Sampson v. Williams

1

KAREEM SAMPSON, Petitioner, v. E. WILLIAMS, Respondent.

No. 20-cv-510-DWD

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois

October 19, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Kareem Sampson is an inmate in the Bureau of Prisons currently incarcerated at FCI-Greenville. Petitioner pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(e) in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Case No. 11-cr-00334 (Doc. 1, Doc. 14-1). He is serving a 180-month sentence imposed in January 2016 (Doc. 14-1; Doc. 14-5). Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). Petitioner invokes Rehaif v. United States, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019), as the basis for his collateral attack and request for immediate release. Respondent answered the Petition (Doc 14; Doc. 15). For the reasons detailed below, the Petition will be denied.

Discussion

Generally petitions for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 may not be used to raise claims of legal error in conviction or sentencing; they may only challenge the execution of a sentence. Valona v. United States 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, aside from the direct appeal process, a prisoner who has been convicted in federal court is ordinarily limited to challenging his conviction and sentence by bringing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the court which sentenced him. Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 2003). A prisoner may only challenge his federal conviction or sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in very limited circumstances, such as the “saving clause” of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), which authorizes a federal prisoner to file a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition where the remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); United States v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792, 798-99 (7th Cir. 2002).

Section 2255 relief is inadequate “when it is so configured as to deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.” In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). Therefore, before relief under § 2241 becomes available, Petitioner must demonstrate the inability of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to cure the alleged defect in their conviction because of a structural problem inherent in § 2255. See Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015) (Petitioner must show “something more than a lack of success with a section 2255 motion” before the saving clause is satisfied). Following Davenport and its progeny, the Seventh Circuit has developed a three-part test for determining whether § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective so to trigger the saving clause:

1. The federal prisoner must seek relief based on a decision of statutory interpretation (as opposed to a decision of constitutional interpretation, which the inmate could raise in a second or successive § 2255 motion); 2. The statutory rule of law in question must apply retroactively to cases on collateral review and could not have been invoked in a first § 2255 motion; and

3. A failure to afford the prisoner collateral relief would amount to an error “grave enough” to constitute “a miscarriage of justice.”

Worman v. Entzel, 953 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (citing Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2016) and Beason v. Marske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019)); see also Chazen v. Marske, 938 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2019).

Petitioner asserts a claim based on the 2019 Rehaif opinion, in which the Supreme Court held, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that “in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif, 204 L.Ed.2d 594; United States v. Williams, 946 F.3d 968, 970 (7th Cir. 2020) (defendant's conviction for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition was based on his status of being illegally or unlawfully in the United States; reversing/remanding because the Government had not been required to prove at trial that defendant knew he was unlawfully in the country). The opinion abrogated nationwide precedent in all eleven circuit courts of appeal which had held that knowledge was not an element that the prosecution must prove to obtain a conviction, including the Third Circuit where Petitioner was convicted. See, e.g., United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 596 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that in a § 922(g) prosecution the Government was not required to prove that the defendant knew of his prohibiting status).

Petitioner claims that the Government failed to prove that he knew he belonged to the category of persons (those with a prior felony conviction) who were prohibited from possessing a firearm, at the time he possessed a firearm (Doc. 1). Petitioner argues generally that he is entitled to relief because his charging indictment did not specify a “status” element, and thus he could not have pled guilty to that element (Doc. 1, p. 10). He further argues that this element was not specifically mentioned in his plea colloquy (Doc. 1, p. 11).

Respondent concedes that Petitioner's Rehaif claim satisfies the first and second prongs of the Seventh Circuit's “saving clause” test - Rehaif is a statutory interpretation case, and it sets forth a new substantive rule narrowing the scope of Section 922(g), which applies retroactively (Doc. 14, pp. 9-10, 20-21). Further, this new substantive rule was previously unavailable to Petitioner because it would have been futile to raise his claim in his first Section 2255 motion^[1] under binding pre-Rehaif precedent (Id.). However, Respondent asserts that Petitioner cannot meet the third Davenport factor - a showing that an error in his conviction amounts to a miscarriage of justice - because he was not convicted of a crime for which he was innocent (Doc. 14, pp. 18-22).^[2] On this issue, the Court agrees.

It is true that Petitioner's indictment did not allege that he knew he was a convicted felon at the time he possessed the firearm (Doc. 14-2), nor was knowledge of his status indicated to be an element of his offense at his plea hearing (Doc. 14-4, p. 28). This was consistent with pre-Rehaif controlling precedent. Cases following the Rehaif decision make clear, however, that this Court can and should consider certain other evidence in the record to determine whether it establishes the knowledge element set forth in Rehaif. See, e.g., United States v. Maez, 960 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2020); Williams, 946 F.3d at 973-74; United States v. Dowthard, 948 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Pulliam, 973 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2020); Thigpen v. Williams, No. 21-2438, 2021 WL 6801271, at *1 (7th Cir. Nov. 8, 2021). Post-Rehaif, the Government does not have “to prove that the defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. Knowledge of the relevant status is enough.” Santiago v. Streeval, 36 F.4th 700, 707 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Maez, 960 F.3d 949); United States v. Cook, 970 F.3d 866, 880 (7th Cir. 2020).

Petitioner's claims that he did not know he was a “prohibited person” are simply not plausible considering the admissions he made during his plea colloquy and the multiple terms of imprisonment he served which were longer than one year. See Williams, 946 F.3d 968 (Finding that defendant “cannot plausibly argue that he did not know his conviction had a maximum punishment exceeding a year” where he spent twelve years of his life in prison). As detailed in the record, Petitioner has previously been convicted of at least six crimes punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year at the time he possessed the firearm in question in this matter (Doc. 15-1, ¶¶ 33-38). Further, the sentences imposed in five of those convictions exceeded one-year terms of imprisonment (Id.). Four of these convictions were for possessing with intent to deliver cocaine, which the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found subjected him to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). See Sampson, 684 Fed.Appx. at 181 (dismissing Petitioner's direct appeal and affirming his judgment of conviction and sentence). One of these convictions was also a state offense for illegally possessing a firearm (Doc. 15-1, ¶ 37).

In his Plea Agreement (Doc. 14-3), Petitioner also admitted that he qualifies as an armed career criminal based on his prior convictions (Doc. 14-3, ¶ 10a). His prior convictions were detailed to at Petitioner's change of plea hearing on July 11, 2014, and Petitioner agreed that he was not contesting his prior convictions (Doc. 14-4, pp. 31-33). The following exchange took place at his change of plea hearing:

[GOVERNMENT]: On June 10th, 2002, September 17th, 2002, June 12th, 2006, and August 10th, 2006, the defendant was convicted of crimes calling for more than one year imprisonment.

THE COURT: Thank you.

BY THE COURT:

Q. Mr. Sampson, do you agree that the Government accurately summarized the facts?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you agree that you committed the acts that are contained in those facts, sir?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you then agree and admit that you are guilty of this crime?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. Now one of the stipulations in [the plea agreement] is that you qualify as an armed career criminal under 18 United States Code, Section 924(e) and sentencing guidelines 4B1.4. Do you understand that?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, as I see this, the facts that were just presented to me contain the information that you have three prior qualifying convictions, felony convictions over one year, and t

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