San Union, Inc. v. Arnold, (2017)

2017 Guam 10

SAN UNION, INC. dba HARMON GARDEN APARTMENTS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD ARNOLD, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court Case No.: CVA16-010

SUPREME COURT OF GUAM

Argued and submitted: March 3, 2017

August 14, 2017

Superior Court Case No.: CV0309-16

OPINION

Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam

Argued and submitted on March 3, 2017

Hagåtña, Guam

Appearing for Defendant-Appellant:

Richard T. Arnold, pro se

P.O. Box 4891

Hagåtña, Guam 96932

Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee:

Joyce C.H. Tang, Esq.

Leslie Travis, Esq.

Civille & Tang, PLLC

330 Hernan Cortez Ave., Ste. 200

Hagåtña, Guam 96910 BEFORE: KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice; ROBERT J. TORRES, Associate Justice.

TORRES, J.:

[1] Defendant-Appellant Richard Arnold appeals from a Superior Court judgment in favor of his former landlord and employer, Plaintiff-Appellee San Union, Inc. ("San Union"), awarding San Union possession of a rental unit along with attorney's fees and costs of suit after a summary proceeding for unlawful detainer.

[2] Arnold argues on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the action for a defective statement of jurisdiction, refusing to recuse itself for a conflict of interest, failing to address the lawfulness of Arnold's discharge from employment, and not recognizing an equitable defense to unlawful detainer for retaliatory eviction. Arnold further contends that the court improperly awarded attorney's fees. For the reasons herein, we affirm the Superior Court judgment.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

[3] Arnold worked for several years as a maintenance person for San Union, which owns Harmon Garden Apartments. Ellen Wilkinson is the president of San Union. From June 6, 2014, until June 5, 2015, Arnold rented a unit in Harmon Garden Apartments pursuant to a discounted one-year lease. No new lease was signed thereafter, though Arnold continued living in the apartment and paying rent.

[4] On March 9, 2016, Arnold was injured and subsequently procured a doctor's note. Two days later, San Union delivered a document terminating Arnold's employment and giving him 30-days' notice to vacate the unit he occupied. This same notice informed Arnold that his rent for the portion of the following month before quitting the premises would be a prorated share of $800, rather than his discounted rate of $475.

[5] Arnold failed to vacate the premises within 30 days. A few days later, San Union filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, which was later amended. Arnold filed an answer and purported counterclaims.

[6] The same day that Arnold filed his answer and counterclaims, the parties appeared briefly before the trial court, during which time the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Good morning.

Ms. Wilkinson, previous realtor . . . realtor for the home I live in now, about 10 years ago. Right? She helped me find that home; we're very happy in that home. Notwithstanding Ms. Wilkinson, we don't necessarily have anything beyond that, no other business dealings; let me make that disclosure now.

Mr. Arnold, do I know you?

MR. ARNOLD: No, sir.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ARNOLD: All right. I have not been before you before.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, good.

Transcript ("Tr.") at 2-3 (Hr'g, Apr. 29, 2016) (ellipsis in original).

[7] The parties again appeared before the trial court for the unlawful detainer hearing. During this proceeding, Arnold was represented by counsel. Arnold's counsel attempted to argue that Arnold's firing was retaliation for the possible filing of a worker's compensation claim and that the rent increase was unlawful. See Tr. at 19 (Unlawful Detainer Hr'g, May 10, 2016). He argued that such evidence was relevant because the court had the ability to deny San Union relief on equitable grounds. Id. at 51. The court limited introduction of evidence regarding Arnold's injury and subsequent report while allowing evidence regarding the increase in rent. See id. at 37, 55-56.

[8] At the end of the proceeding, the court and parties reached an understanding regarding the status of arguments that Arnold had raised as counterclaims before acquiring counsel and without the understanding that the proceeding for unlawful detainer was a summary one.

THE COURT: . . . I do understand how Mr. Arnold has responded in some fashion. Let me just make for the record, the cross-complaints, I'm not saying they're without merit, I would say that this is not the venue for those to be completed. This is just about, really, tenancy . . . .

MR. ARNOLD: Your Honor, may I withdraw those --

[ARNOLD'S COUNSEL]: No --

THE COURT: I'm not dismissing them. I'm just saying that you can take them at another venue. You may file those at a different time. You are not precluded, as a result of your filing them in your answer, from taking some other action at another venue, or through another filing.

[SAN UNION'S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, to clarify, we don't have to respond to that filing and the context --

THE COURT: No, you do not. At this -- I'm not addressing it any further.

[ARNOLD'S COUNSEL]: There are no counterclaims allowed in a -- I acknowledge that there are no counterclaims allowed in a summary proceeding --

THE COURT: Right. Correct, correct.

[ARNOLD'S COUNSEL]: -- unlawful detainer, and so the court doesn't have jurisdiction over them --

THE COURT: That's right.

[ARNOLD'S COUNSEL]: -- so because the court doesn't have jurisdiction over them, it has -- this ruling has no effect on them. They're --

THE COURT: None whatsoever. Take none from it.

[ARNOLD'S COUNSEL]: -- (indiscernible) he can bring up in a different action.

THE COURT: This is strictly about, again, the occupation of the premises.

Id. at 66-67.

[9] After hearing testimony from Wilkinson and Arnold, the court ordered Arnold to vacate the unit according to a negotiated schedule. Id. at 57-65. Thereafter, San Union's counsel clarified that they were seeking attorney's fees under a provision of the lease. Id. at 68. The amended complaint states that San Union was seeking "forfeiture of the [l]ease, and restitution and possession of the [p]remises; and . . . such other and further relief as the [c]ourt may deem just and proper." Record on Appeal ("RA"), tab 9 at 3-4 (Verified Am. Compl., Apr. 26, 2016). San Union's counsel stated that the restitution they were seeking was the attorney's fees. Tr. at 45, 68 (Unlawful Detainer Hr'g). The court allowed "strictly whatever application you have for reasonable attorney's fees associated with the statute." Id. at 68.

[10] The court signed a proposed judgment submitted by San Union, which granted San Union immediate possession of the unit and specified that San Union "recovers reasonable attorneys [sic] fees" and "recovers the costs of suit." RA, tab 19 at 2 (Proposed J., May 23, 2016). Arnold's attorney signed the proposed judgment, approving it as to form. Arnold timely appealed, appearing pro se.

[11] Now before this court, Arnold filed a motion to supplement the record, seeking to include two exhibits—apparently screenshots memorializing Facebook text chat conversations with his son—and an affidavit about an oral contract he had purportedly reached with San Union, which were not introduced in the trial court. San Union, Inc. v. Arnold, CVA16-010 (Mot. to Suppl. R. (Dec. 7, 2016)). We denied the motion, as the proposed documents were outside of the trial court record, did not merit exercise of this court's inherent power to supplement the record on appeal, and were not amenable to judicial notice. San Union, Inc. v. Arnold, CVA16-010 (Order (Dec. 23, 2016)).

II. JURISDICTION

[12] This court has jurisdiction over an appeal from a final judgment of the Superior Court. 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424-1(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 115-43 (2017)); 7 GCA §§ 3107, 3108(a) (2005).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[13] This court interprets the requirements of the Guam Rules of Civil Procedure and the Guam Superior Court Rules de novo. Cf. People v. Callahan, 2015 Guam 24 ¶ 8 (applying de novo review to interpretation of the Guam Rules of Appellate Procedure); Melwani v. Hemlani, 2015 Guam 17 ¶ 16 (applying de novo review to statutory interpretation).

[14] The interpretation of a statute is a legal question subject to de novo review. Guerrero v. Santo Thomas, 2010 Guam 11 ¶ 8 (citing Apana v. Rosario, 2000 Guam 7 ¶ 9).

[15] "A trial court's ruling on the relevance of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." People v. Guerrero, 2001 Guam 19 ¶ 26 (citing United States v. Easter, 66 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1995)).

[16] "Whether a judge should be disqualified from hearing a matter is reviewed for appearance of impropriety." People v. Camaddu, 2015 Guam 2 ¶ 9 (citing Dizon v. Superior Court of Guam (People), 1998 Guam 3 ¶ 8).

[17] "An award of attorney's fees is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion." Duenas v. George & Matilda Kallingal, P.C., 2012 Guam 4 ¶ 9 (citing Fleming v. Quigley, 2003 Guam 4 ¶ 14). "However, determination of the legal basis for an award of attorney's fees is reviewed de novo as a question of law." Id.

IV. ANALYSIS

[18] Many of the arguments Arnold raises on appeal are not properly before the court.¹ As explained more fully below, most of the remaining arguments—although questions of law—are raised for the first time on appeal. We do not exercise our discretion to reach the merits of several of these questions. See Tanaguchi-Ruth + Assocs. v. MDI Guam Corp., 2005 Guam 7 ¶ 80 (citation omitted) (allowing us to reach unraised issues on a discretionary basis, subject to several broad constraints).

[19] This court traditionally affords pro se litigants considerable leeway. See, e.g., McGhee v. McGhee, 2008 Guam 17 ¶ 11. But although Arnold is pro se before this court, he was represented by counsel before the trial court, where these issues went unpreserved. The arguments now before the court are legally complex and without simple application to the facts of this case. Many are matters of first impression. Although most of the arguments raised for the first...