Sanchez v. Gomez

283 F.Supp.3d 524

Celia SANCHEZ and Oscar Salas, statutory death beneficiaries of ERIK Emmanuel Salas–Sanchez, Plaintiffs,

v.Mando Kenneth GOMEZ, Alberto Rivera, Pamela Smith, and the City of El Paso, Texas, Defendants.

EP–17–CV–133–PRM

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division.

Signed October 6, 2017

Enrique Moreno, The Law Offices of Enrique Moreno, Christopher BenoitTexas RioGrande Legal Aid, Inc., Lynn A. Coyle, The Law Office of Lynn Coyle, PLLC, El Paso, TX, for Plaintiffs.

James O. Darnell, Jim Darnell, P.C., Eric M. Brittain, Windle Hood Norton Brittain & Jay LLP, El Paso, TX, Lowell F. Denton, Denton Navarro Rocha Bernal, & Zech, PC, San Antonio, TX, Scott M. Tschirhart, Denton Navarro Rocha Bernal, & Zech, PC, Austin, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT CITY OF EL PASO'S MOTION TO DISMISS

PHILIP R. MARTINEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On this day, the Court considered Defendant City of El Paso's [hereinafter "Defendant"] "Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint" (ECF No. 22) [hereinafter "Motion"], filed on June 29, 2017, Plaintiffs Celia Sanchez and Oscar Salas's [hereinafter collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs"] "Response to Defendant City of El Paso's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss" (ECF No. 33) [hereinafter "Response"], filed on July 24, 2017, and Defendant's "Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant City's Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss" (ECF No. 38) [hereinafter "Reply"], filed on July 31, 2017, in the above-captioned cause. For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Defendant's Motion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are the parents of decedent Erik Emmanuel Salas–Sanchez. Pl.'s Am. Compl., June 15, 2017, ECF No. 17 [hereinafter "Amended Complaint"]. Co-defendant Officers Smith, Rivera, and Gomez [hereinafter collectively referred to as "co-defendant officers"] were employed as police officers by the City of El Paso Police Department [hereinafter "EPPD"]. Am. Compl. 2. On April 29, 2015, Erik Salas–Sanchez [hereinafter "Salas–Sanchez"] was twenty-two years old and living with his family in El Paso, Texas. Id. On that same day, co-defendant officers arrived at Salas–Sanchez's family home and questioned Mrs. Sanchez, Salas–Sanchez's mother, about an alleged incident involving her son. Id. The incident involved Salas–Sanchez's uninvited presence in a neighbor's home, which prompted the neighbor to call 911. Id. at 2–3.

During the co-defendant officers' conversation with Mrs. Sanchez, Mrs. Sanchez informed them that her son had been acting strange and exhibiting signs of mental illness. Id. at 4. Salas–Sanchez was inside the house during the conversation and intermittently interrupted to speak with his mother or the co-defendant officers. Id. Plaintiffs claim that Mrs. Sanchez calmly talked to the officers at her door while simultaneously speaking with her son and telling him "the police are here to talk with her, not him." Id. at 4. Despite this, Salas–Sanchez began telling the co-defendant officers "to leave as he believed they had no right to be at his home."Id. Plaintiffs then claim that "[a]fter an extended period of time speaking with Mrs. Sanchez, and frustrated by [Salas–Sanchez]'s insistence that they leave the home, [co-d]efendant [o]fficers pushed Mrs. Sanchez out of the way and entered the home without consent and without a warrant." Id.

Once inside the house, Plaintiffs claim that Officer Rivera used his taser in an attempt to subdue Salas–Sanchez, while Officer Gomez had his weapon drawn and pointed at Salas–Sanchez. Id. at 5. Then, Plaintiffs allege that despite the fact that Salas–Sanchez "moved away" from all of the officers and "did not make any aggressive movements towards them," Officer Gomez fired five rounds at him, striking him twice in the back and once in the buttocks. Id. at 6. The shots proved fatal, and Salas–Sanchez was pronounced deceased upon arriving at the hospital. Id. No firearm, knife, or any other weapon was ever found at the scene. Id.

Plaintiffs claim that various failures of the EPPD and its Chief, Gregory Allen [hereinafter "Chief Allen"], were a "moving force and/or a proximate cause of the deprivations of" Salas–Sanchez's constitutional rights. Plaintiffs make eight distinct allegations in that regard:

(A) [EPPD maintains] a policy or custom of excessive force by officers so common and widespread as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy;

(B) [EPPD maintains] a policy or custom of officers' failure to avoid the use of deadly force against individuals when the officer is not at risk of imminent serious bodily injury or death;

(C) [EPPD maintains] a policy or custom of the use of excessive force by officers when the officer is on notice of a victim's mental health problems that is so common and widespread as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy;

(D) [EPPD failed to] properly train or supervise members of the El Paso Police Department, including [co-d]efendants Gomez, Rivera, and Smith, not to use intermediate or deadly force against an individual who does not place the officer or another at risk of imminent serious bodily injury or death;

(E) [EPPD failed to] properly train or supervise members of the El Paso Police Department, including [co-d]efendants Gomez, Rivera, and Smith, on mental health issues and how [to] implement de-escalation and communication tactics during incidents where their officers have notice and knowledge that the person for whom they are called has a mental health issues [sic];

(F) [EPPD failed to] institute proper procedures to ensure that EPPD officers use appropriate de-escalation and communication tactics in situations in which it is known that an unarmed resident has a mental illness;

(G) [EPPD failed to] classify any officer-involved shootings as unjustified—particularly those involving unarmed victims; and

(H) [EPPD failed to] pursue criminal or disciplinary charges or support criminal or disciplinary action against officers, including Gomez, Rivera, and Smith, who have deprived citizens and residents of El Paso of their constitutional rights.

Am. Compl. 23–24.

Plaintiffs provide numerous factual allegations to support their claims against Defendant City of El Paso. To avoid redundancy, these allegations will be summarized and explained in the following sections analyzing each specific claim, infra.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. General Pleading Standard for Motions to Dismiss

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss an action for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In determining whether a plaintiff states a valid claim, a court "accept[s] all well-pleaded facts as true and view[s] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs." Gonzalez v. Kay , 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc. , 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) ).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. A pleading that offers mere " ‘labels and conclusions’ ... will not do," especially when it simply tenders " ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ " Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

B. Pleading Standard for Municipal Liability

Prior to Twombly and Iqbal , the Supreme Court specifically held that plaintiffs need only state "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" and did not need to conform to any sort of "heightened pleading standard ... in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under" § 1983. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit , 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). Courts have diverged as to how Leatherman can be reconciled with the more recent Twombly and Iqbal decisions. Some courts have allowed "generic or boilerplate assertions of the grounds for holding the municipality liable," consistent with earlier pleading standards, while other courts have held that suits against municipalities should be subject to the same modern pleading standards as other types of civil cases. See Thomas v. City of Galveston, Texas , 800 F.Supp.2d 826, 842 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (collecting cases illustrating the division among district courts). The Fifth Circuit does not appear to have weighed in conclusively on this divide.¹

However, it is apparent to the Court that Leatherman is in tension with the Supreme Court's more recent directives on the interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Other courts have highlighted this tension. See, e.g., McCauley v. City of Chicago , 671 F.3d 611, 623 (7th Cir. 2011) (" Iqbal conflicts with other recent Supreme Court decisions ... [because it] did not overrule or question a number of the Court's prior cases on notice pleading" including Leatherman. ); White v. City of Chicago , 829 F.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. White v. City of Chicago, Ill. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 526, 196 L.Ed.2d 408 (2016) ("The Leatherman holding has survived the Court's later civil pleading decisions in Iqbal and Twombly , which require the pleader to allege a ‘plausible’ claim."); Gearin v. Rabbett , No. 10-CV-2227 PJS/AJB, 2011 WL 317728, at *10 (D. Minn. Jan. 28, 2011) ("Although it is difficult for this Court to understand how this aspect of Leatherman could survive Twombly and Iqbal , the Supreme Court cited Leatherman in Twombly and specifically...