Sanchez v. California, Case No. 1:12–cv–01835–SAB.

90 F.Supp.3d 1036

Irma B. SANCHEZ, Plaintiff

v.State of CALIFORNIA, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:12–cv–01835–SAB.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed Feb. 26, 2015.

Filed Feb. 27, 2015.

John Wesley Hawk Stoller, Price and Associates, Hayward, CA, Pamela Y. Price, Price and Associates, Oakland, CA, for Plaintiff.

Matthew T. Besmer, Office of the Attorney General, Fresno, CA, Scott Holmes Wyckoff, Attorney General's Office for the State of California, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

STANLEY A. BOONE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Currently before the Court is Defendants California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation¹ (“CDCR”) and Sidney Smyth's motion for partial summary judgment.²

I.PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Irma B. Sanchez (“Sanchez” or “Plaintiff”) filed this action on November 8, 2012. On May 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. Plaintiff alleges seven causes of action for sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”); and the California Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California Government Code sections 12940 et seq.

On January 16, 2015, Defendants CDCR and Smyth filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the second, fourth, sixth, and seventh causes of action. Plaintiff filed an opposition on February 11, 2015. On February 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed a corrected opposition and declaration. On February 18, 2015, Defendants CDCR and Smyth filed a reply and objections to Plaintiff's opposition.

II.LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if, taking the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Smith v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir.2013) (citations omitted). A fact is material if, under the substantive law governing the action, resolution of the fact might affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment must be entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case....” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) ; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 1348. This requires the party opposing summary judgment to respond with more than mere hearsay and legal conclusions, Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach and Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir.1986), or “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts[,]” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that in evaluating motions for summary judgment in employment discrimination cases, we must zealously guard an employee's right to a full and fair trial because “discrimination claims are frequently difficult to prove without a full airing of the evidence and an opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.”McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir.2004). This sets a high standard for granting summary judgment in employment discrimination cases. Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). Very little evidence is required to survive summary judgment in an employment discrimination case because “because the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a ‘searching inquiry'-one that is most appropriately conducted by the factfinder, upon a full record.” Schnidrig, 80 F.3d at 1410 (citations omitted). Nevertheless, summary judgment is appropriate where there is a “[f]ailure to allege ‘specific facts' that establish the existence of a prima facie case” or “when evidence to refute the defendant's legitimate explanation is totally lacking’... even though plaintiff may have established a minimum prima facie case.” Hunt v. City of Portland, 726 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1255 (D.Or.2010) (citations omitted).

III.UNDISPUTED FACTS

1. Sanchez has been employed by the CDCR as a correctional officer at California State Prison–Corcoran (“Corcoran”) since 1994.

2. Smyth has been employed as a correctional officer with CDCR since 1995, and worked at Corcoran from 1997 through December 2014.

3. CDCR operates Corcoran. The inmate population at Corcoran is organized into facilities which typically include housing units for inmates, a yard, gym, dining facility, and other buildings.

4. Correctional officers are assigned to positions known as posts. Each post has certain duties and responsibilities, a certain shift (known as a watch), and set days off.

5. Correctional officers bid for posts, and bids are won based on seniority.

6. In 2010, Sanchez's post was on the 3C facility in building 02 where she worked the second watch (6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.) five days per week.

7. In 2010, Smyth's post was on the 3C facility as a relief officer.

8. On Sundays, Smyth worked with Sanchez on the second watch in building 02.

9. During the other days of the week, Smyth worked in other buildings.

10. On September 28, 2010, Sanchez filed her first internal sexual harassment equal opportunity (“E.O.”) complaint against Smyth.

11. Sanchez's September 28, 2010, complaint alleged that “sexual harassment by C/O S. Smyth over the last 7–8 months continues.” Sanchez claimed that Smyth would stare at her, make comments of a sexual nature, she was uncomfortable doing cell searches with him, onetime he walked into the unisex staff restroom while she was inside, and he would hang-up the phone when male officers called for her.

12. Sanchez's complaint was referred to the CDCR Internal Affairs Office of Civil Rights for investigation in Bakersfield, California.

13. On January 3, 2011, Eric Lawton became the new program sergeant for facility 3C and thus became Sanchez's and Smyth's direct supervisor.

14. Within days of Lawton becoming the new program sergeant, Sanchez told him that she had filed a sexual harassment complaint against Smyth, and that she did not want to work with him alone.

15. On or about January 20, 2011, CDCR Office of Internal Affairs closed the investigation into Sanchez's complaint and concluded that no violation of CDCR's EEO policy was found.

16. Lieutenant Weaver met with Smyth and Sanchez and informed them that the investigation had been unsubstantiated, and that the two of them were expected to remain on the 3C facility, be professional, and carry out their duties.³

17. On or about February 14, 2011, Sanchez had bid into a new post on the 3C facility, and began working in building 04.

18. With Sanchez's new post, she no longer worked with Smyth in the same building one day per week.

19. Smyth remained working on the 3C facility as a relief officer in the new bid.

20. Correctional officers are expected and required to perform duties which include search and escort duties, pat downs, helping with the morning meal release, working the steam line in the cafeteria, and filling other posts when needed by the institution, among other duties.⁴

21. At Sanchez's request, Lawton gave Sanchez permission to switch (swap) with other officers in the event she was expected to perform collateral duties with Smyth.

22. Lawton never told Sanchez she could not switch with other officers so that she would not have to work with Smyth.

23. Switching, or swapping as Sanchez calls it, is a voluntary decision among correctional officers to trade places at work, subject to supervisory approval.

24. When Lawton became the 3C facility program sergeant, he restructured the process for releasing inmates from their cells for morning meal.

25. Lawton would serve on the meal release team along with two other correctional officers. They would move from one building to the next until all of the inmates had been released for morning meal. When Lawton could not serve on the meal release team, he ensured that at least two officers were providing meal release coverage. Some days, he had to redirect officers from other duties to meet the two officer meal release team minimum.⁵

26. On October 19, 2011, Lawton called building 02 and talked to Smyth.

27. On October 19, 2011, Lawton told Smyth that either Smyth or his partner were needed to go to building 04 for the meal release.

28. On October 19, 2011, Smyth went to perform the meal release.

29. At approximately 6:30 a.m. on October 19, 2011, Sanchez called Lawton regarding working with Smyth.⁶

30. On October 19, 2011, Sanchez called officers on the 3C facility and asked if anyone wanted to swap with her. No one wanted to swap.

31. On October 19, 2011, Sanchez stayed in her office while Smyth released the inmates from building 04.

32. On October 19, 2011, when Smyth finished releasing the inmates from building 04, he went to building 03.

33. On ...