San Benito Consol. ISD v. Leal

SAN BENITO CONSOLIDATED ISD, Appellant, v. MARY ALICE LEAL, Appellee.

No. 13-20-00569-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Thirteenth District, Corpus Christi-Edinburg

January 27, 2022

On appeal from the 107th District Court of Cameron County Texas.

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GINA M. BENAVIDES Justice.

Appellant San Benito Consolidated Independent School District (School District) appeals from the denial of its plea to the jurisdiction on appellee Mary Alice Leal's claims of employment discrimination, breach of contract, and state constitutional violations. By its first two issues, the School District contends that it conclusively established that Leal failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) because both her charge of discrimination and suit were untimely. By its third and fourth issues, the School District argues that Leal failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on her breach of contract claim under § 7.057 of the Texas Education Code and that Leal has not alleged a viable constitutional claim. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Background

The School District employed Leal as an administrator for the 2016-2017 school year.^[1] On August 19, 2016, Leal was transferred from her position as a middle school assistant principal to an "Instructional Facility position" at an elementary school. On May 9, 2017, Leal filed a formal charge of discrimination with both the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) and United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

The discrimination charge form required Leal to check boxes next to all bases of discrimination against her. Leal checked the boxes next to sex and retaliation. The form also prompted Leal to fill in the earliest and latest dates of discrimination. Leal filled in "8/19/16" for the earliest, "09/19/16 - Continuing" for the latest, and checked the box that indicated the discrimination was a "continuing action." In a field requesting a narrative, Leal provided:

I have been subjected to a demotion, discipline, harassment[, ] and inequitable terms [and] conditions [of employment] due to retaliation. On or about 08/18/16, I was assigned to work in the front office with secretarial staff, [even though] I am an administrator. I was also assigned a small cubicle, given a ten[-]year[-]old computer, a chair with metal sticking out of the seat[, ] and I was not given access to students' information in order to complete my job duties. On or about 08/19/16, I was demoted and transferred from my position as an Assistant Principal of BCMS to an Instruction Facility position at Judge De La Fuente Elementary School for the 2016-2017 school year[]. On or about 09/19/16, I was given a negative evaluation, which resulted in the inability to be promoted. I believe the discriminatory treatment I have experienced is a result of me previously filing an EEO complaint."

On October 25, 2017, Leal filed an amended charge. The narrative section contains identical allegations. The only change Leal made was to the dates of discrimination; she now alleged that the most recent discrimination and retaliation occurred in "July 2017."

On November 28, 2017, the TWC issued Leal a right-to-sue letter and explained that it was dismissing her charge. The EEOC adopted the TWC's findings, and Leal did not ask the EEOC for a separate review of her claims.

Leal filed suit on January 30, 2018, alleging discrimination and retaliation under the labor code and free-speech and due-course-of-law violations under the Texas Constitution. The School District filed a plea to the jurisdiction, and the parties agreed to abate the case for six months to conduct jurisdictional discovery.

Upon reinstatement, Leal supplemented her petition, adding a claim for breach of her employment contract. In her live petition, Leal claims that the School District began discriminating and retaliating against her after she "acted to investigate, support[, ] and sustain complaints of sexual discrimination and harassment by employees under her supervision" in 2015. She also claims that she suffered "ongoing harassment, discrimination[, ] and retaliation . . . within 180 days of filing her charge of discrimination with the [TWC]" and was subjected to "demotion, discipline, harassment[, ] and inequitable terms and conditions of employment" during the 180-day period.

The School District filed an amended plea to the jurisdiction. The School District attached to its plea a verified copy of Leal's EEOC file, including an investigative memorandum by the TWC. After a hearing, the trial court denied the plea, and this interlocutory appeal followed.^[2] See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (providing for interlocutory appeal from a trial court's denial of a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit).

II. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to a court's authority to decide a case. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000) (citing Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993)). Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002).

Governmental immunity from suit protects political subdivisions of the State like the School District from lawsuits for money damages and deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims. See Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 & n.2 (Tex. 2008). The plaintiff has the initial burden to plead facts affirmatively showing that the trial court has jurisdiction. Fleming v. Patterson, 310 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2010, pet. struck) (citing Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 446). To prevail on a claim of immunity, the governmental defendant "may challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both." Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). When a defendant challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, the analysis "mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment." Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Lara, 625 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 634 (Tex. 2012)). As such, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in their favor. Id. (citing Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 771).

The TCHRA prohibits employers from discriminating against protected employees or retaliating against employees who engage in protected activities. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 21.051(1), 21.055. An employee engages in a protected activity by, among other things, opposing a discriminatory practice, making a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or TWC, or participating in an investigation by the EEOC or TWC. Id. § 21.055. The TCHRA waives a governmental employer's immunity from suit for violations under the act. Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 770. Because the TCHRA was modeled after federal statutes, Texas courts look to relevant federal precedent for guidance. Lara, 625 S.W.3d at 52 (citing Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 634).

III. 180-Day Filing Requirement

By its first issue, the School District argues that Leal failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the TCHRA because she filed her charge of discrimination more than 180 days after she was demoted.

A. Applicable Law

A person must exhaust the TCHRA's administrative remedies prior to filing suit, and failure to do so is a jurisdictional defect that deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 156 (Tex. 2008). To exhaust administrative remedies, a person must, among other requirements, file a charge of discrimination with the TWC "not later than the 180th day after the date the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.202(a); Lopez, 259 S.W.3d at 156.

"Unlawful employment practices" include discrete acts, such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire, which are easy to identify. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002). "Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act." Id. at 113. A demotion is a discrete act that places an employee on notice that a cause of action has accrued. Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 280 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114); see Davis v. Autonation USA Corp., 226 S.W.3d 487, 492 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding demotion triggered 180-day deadline); see also Abbott v. Rankin, No. 06-07-00149-CV, 2008 WL 5156453, at *4 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Dec. 10, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (same).

There is an exception to the 180-day deadline, known as the continuing violation doctrine, which generally arises in the context of hostile work environment claims. Morgan 536 U.S. at 114. Rather than discrete acts, a hostile work environment claim alleges related and sustained harassment so that the unlawful employment practice "cannot be said to occur on any particular day." Id. at 115. (explaining that hostile work environment claims are "different in kind" and "in direct contrast to discrete acts"). Instead, "[a] hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one 'unlawful employment practice.'" Id. at 117. For such claims, a court may consider contributing acts that occurred outside the 180-day deadline if at least one contributing act...