Sanchez v. State

BYRON LEE SANCHEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE OF IDAHO, Respondent.

Docket No. 46179

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

October 28, 2020

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Gem County. Hon. Susan E. Wiebe, District Judge.

Order dismissing second amended petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed.

Byron L. Sanchez, Boise, pro se appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

____________________

HUSKEY, Chief Judge

Byron Lee Sanchez appeals from the district court's order dismissing his second amended petition for post-conviction relief. Sanchez alleges the district court erred because: (1) the time for filing a petition for post-conviction relief should have been tolled as to his untimely claims; (2) the trial court's relinquishment of jurisdiction violated his due process rights; (3) the trial court's relinquishment of jurisdiction violated his Sixth Amendment rights; (4) his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 counsel provided ineffective assistance during the Idaho Criminal Rule 35 proceedings; and (5) the district court wrongly prohibited him from raising a claim of actual innocence and declined to consider evidence to support this claim during the evidentiary hearing. For the reasons asserted below, we affirm the district court's order dismissing Sanchez's second amended petition for post-conviction relief.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After challenging his son to a duel with two loaded guns, the State charged Sanchez with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon enhancement, possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sanchez pled guilty to an amended charge of felony injury to a child and the State agreed to dismiss the other charges.

On May 27, 2014, the district court accepted Sanchez's guilty plea and on July 28, 2014, sentenced him to a unified sentence of ten years, with two years determinate, and retained jurisdiction. Sanchez was placed in the Therapeutic Community program during the period of retained jurisdiction. Based on Sanchez's failure to successfully participate in and complete the program, the Idaho Department of Correction (Department) filed an amended presentence investigation report (APSI) recommending the district court relinquish jurisdiction over Sanchez. On March 18, 2015, the district court relinquished jurisdiction.¹ Sanchez filed a Rule 35 motion to reduce his sentence, and the district court denied the motion. Sanchez did not appeal from his judgment of conviction or from the district court's denial of his Rule 35 motion.

On March 18, 2016, Sanchez filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. Sanchez asserted: (1) his guilty plea was obtained under duress and was based upon a false premise; (2) he did not commit felony injury to a child because he did not injure a child; and (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The district court appointed Sanchez post-conviction counsel. Through counsel, Sanchez filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief which reiterated his original claims and expanded his ineffective assistance claim, asserting that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest and failed to provide Sanchez with discovery, assert proper defenses, file a motion to suppress, advise Sanchez of the consequences of pleading guilty, and present exculpatory evidence. Sanchezalleged that but for trial counsel's errors, Sanchez would have been "acquitted" of the injury to child charge.

Subsequently, Sanchez's post-conviction counsel filed a second amended petition for post-conviction relief, which incorporated by reference the claims Sanchez asserted in his pro se petition and asserted additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the Rule 35 proceedings and due process violations relating to the relinquishment of jurisdiction.² The State filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to strike Sanchez's second amended petition. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, but granted the motion to strike the portions of Sanchez's second amended petition that incorporated by reference each of the claims from Sanchez's first pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The district court gave Sanchez additional time to file a new amended petition, but Sanchez did not do so. The State answered Sanchez's second amended petition and moved for summary dismissal.

Throughout the course of the post-conviction proceedings, Sanchez filed multiple pro se motions. The district court declined to consider Sanchez's motions because Sanchez was represented by post-conviction counsel.

The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Sanchez's second amended petition for post-conviction relief. Sanchez represented himself, but his appointed post-conviction counsel remained as stand-by counsel in the event Sanchez needed assistance with procedural issues. During the hearing, the district court reminded Sanchez that the only petition before the court was Sanchez's second amended petition for post-conviction relief and the claims raised in his first pro se petition were no longer properly before the district court and thus, were beyond the scope of the hearing.

After the presentation of evidence, the district court made oral findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district found that Sanchez's claims relating to ineffective assistance of trial counsel were not timely filed as Sanchez filed his first petition for post-conviction relief 599 days after the judgment of conviction, well beyond the one-year filing deadline. Nonetheless, the district court found that, even if the claims were timely filed, they failed on the merits. First, the district court found Sanchez did not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his assertions of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Second, the district court found it was clear from thechange of plea advisory form and the transcript of the change of plea hearing that Sanchez knew the trial court did not have to follow the plea agreement and Sanchez could not withdraw his plea in the event he was not placed on probation and placed into a drug court program. Finally, the district court found that Sanchez's trial counsel did not have a conflict of interest with Sanchez because counsel withdrew from the representation that may have caused a conflict once counsel was aware of the potential issue.

Additionally, the district court found that dismissal was also appropriate for Sanchez's timely claims. First, the district court found that Sanchez did not establish ineffective assistance of Rule 35 counsel because Sanchez did not show that he was prejudiced by counsel's actions. Second, the district court found that Sanchez's rights were not violated during the relinquishment proceedings because Sanchez was given an opportunity to respond to the APSI, which satisfied the due process requirements. Accordingly, the district court dismissed Sanchez's second amended petition for post-conviction relief. Sanchez timely appeals.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner must prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 861, 243 P.3d 675, 677 (Ct. App. 2010). When reviewing a decision denying post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, an appellate court will not disturb the lower court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1990). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court. Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 56, 106 P.3d at 382; Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988). We exercise free review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts. Baxter, 149 Idaho at 862, 243 P.3d at 678.

III.ANALYSIS

Sanchez argues that the district court erred in dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, Sanchez alleges that the district court erred because: (1) the time for filing apetition for post-conviction relief should have been tolled as to his untimely claims; (2) the trial court's relinquishment of jurisdiction violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; (3) the trial court's relinquishment of jurisdiction violated his Sixth Amendment rights; (4) his Rule 35 counsel provided ineffective assistance during the Rule 35 proceedings; and (5) the district court wrongly prohibited him from raising a claim of actual innocence and declined to consider evidence to support this claim during the evidentiary hearing.

A. Sanchez Waived His Claim That His Letter to His Attorney Equitably Tolled His Time to File Post-Conviction Claims Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Sanchez argues the district court erred when it found his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were untimely because the time for filing his petition to allege such claims should have been equitably tolled from the date he sent his trial counsel a letter requesting relief from his judgment of conviction. Sanchez alleges Idaho courts are too restrictive in the application of equitable tolling to the one-year statute of limitation for post-conviction and the federal doctrine of equitable tolling, as it applies to federal habeas corpus proceedings, should apply instead. Applying the federal standard, Sanchez argues the letter he sent to his trial counsel equitably tolled the time for filing a timely...