Sanabria v. Martins

568 F.Supp.2d 220

Luis SANABRIA, Plaintiff, v. Officer Steven MARTINS, Defendant.

Civil No. 3:06cv647 (JBA).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

March 26, 2008.

E. Gregory Cerritelli, Knight, Conway & Cerritelli, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey E. Potter, John J. Radshaw, III, Howd & Ludorf, LLC, Hartford, CT, for Defendant.

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OUTSTANDING DISCOVERY MOTIONS

JANET BOND ARTERTON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Luis Sanabria brought this suit against Defendant Steven Martins, a police officer for the City of Ansonia, alleging that Martins used excessive force in the course of arresting him, thereby violating his constitutional rights and also constituting both assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.¹ Martins now moves for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) Sanabria's claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); (2) Martins is entitled to qualified immunity; and (3) Sanabria's testimony is sufficiently unreliable that his claims should be dismissed. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion is denied. As explained below, the Court also grants two outstanding discovery motions relating to the March 26, 2007 Qualified Protective Order.

I. Factual Background

On August 29, 2005, Martins responded to a report of an assault at the Laticrete Industries building in Bethany, Connecticut. (Def.'s Local R. 56(a)1 Stmt. ¶ 4.) Martins, who was specifically requested because he was a certified canine handler, arrived at the scene along with several members of the state police. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 15.) Understanding that the suspect had brandished a box cutter and then fled from the building into the surrounding wooded area, Martins fitted his dog, Thor, with a tracking harness and pursued the suspect. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) Thor found the suspect, Sanabria, near the building and engaged him, biting him on the right arm, and Sanabria was eventually placed under arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 30-37, 47, 60-65.) Plaintiff was hospitalized as a result of his arm injury and subsequently charged with three offenses; he later pleaded guilty to one count of interfering with a police officer in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-167a. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41, 75.) During the plea hearing in which Sanabria acknowledged his guilt, the prosecutor provided the following factual basis for the plea:

Police were called to this gentleman's place of business in Bethany. It was a fight between himself and Mr. Torres. When they attempted [to] apprehend both of them, Mr. Torres was, apparently, compliant. Mr. Sanabria ended up taking off and they ended up chasing him through the woods. There was a dog with them. The dog ended up finding Mr. Sanabria.

(Plea Hr'g Tr., Sept. 12, 2005, 4:6-15, Def.'s Ex. I.) Sanabria confirmed the accuracy of this account. (Id. 5:27-6:3.)

The Plaintiff subsequently filed this civil action, alleging that Martins used unconstitutionally excessive force in the course of bringing him into custody. According to Sanabria, the critical facts of the encounter between him, the Defendant, and Thor are as follows:

[Sanabria] has testified under oath that he complied with the defendant's command to show his hands. The plaintiff further testified that despite his immediate compliance, the defendant officer gave a command to the canine, which resulted in the attack which is the subject of this lawsuit. The plaintiff was not actively resisting arrest, nor was he otherwise not compliant with the defendant's commands. A jury may indeed find that under the context of these facts, the defendant's actions were indeed excessive.

(Pl.'s Opp'n at 6; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6-11.)

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where the record after discovery "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue of fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and is "genuine" if it could lead "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In moving for summary judgment against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant "need not prove a negative," but "need only point to an absence of proof on plaintiff's part, and, at that point, plaintiff must `designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Parker v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 260 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). The non-moving party, in order to defeat summary judgment, must then come forward with evidence that would be sufficient to support a jury verdict in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. But if the record as a whole, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial," and summary judgment should follow. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quotation marks omitted).

B. Effect of Sanabria's Guilty Plea

Martins contends that Sanabria's claims are barred because they necessarily conflict with his conviction for interfering with a police officer. Section 53a-167a, the statute defining that offense, provides that "[a] person is guilty of interfering with an officer when such person obstructs, resists, hinders or endangers any peace officer ... in the performance of such peace officer's ... duties." Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-167a(a). This offense thus has three elements: (1) interference with an officer, (2) with intent to so interfere, (3) while the officer is performing his or her duties. State v. Williams, 205 Conn. 456, 534 A.2d 230, 238 (1987). The Connecticut Supreme Court has interpreted this language as encompassing "conduct that amounts to meddling in or hampering the activities of the police in the performance of their duties," which includes "acts of verbal resistance as well as acts of physical resistance." Id; State v. Aloi, 280 Conn. 824, 911 A.2d 1086, 1094-95 (2007) (reading § 53a-167a as "establish[ing] a broad proscription against conduct that intrudes upon the ability of a police officer to perform his or her duties"). A police officer is performing his or her duties as contemplated by the statute "[i]f he is acting under a good faith belief that he is carrying out that duty [and] if his actions are reasonably designed to that end." State v. Davis, 261 Conn. 553, 804 A.2d 781, 789-90 (2002).

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court explained that "civil tort actions," such as those brought pursuant to § 1983, "are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments," and cannot proceed if they would "necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement." 512 U.S. at 486, 114 S.Ct. 2364. The petitioner in Heck was a prisoner convicted of voluntary manslaughter who brought a § 1983 action against state officials challenging various aspects of his prosecution and conviction. Id. at 478-79, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Affirming the dismissal of these claims, the Supreme Court held:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Id. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (footnote omitted). Under this "favorable termination" rule, a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages is not cognizable where "the basis for the damages claim necessarily demonstrates the invalidity of the conviction," thus in reality "attacking the fact or length of confinement." Id. at 481-42, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973)); Peralta v. Vasquez, 467 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir.2006).

Determining whether awarding Sanabria the relief he seeks in this case "would necessarily imply the invalidity of [his] conviction" is a fact-specific inquiry. Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir.1999). Plaintiff argues that "a claim for excessive force may lack the requisite relationship to the conviction necessary for dismissal under Heck." (Pl.'s Opp'n at 8.) However, there is a more compelling reason that Defendant's Heck argument falls short. In Leather v. Eyck, 180 F.3d 420, 424 (2d Cir.1999), the Second Circuit reasoned that, where a § 1983 plaintiff was never incarcerated for a prior offense and thus had no opportunity to raise a constitutional challenge via habeas corpus, Heck does not apply. Here, Sanabria pleaded guilty to violating § 53a-167(a) and was sentenced to pay a $250 fine without any term of incarceration. (Plea Hr'g Tr., Sept. 12, 2005, 7:24-27, Def.'s Ex. I.) Like the plaintiff in Leather, Sanabria had no habeas corpus remedy, and so Heck is no bar to...