San Jacinto River Auth. v. Lewis

629 S.W.3d 768

SAN JACINTO RIVER AUTHORITY, Appellant

v.Evan LEWIS, Appellee

NO. 14-19-00696-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Opinion filed July 13, 2021

Jose E. De La Fuente, James F. Parker III, Nathan Vassar, Austin, J. Mark Breeding, Shane Kotlarsky, William S. Helfand, Cameron P. Pope, Houston, for Appellant.

Kurt B. Arnold, Jason A. Itkin, Micajah Daniel Boatright, Roland Christensen, Russell S. Post, Kyle Lawrence, Nicholas Bruno, Houston, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Bourliot, and Wilson.

OPINION

Kevin Jewell, Justice

Appellant San Jacinto River Authority ("SJRA") appeals the denial of its plea to the jurisdiction in this property takings case. Appellee Evan Lewis alleged that water SJRA released from Lake Conroe after Hurricane Harvey made landfall flooded and damaged his property. The dispositive issue in this case¹ is whether Lewis timely filed a statutory takings claim under Government Code chapter 2007. SJRA contends that he did not do so and, as a result, the trial court was required to dismiss Lewis's suit for want of jurisdiction.

We conclude that Lewis did not timely assert a statutory takings claim under chapter 2007, which requires such claims to be filed not later than 180 days after the date the landowner knew or should have known that the governmental action restricted or limited the owner's right in the private real property. Because this particular legislative filing deadline is jurisdictional, and because Lewis asserted his chapter 2007 claims after the deadline passed, the trial court erred in denying SJRA's plea to the jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order denying SJRA's plea to the jurisdiction and render judgment dismissing Lewis's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Background

Lewis alleged that he owns private real property in Kingwood, Texas, which is in Harris County. During Hurricane Harvey in late August 2017, SJRA released water from its Lake Conroe reservoir into the West Fork of the San Jacinto River. Lewis alleged that SJRA's release of water caused the downstream flooding of his home in Kingwood. He sued SJRA in Harris County District Court on November 3, 2017, alleging an inverse condemnation claim under article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution and seeking damages in excess of $1,000,000 for SJRA's unconstitutional taking, as well as attorney's fees and costs.

SJRA filed a combined plea to the jurisdiction and rule 91a motion to dismiss (the "first jurisdictional plea"), asserting that the trial court, a Harris County district court, lacked jurisdiction over Lewis's constitutional inverse condemnation claim. Lewis responded, arguing, as relevant here, that even assuming the district court lacked jurisdiction over his constitutional inverse condemnation claim, his original petition also alleged a statutory takings claim under Texas Government Code chapter 2007, and the trial court had jurisdiction over that claim. See Tex. Gov't Code § 2007.021(a) (stating that takings claims under the chapter "must be filed in district court"). A hearing occurred, during which, according to Lewis, the trial court construed SJRA's first jurisdictional plea as special exceptions to his original petition and "orally granted Lewis leave to file an amended pleading that clarified the legal basis for his claims."

Rule 91a.3 requires trial courts to rule on a rule 91a motion to dismiss within forty-five days of the date the motion is filed. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.3(c). In this case, the forty-five-day period expired December 20, 2018. The court did not rule on the first jurisdictional plea (which included SJRA's rule 91a motion to dismiss) by the deadline.² SJRA filed a notice of interlocutory appeal on February 14, 2019, asserting that the court's failure to timely rule operated as a denial as a matter of law. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). SJRA's notice of interlocutory appeal entitled SJRA to a stay of all trial court proceedings pending resolution of the appeal. See id. § 51.014(b).

On February 28, 2019, while SJRA's interlocutory appeal was pending before this court, and while the statutory stay was in effect, Lewis filed an amended petition, which explicitly added a chapter 2007 statutory takings claim.

Meanwhile, this court determined that we lacked jurisdiction over SJRA's interlocutory appeal, and we dismissed that appeal on April 16, 2019. See San Jacinto River Auth. v. Lewis , 572 S.W.3d 838, 840-41 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (per curiam) ("Because the trial court has not ruled on SJRA's plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss under Rule 91a, no ruling exists over which this court may exercise its interlocutory appellate jurisdiction."). We issued our mandate on June 28, 2019. The statutory stay lifted, at the latest, by June 28, 2019.

On May 20, 2019, before our mandate issued, and while the statutory stay was in effect, SJRA filed a second plea to the jurisdiction in the trial court. In this second plea, SJRA asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Lewis's claims for a number of reasons, including that: (1) Harris County civil courts at law have exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional inverse condemnation claims; and (2) Lewis's chapter 2007 statutory takings claim was time-barred.

Lewis non-suited his constitutional inverse condemnation claim. Thus, the focus of the jurisdictional inquiry became whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Lewis's chapter 2007 statutory takings claim. On this point, SJRA invoked chapter 2007's filing deadline applicable to suits against political subdivisions. See Tex. Gov't Code § 2007.021(b). That subsection states: "A suit under this subchapter must be filed not later than the 180th day after the private real property owner knew or should have known that the governmental action restricted or limited the owner's right in the private real property." Id. SJRA argued that Lewis's original petition, though filed before the 180-day deadline in section 2007.021(b), did not state a claim under chapter 2007 but rather alleged only a constitutional inverse condemnation claim over which Harris County district courts lack jurisdiction. Moreover, SJRA asserted that Lewis's amended petition, which asserted a chapter 2007 claim, could not invoke the court's jurisdiction because it was either void (because it was filed during the statutory stay pending the interlocutory appeal) or untimely (because it was filed after the 180-day deadline).

In response, Lewis argued among other things that he sufficiently pleaded a statutory takings claim in his original petition, applying Texas's fair notice pleading standards. Alternatively, Lewis contended that his amended petition was not void, but only voidable, and that the chapter 2007 claim raised in his amended petition was timely because that pleading "relates back" to his original petition, which SJRA conceded was filed within the 180-day deadline enumerated in section 2007.021(b).

The trial court signed an order denying SJRA's jurisdictional plea. SJRA timely filed this interlocutory appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8).

Issues Presented

SJRA presents two issues for our review. First, it contends that Lewis failed to timely plead a statutory takings claim, and that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the only claim Lewis properly pleaded (but has since non-suited)—a constitutional inverse condemnation claim. Second, SJRA contends that, if Lewis's live pleading states a statutory takings claim, chapter 2007 does not apply to governmental actions like SJRA's release of water from the Lake Conroe Dam in connection with an emergency event such as Hurricane Harvey. SJRA's first issue is dispositive of this appeal, and we do not address its second issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

Standard of Review

Subject matter jurisdiction is necessary to a court's authority to decide a case. City of Houston v Rhule , 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam). A plea to the jurisdiction seeks to dismiss a case for want of subject matter jurisdiction. City of Waco v. Kirwan , 298 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2009). Because subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, we review the court's ruling de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004) ; City of Brazoria v. Ellis , No. 14-14-00322-CV, 2015 WL 3424732, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 28, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). In deciding a jurisdictional plea, the trial court may not weigh the merits of the plaintiff's claims but must consider only the pleading and the evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry. County of Cameron v. Brown , 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002).

When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged acts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the case. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 227. We construe the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff's favor, look to the pleader's intent, and accept as true the unchallenged factual jurisdictional allegations in the pleadings. See id. at 226. If the pleading is sufficient to demonstrate jurisdiction, and if the defendant does not challenge the plaintiff's factual allegations with supporting evidence, then our inquiry ends. See id. at 227-28.

If the defendant challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. See id. at 227. We take as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts arising from such evidence in the plaintiff's favor. See id. at 228. If the relevant evidence is undisputed or a fact question is not raised relative to the jurisdictional issue, the court rules on the jurisdictional plea as a matter of law. Id. If the evidence creates a fact question regarding...