proposed the project to QGLP and a company named Magnetek, Inc. (Magnetek). " At the time of the plan’s adoption, a city block bounded by Crescent Avenue, Bunnell Street, Williston Street and Seaview Avenue was occupied by three separate industrial plants. [Magnetek] occupied the westerly portion of the block adjoining Seaview Avenue. Another company, Syntex Rubber Corp., was located between the Magnetek parcel and [QGLP’s] parcel. [QGLP’s] land occupied the easternmost parcel on the block, which was occupied by Rotair Industries, Inc., a manufacturer of helicopter parts, in a plant bordering Bunnell Street on the east." Ray Weiner, LLC v. Bridgeport, supra, 150 Conn.App. 281.

" In March of 2009, [QGLP] signed a contract to purchase land directly across from the land it already owned on Bunnell Street." Id., 281-82. The closing date to transfer title was listed in the agreement as March 13, 2009. Id., 282. As of the date of trial in the underlying action in 2012, title had not yet passed to the plaintiff, but the parties had not rescinded the contract. Id. On the south side of Williston Street, across from Magnetek’s parcel, was land referred to as the " Williston Street parcel." The Williston Street parcel was previously zoned for residential use, but the city had demolished the housing located thereon to provide employee parking for the Magnetek parcel. Id. After Magnetek went out of business, the city reacquired the Williston Street parcel by foreclosing on its tax liens. A zone change was subsequently approved changing the Williston Street parcel from residential to industrial use, but the developers seeking to use the land for that purpose never entered into a land disposition agreement with the city. Id.

In February of 2009, Sampson entered into a land disposition agreement to purchase the Williston Street parcel in order to construct and operate a waste reduction facility. Id., 282-83. Sampson " then applied to the Bridgeport Zoning Board of Appeals (board) for a variance to permit an increase in truck traffic from the permitted five trucks per day to twenty-five trucks per day." Id., 283. The board granted the variance and QGLP appealed from the board’s decision to the Superior Court. Id. Thereafter, QGLP also brought the underlying action in the Superior Court against Sampson and other parties, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. With respect to Sampson, QGLP sought a declaratory judgment on the ground that Sampson’s " contemplated use of the Williston Street parcel [was] a modification and substantial change of the plan" ; id. ; which required QGLP’s consent because it was statutorily aggrieved, pursuant to General Statutes § 8-200(a), as a contract purchaser of real property in the project area after the plan was adopted. QGLP also requested " injunctive relief enjoining [the city] from conveying the Williston Street parcel to Sampson." Id. The trial court found in favor of Sampson. Ray Weiner, LLC v. Bridgeport, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-11-6019100-S. QGLP subsequently appealed, and the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. Ray Weiner, LLC v. Bridgeport, supra, 150 Conn.App. 281. Although Harrington represented QGLP throughout the entire litigation, defendants Attorney Jennifer Yoxall and Carmody Torrance Sandak & Hennessey, LLP (collectively the Carmody defendants) appeared on QGLP’s behalf in the appeal.

Following the underlying litigation, on May 6, 2016, Sampson commenced the present vexatious litigation action against the defendants pursuant to General Statutes § 52-568(1) and (2).^[2] Counts one through four are brought against QGLP and Harrington, and counts five through eight were brought against the Carmody defendants. The plaintiff withdrew the action as to the Carmody defendants on April 2, 2018. In the remaining counts of the complaint, Sampson alleges that QGLP and Harrington commenced the underlying action without probable cause (counts one and three) and both without probable cause and with malicious intent to unjustly vex and trouble Sampson (counts two and four). As a result, Sampson claims, it suffered damages in the form of attorneys fees and costs in connection with the permit process, litigation defense, and lost profits because it was unable to construct and operate the waste reduction facility.

On October 16, 2017, QGLP and Harrington filed a motion for summary judgment on Sampson’s claims against them, adopting portions of the memorandum of law in support filed by the Carmody defendants, who had previously filed their own motion for summary judgment. On December 8, 2017, Sampson filed a memorandum in opposition. The Carmody defendants subsequently filed a reply memorandum on December 14, 2017, which QGLP also adopted. On December 18, 2017, Harrington filed a separate reply memorandum in response to Sampson’s objection. The motion was heard at short calendar on December 18, 2018.

DISCUSSION

" Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vendrella v. Astriab Family Ltd. Partnership, 311 Conn. 301, 313, 87 A.3d 546 (2014). " The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534-35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012).

" In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact The courts hold the movant to a strict standard ... Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ... It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact ... are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book [§ 17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tully, 322 Conn. 566, 573, 142 A.3d 1079 (2016).

In support of their motion, QGLP and Harrington assert that they did not commence an underlying " action" for purposes of this vexatious litigation action, and that they had standing to apply for declaratory and injunctive relief. Alternatively, they assert that even if they had initiated a civil action, they had probable cause to bring the underlying action because § 8-200(a) conferred onto QGLP a right to seek declaratory and injunctive relief. In his reply brief, Harrington separately argues that he did not commence an action because the underlying proceeding was not an action; rather, it was merely an application for injunctive and declaratory relief.

In opposition, Sampson argues that summary judgment would be inappropriate for several reasons. In response to QGLP and Harrington’s argument that it did not commence an " action" for purposes of this vexatious litigation action, it maintains that the term " action" is construed broadly to include various types of proceedings including the underlying proceedings. It further argues that genuine issues of material fact exist with regard to whether QGLP and Harrington lacked probable cause to pursue the underlying litigation, specifically because they knew that QGLP did not own or lease any property within the development project area and that, therefore, it lacked standing to pursue its claims under General Statutes § 8-200(a).^[3] Sampson maintains that probable cause was lacking because the statutory language at issue is clear and that, under that clear language, QGLP could not have had standing as a mere contract purchaser because it was not an owner or lessee of property in the relevant area. Sampson further argues that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether QGLP and Harrington lacked probable cause because they knew that they lacked evidence to support QGLP’s claim of irreparable harm.

" In Connecticut, the cause of action for vexatious litigation exists both at common law and pursuant to statute. Both...