Sams v. Pinnacle Treatment Ctrs.

TALBIRD REEVE SAMS Plaintiff, v. PINNACLE TREATMENT CENTERS, INC., JOHN DOES (1-10) (said names beingfictitious individuals) and ABC-XYZ CORPORATIONS (said names beingfictitious business entities), Individually, Jointly and Severally

Case No. 1:18-CV-09610-JHR-AMD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

May 20, 2021

Opinion

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Talbird Reeve Sams's ("Plaintiff") Motion for Summary Judgment as to his claim for unlawful termination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD") (Count I) [Dkt. 61] and Defendant Pinnacle Treatment Centers, Inc.'s ("Defendant" or "Pinnacle") renewed opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's NJLAD, common law fraud (Count II), equitable fraud (Count III), and fraud in the inducement (Count IV) claims. [Dkt. 74]. Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Strike [Dkt. 85] and Defendant's Motion for Sanctions [Dkt. 86]. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will deny both summary judgment motions as to Count I and grant Defendant's summary judgment motion as to counts II-IV. The Court will also deny Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and Defendant's Motion for Sanctions.

I. Overview

Defendant provides substance abuse and addiction treatment services through its in-patient and out-patient clinics nationwide. Sams v. Pinnacle Treatment Centers, Inc., No. 118CV09610JHRAMD, 2021 WL 567986, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2021). Early in 2014, Joseph Pritchard, Chief Executive Officer for Pinnacle, offered at-will employment to Plaintiff as an "OTP Developer." [Dkt. 61-14, Pl's SUMF ¶ 1; Dkt. 74-3, Def's SUMF ¶¶ 3-5]. Plaintiff began work shortly thereafter. While the parties dispute the exact scope of Plaintiff's job duties, Plaintiff was required to scout potential locations for Pinnacle facilities and help Pinnacle to open these new facilities. Sams, 2021 WL 567986, at *1. Plaintiff was fifty-four (54) years old when he began working for Defendant. [Pl's SUMF ¶ 4]. Plaintiff performed his job without complaint or discipline. [See Pl's SUMF ¶ 9].

Plaintiff's employment offer letter established a two-tier compensation plan whereby Plaintiff would receive a $60,000 annual base salary, and $37,500 incentive bonuses when Plaintiff "opened" a Pinnacle clinic and when a clinic attained one-hundred clients. [Compl. ¶ 15]. Plaintiff's compensation plan changed twice during his tenure with Pinnacle. In January 2015, Plaintiff's base salary increased to $100,000, but his incentive bonuses reduced to $12,500 "upon opening" of each new clinic and $12,500 "at 100 census," for a possible incentive bonus of $25,000 per clinic (the "Second Incentive Plan"). [Compl. ¶ 17]. In January 2017, Plaintiff's base salary increased to $110,000. [Compl. ¶ 18].

In the fall of 2016, Pinnacle hired Robert O'Sullivan as Chief Development Officer. O'Sullivan was approximately thirty-eight (38) years old when Pinnacle hired him. [Pl's SUMF at ¶¶ 10-11]. As Chief Development Officer, O'Sullivan supervised Plaintiff. On or around October 16, 2017, O'Sullivan informed Plaintiff that his position was being eliminated due to corporate restructuring and that Plaintiff would be terminated as a result. [Pl's SUMF ¶ 14; Dkt. 61, Exh. A at 42:9-13]. Plaintiff was fifty-eight (58) years old when he was terminated, and O'Sullivan was approximately thirty-nine (39) years old. [Pl's SUMF ¶¶ 10-11]. Around thesame time, Defendant also terminated Plaintiff's colleague in Pinnacle's development department, Matthew Rice, who was forty-six (46) years old. [Pl's SUMF ¶¶ 6, 16]. O'Sullivan assumed Plaintiff's job responsibilities for a time. [Dkt. 77 at 20]. Pinnacle did not hire new employees to replace Plaintiff or Rice because Pinnacle eliminated those positions. [Def's SUMF ¶ 38].

On May 23, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant in this Court, alleging unlawful termination under the NJLAD (Count I); common law fraud (Count II); equitable fraud (Count III); fraud in the inducement (Count IV); unjust enrichment (Count V); quantum meruit (Count VI); breach of contract (Count VII); and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count VIII). [Dkt. 1]. After discovery, Plaintiff filed this Motion for Summary Judgment on his NJLAD claim (Count I). [Dkt. 61]. Defendant cross-moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's NJLAD (Count I) and fraud (Counts II-IV) claims. [Dkt. 66]. On February 5, 2021, the Court denied Defendant's motion without prejudice because Defendant failed to attach a statement of material undisputed facts to its motion as Local Rule 56.1 requires,¹ but permitted Defendant to refile its motion in compliance with Local Rule 56.1. [Dkt. 70]. Defendant filed a renewed motion that complied with Rule 56.1 and this Court's February 5, 2021 order. [Dkt. 74-77; 82].²

II. Motion to Strike and Motion for Sanctions

Before addressing the merits of the parties' summary judgment motions, the Court will briefly address Plaintiff's Motion to Strike. [Dkt. 85-1]. Plaintiff argues that the Court should strike Defendant's reply brief [Dkt. 84] because Defendant filed this brief against local rules and the Court's February 5, 2021 order. However, that order expressly permitted Defendant to file a reply brief, and Defendant did so in a timely manner. [See Dkt. 70]. The Court therefore denies Plaintiff's Motion to Strike.

In response to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike, Defendant filed a Motion for Sanctions urging the Court to award sanctions under 28 U.S.C § 1927 or the Court's inherent power. [Dkt. 86]. The Court declines to award sanctions and will deny Defendant's motion.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Courts will grant a motion for summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 482 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). Thus, this Court will grant summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c).

An issue is "genuine" if supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if, under the governing substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the outcome of the suit. Id. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Maidenbaum v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (D.N.J. 1994). Thus, to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. Indeed, Rule 56(c) requires the entry of summary judgment against a party who fails to sufficiently establish an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.

When deciding a party's motion for summary judgment, the court must determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial rather than evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Credibility determinations are the province of the finder of fact. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).

IV. Application

a. Count I—NJLAD

The NJLAD prohibits discrimination in the workplace based on age. N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1, et seq. NJLAD claims follow the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework. Hellman v. Am. Water Works Serv. Co., Inc., No. 1:17-CV-12961, 2020 WL 2189967, at *5 (D.N.J. May 6, 2020) (citing Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, 130 F.3d 1101, 1108-12 (3d Cir. 1997)); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). Under this framework, where a plaintiff claims that he was unlawfully discharged, the plaintiff bears the burden to establish a prima facie case by showing that "(1) he was in the protected group; (2) he was performing his job at a level that met his employer's legitimate expectations; (3) he nevertheless was fired; and (4) the employer sought someone to perform the same work after he left. Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 450, 867 A.2d 1133, 1141 (2005) (citation omitted).

If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03, 93 S. Ct. 1817. "This burden is relatively light and defendants can easily meet the threshold in a variety of ways." Hellman v. Am. Water Works Serv. Co., Inc., 2020 WL 2189967, at *5 (citations and quotations omitted) (citing Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994)). The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's offered reason for the adverse employment action is mere pretext for discrimination. Id. (citing Sarullo v. U.S....