Samuels v. We've Only Just Begun Wedding Chapel, Inc.

154 F.Supp.3d 1087

Judith Samuels, Plaintiff,

v.We've Only Just Begun Wedding Chapel, Inc. d/b/a Little White Chapel; Charolette Richards, an individual; and Does I through 50, inclusive, Defendants.

Case No. 2:13-cv-00923-APG-PAL

United States District Court, D. Nevada.

Signed December 15, 2015

Jason J. Kuller, Kuller Law PC, Reno, NV, Robert Montes, Jr., Mass & Montes, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.

Anthony L. Martin, Jill Garcia, Dana B. Krulewitz, Jamie L. Zimmerman, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Las Vegas, NV, for Defendants.

Order on Motion for Summary Judgment

ANDREW P. GORDON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Judith Samuels was employed as a bookkeeper at We've Only Just Begun Wedding Chapel (“WOJB”) before being discharged by owner Charolette Richards. Ms. Samuels, who is Jewish, claims that she suffered discrimination and a hostile work environment because of her religious beliefs and practices. I previously dismissed one of Ms. Samuels' claims and remanded five others to the state court. (Dkt. #37 at 7.) Her remaining claims against WOJB and Ms. Richards assert (1) religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) and Nevada law; (2) religious discrimination based on a failure to accommodate under Title VII and Nevada law; (3) harassment/hostile work environment; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants now seek summary judgment on all of these claims. Defendants also request that I dismiss Ms. Richards from this lawsuit, arguing that there are no valid claims asserted against her.

There are genuine disputes as to whether WOJB discriminated against Ms. Samuels when they terminated her and whether they failed to accommodate her religious practices. But the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Samuels' discrimination claims based on her salary and her claims of harassment/hostile work environment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ms. Samuels has offered no evidence that religion was a factor in her salary. Further, no reasonable jury could find that a hostile work environment existed or that the defendants' conduct was extreme or outrageous or constituted harassment. Finally, Title VII does not permit claims against individuals, so Ms. Richards is entitled to judgment on the Title VII claims. However, Ms. Samuels also brought religious discrimination claims against Ms. Richards based on Nevada law. The defendants do not address the Nevada law aspects of these claims in their summary judgment motion and therefore, as explained below. I deny summary judgment for Ms. Richards as to the remaining Nevada law claims against her.

I. BACKGROUND

WOJB operates the Little White Wedding Chapel, which provides wedding ceremonies to its customers. Ms. Richards is the president and owner of WOJB. WOJB employed Ms. Samuels as a part-time bookkeeper between December 2010 and April 2011. Ms. Samuels was first placed at WOJB by a temporary agency in September 2010. (Dkt. #57-1 at 9; Dkt. #58-1 at 12.) She worked part-time at WOJB. receiving approximately $13-$15 per hour from the temporary agency for this work. (Dkt. #57-1 at 9, 11.) In December 2010, Ms. Samuels accepted a position with WOJB as a part-time bookkeeper for a salary of $ 18 per hour. (Id. at 19.)

Ms. Samuels is Jewish and observes the Jewish holidays. Ms. Samuels states that while employed by WOJB: (1) Ms. Richards conducted prayer sessions at the end of staff meetings that made her uncomfortable, (2) she felt compelled to attend one after-work prayer service, (3) Ms. Richards sang Christian songs to her both at work and over the telephone, and (4) that Ms. Richards does not deny once telling her. “You know the Jews killed our Savior.” (Dkt. #57-1 at 31-37; Dkt. #58-1 at 63-64.) Ms. Samuels further alleges that she believes she was paid less than prior bookkeepers because of her religion. (Dkt. #10 at 4.) Neither Ms. Samuels nor Ms. Richards is sure when Ms. Richards learned that Ms. Samuels was Jewish, but at the latest Ms. Richards would have been aware of this fact in March 2011 when Ms. Samuels asked for time off to celebrate the Passover holiday. (Dkt. #57-1 at 14-15.) The defendants contend that Ms. Samuels was never required to attend any prayer services and Ms. Richards' singing of Christian songs in the office was not directed at Ms. Samuels specifically. (Dkt. #57-1 at 31-35.)

Ms. Richards initially approved Ms. Samuels' request to take off April 18 and 19 to celebrate Passover with her family. (Id. at 14-15.) Around that same time. Ms. Samuels also asked for an advance on her salary to travel to a family member's bar mitzvah. (Id. at 16-17.) Ms. Richards also granted this request. (Id. ) On the evening of April 18, on the first night of Passover and after Ms. Samuels had taken the day off, Ms. Richards terminated Ms. Samuels via a text message which read:

“Judy I did not want to call you as I know this is a special time for you. However if I allow you to take off for a special holiday I would have to allow everyone that works here to take off for special holidays. That is stated in our handbook and as you have explained to people you have stated during here (sic) orientation .ZAlong (sic) with the fact I had to search for a long while to find some of the insurance papers for the limos[.] Guess where I finally found some of them? In a file folder named miscellaneous .ZI (sic) will have your check ready Wednesday Charolette.”¹

(Id. at 73-76.)

Ms. Richards says that Ms. Samuels was never discriminated against and that Ms. Samuels' religion had nothing to do with her termination. Rather, she says that there were several reasons why Ms. Samuels was terminated and all relate to her poor work performance, including that she had failed to keep a clean work area, manipulated WOJB's payroll system, and that she had tailed to maintain its ATM machine. (Dkt. #57 at 28-29; Dkt. # 57-1 at 25-26; 28-29.) According to Ms. Richards, the concerns she had with Ms. Samuels' performance came to a head over the Passover holiday when it was discovered that certain of WOJB's vehicles did not have their proper proof of insurance information which resulted in a WOJB driver being ticketed. (Dkt. #57 at 32; Dkt. #57-1 at 28-29.)

Ms. Richards does not remember if she ever discussed with Ms. Samuels any of her poor work habits prior to Ms. Samuels' termination. (Dkt. #58-1 at 52.) Ms. Samuels states Ms. Richards never spoke to her about any concerns about her performance. (Dkt. #58-1 at 13.) Ms. Samuels also contends that many of the performance issues the defendants complain of are events for which she was not responsible. For example, she states that she was not responsible for loading the ATM machine the day it was improperly maintained and that Ms. Richards* grandson, not Ms. Samuels, had been delegated the responsibility of placing the proof of insurance in WOJB's vehicles. (Dkt. #58-1 at 25-26; 32-33.)

II. ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, discovery responses, and affidavits “show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ). For summary judgment purposes, the court views all facts and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fis c hbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir.1986).

If the moving party demonstrates the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Bank of Am. v. Orr, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir.2002) (internal citations omitted). She “must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show” a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact finder could find in her favor. Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir.1991) ; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

A. Religious discrimination

Ms. Samuels' Seventh Cause of Action asserts a religious discrimination claim against the defendants under Title VII and Nevada Revised Statutes § 613.310. et seq., alleging that she was both paid less and terminated because of her religion. (Dkt. #10 at 16-17.) The defendants argue that Ms. Samuels was terminated for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons related to her poor work performance. They further argue that the events which Ms. Samuels cites to as allegedly discriminatory do not support a claim for religious discrimination. Specifically, they argue that they never required or demanded that Ms. Samuels attend any prayer services and that Ms. Richards' singing of Christian songs was not specifically directed at Ms. Samuels. Finally, they argue that Ms. Samuels has not put forth any evidence: (1) that previous bookkeepers were paid more than her, (2) about the religion of those bookkeepers, or (3) that any difference in pay was based on religion.

In response, Ms. Samuels argues that Ms. Richards' text informing her of her termination, directly references her request to take time off for Passover. Further, she argues that all of the defendants' non-religious reasons for terminating her were manufactured after the fact and conflict with the reason given in Ms. Richards' text.

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). N.R.S. § 613.330(1)(a) makes the same conduct...