Sanchez v. Maricopa Cnty.

541 P.3d 566

Jacquelin Jamilex Lopez SANCHEZ, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.MARICOPA COUNTY, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0572

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.

Filed December 7, 2023

Rasmussen Injury Law, Mesa, By Chase W. Rasmussen, Alexander M. Hyde, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Ahwatukee Legal Office, P.C., Phoenix, By David L. Abney, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix, By Darlene M. Cortina, Pamela A. Hostallero, Sean M. Moore, Joseph J. Branco, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Judge David B. Gass and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

OPINION

FURUYA, Judge:

¶1 Plaintiffs Jacquelin Jamilex Lopez Sanchez, Marlin Lopez Sanchez, Rosario Lopez Sanchez, Iliana Ofelia Sanchez, and Orlando Lopez filed this lawsuit against Maricopa County (the "County") for injuries they sustained as the result of a car accident involving a deputy (the "Deputy Sheriff") of the Maricopa County Sheriff (the "Sheriff"). The superior court granted the County's motion to dismiss the complaint under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6) because the County is not vicariously liable for the Deputy Sheriff's actions. Plaintiffs challenge that order, arguing the County is vicariously liable for the Deputy Sheriff's actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior and they otherwise have no remedy because they cannot sue the Sheriff.

¶2 We hold the County is not vicariously liable for the negligent conduct of the Sheriff's employees because the County does not have a principal-agent relationship with them. And we hold under appropriate circumstances plaintiffs can sue sheriffs, who qualify as "public entities" within the meaning of A.R.S. § 12-820(7). Finally, no other statute creates the right to sue the County on this record. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 On June 16, 2021, Plaintiffs were traveling eastbound on Interstate 10 in a vehicle driven by Plaintiff Jacquelin Jamilex Lopez Sanchez. As she slowed for traffic, the Deputy Sheriff rear-ended Sanchez's vehicle. At the time of the accident, the Deputy Sheriff was driving a vehicle owned by the County.

¶4 Plaintiffs alleged they were injured in the collision and filed a timely notice of claim under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 12-821.01 against the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors. They then sued the County for negligence and negligence per se based on a theory of vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The complaint named the County as the sole defendant.

¶5 The County filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing it was not vicariously liable for torts committed by the Sheriff's employees. Following briefing, the superior court granted the County's motion to dismiss. The court concluded the County is not liable for common law torts committed by the Sheriff's employees because the County lacks control over how the Sheriff conducts his official duties.

¶6 Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(1) and -120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 We review de novo the court's dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Coleman v. City of Mesa , 230 Ariz. 352, 355 ¶ 7, 284 P.3d 863, 866 (2012). In doing so, we assume the well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint to be true and affirm the dismissal only if Plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief on any interpretation of those facts. Chalpin v. Snyder , 220 Ariz. 413, 418 ¶ 18, 207 P.3d 666, 671 (App. 2008).

¶8 Plaintiffs’ case here bears great resemblance to a case this court recently decided, Loredo, et al. v. Maricopa Cnty. , 1 CA-CV 22-0259, 2023 WL 2181126 (Ariz. App. Feb. 23, 2023) (mem. decision), review denied (Aug. 22, 2023). Like here, the Loredo plaintiffs alleged they were injured in a collision with a vehicle being driven by Maricopa County deputy sheriff. Id. at ¶ 2. And like here, the Loredo plaintiffs sued Maricopa County but not the sheriff or the deputy sheriff. Id. In Loredo , this court held that Maricopa County could not be held vicariously liable for the sheriff's office. Id. at ¶¶ 6–13. Because Loredo ’s facts are closely aligned with those at issue in this case and because its analysis likewise addresses Plaintiffs’ claims, it is highly persuasive, and we draw from its discussion and holdings. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c).

I. The County Is Not Vicariously Liable for the Deputy Sheriff's Alleged Negligence.

¶9 To be liable for an employee's negligence, an employer must have control or right of control over that employee. Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng'g, Inc. , 227 Ariz. 486, 491 ¶ 17, 258 P.3d 304, 309 (App. 2011), aff'd , 230 Ariz. 55, 280 P.3d 599 (2012). Generally, counties are not vicariously liable for the acts of elected officials whose duties are imposed by statute or the Arizona Constitution. See Hernandez v. Maricopa Cnty. , 138 Ariz. 143, 146, 673 P.2d 341, 344 (App. 1983) (quoting Fridena v. Maricopa Cnty. , 18 Ariz. App. 527, 530–31, 504 P.2d 58 (App. 1972) ). The Sheriff is an elected constitutional officer, Ariz. Const. art. 12, § 3, and the Legislature establishes an elected sheriff's duties. See Ariz. Const. art. 12, § 4, A.R.S. §§ 11-406(A), -441. In general, deputy sheriffs possess the same powers and may perform the same duties as a sheriff. A.R.S. § 38-462(A).

¶10 By statute, a deputy sheriff's duties include preserving the peace, arresting those who commit crimes, attending court hearings, serving process, securing the homes of deceased persons, and conducting or coordinating search and rescue operations. See A.R.S. § 11-441(A)(1), (2), (4), (7), (8), (C). To accomplish these duties, deputy sheriffs spend a significant amount of their time operating vehicles.

¶11 Plaintiffs contend personnel who work in the Sheriff's office, including the Deputy Sheriff in this case, are not the Sheriff's employees "but are ... employees of the [C]ounty." In support of this contention, they cite A.R.S. § 11-251(1), which grants a county board of supervisors’ authority to

[s]upervise the official conduct of all county officers and officers of all districts and other subdivisions of the county charged with assessing, collecting, safekeeping, managing or disbursing the public revenues, see that the officers faithfully perform their duties and direct prosecutions for delinquencies, and, when necessary, require the officers to renew their official bonds, make reports and present their books and accounts for inspection.

Plaintiffs argue the phrase "[s]upervise the official conduct of all county officers" establishes a "broad, at-all-times right of control." Not so.

¶12 When read in context, the language of § 11-251(1) does not grant plenary power to supervise county officers. It instead gives boards the authority to supervise those who are "charged with assessing, collecting, safekeeping, managing or disbursing the public revenues." See State v. Jones , 196 Ariz. 306, 307 ¶ 7, 995 P.2d 742, 743 (App. 1999) ("Every provision of a statute must be read in conjunction with the other provisions, giving meaning, if possible, to ‘each word, clause or sentence, considered in the light of the entire act itself and the purpose for which it was enacted into law.’ ") (quoting Frye v. S. Phoenix Volunteer Fire Co. , 71 Ariz. 163, 168, 224 P.2d 651 (1950) ); cf. Hounshell v. White , 220 Ariz. 1, 5 ¶ 21, 202 P.3d 466, 470 (App. 2008) (interpreting § 11-251(1) as granting the board authority to supervise county officers "in some limited circumstances"). Indeed, if § 11-251(1) conferred broad authority to supervise all county officer functions, the Legislature would have had no reason to enact the other subsections of § 11-251, which authorize boards of supervisors to direct the prosecution and defense of all actions to which their respective counties are a party, permit their sheriffs to offer rewards, or direct their sheriffs to transport insane persons to the state hospital. A.R.S. § 11-251(14), (25), (26).

¶13 Plaintiffs further point to A.R.S. §§ 11-441, -444(A), and -444(C) to bolster their interpretation of § 11-251, arguing the Sheriff is a "county officer" and that each county "bears the cost[s] of the sheriff's conduct." See also Ariz. Const. art. 12, § 3. They suggest these statutes make the Sheriff's status as an officer derivative from the County, and his dependence on County budgeting gives the County the right to control his employees, making the Sheriff's deputies County employees. But although the Sheriff is indeed a "county officer," see A.R.S. § 11-441, and his expenses in fulfilling the statutory duties of his office are indeed a "county charge," see A.R.S. § 11-444(A), Ariz. Const. art. 12, § 3, those circumstances do not justify Plaintiffs’ expansive reading of § 11-251. Rather, reading § 11-251(1) to confer only oversight powers related to fiscal accountability is more consistent with § 11-444, which obligates sheriffs to render a monthly accounting and provides that most of a sheriff's "actual and necessary expenses" are "a county charge." A.R.S. § 11-444(A), (C).

¶14 This more limited reading is also consistent with § 11-409, which grants county officers—not the County—the power to appoint deputies and other staff "necessary to conduct the affairs of their respective offices" and only gives boards the limited authority to consent to those appointments and fix salaries. A.R.S. § 11-409 ; see also Hounshell , 220 Ariz. at 4 ¶ 14, 202 P.3d at 469 ("The fact that the Board must consent to the appointment of a given employee does not make the Board a separate appointing authority."). The constrained nature of these statutes suggests the authority of boards of supervisors to supervise county officers under § 11-251(1) is fiscal only; not, as Plaintiffs argue, a "broad, at-all-times right of control" sufficient to convert the Deputy Sheriff into the County's employee...