Sanders v. Arseneault

WINSTON SANDERS, Plaintiff, v. BRIAN ARSENEAULT and MATTHEW BORGES, in their individualand official capacities, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 19-cv-12284-IT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

March 16, 2021

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

TALWANI, D.J.

This case involves the alleged mistreatment of Plaintiff Winston Sanders by two employees of the Massachusetts Department of Correction while he was incarcerated at Massachusetts Correctional Institution-Cedar Junction ("MCI-Cedar Junction").¹ Sanders alleges that correction officers Brian Arsenault and Matthew Borges physically assaulted him and then fabricated disciplinary reports against him.

Pending before the court are Arsenault and Borges' Motion to Dismiss [#25] and Sanders' Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint [#35]. For the following reasons, the Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint [#35] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and the Motion to Dismiss [#25] is DENIED as moot.

I. Factual Background

The facts, as alleged in the Complaint [#1], are as follows. At all times relevant to this action, Sanders was incarcerated at MCI-Cedar Junction. Compl. ¶ 6 [#1]. On June 27, 2018, Arsenault and Borges removed Sanders from his housing unit and subjected him to a strip search. Id. at ¶¶ 12-15. The Complaint [#1] alleges that while Sanders was naked, Borges ordered Sanders to put his hands behind his back, but before Sanders had a chance to comply, Arsenault grabbed Sanders and slammed him to the ground. Id. at ¶ 17. According to the Complaint [#1], Arsenault then grabbed Sanders by the throat and stuck his fingers down Sanders' throat, causing Sanders to lose consciousness and fear for his life. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 23. Sanders contends that when he regained consciousness, Borges and unnamed correction officers were on top of him and placing him in restraints. Id. at ¶ 22. Sanders reports that he was then taken to the Health Services Unit for ten days, and, while there, was strip searched every day, required to defecate into a plastic bag, and put through a body scanner. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.

The Complaint [#1] further alleges that, following this incident, Arsenault and Borges issued Sanders multiple disciplinary reports, which falsely claimed that he had possessed narcotics and confessed to such possession. Id. at ¶¶ 26-29. Sanders claims that he was then placed in segregated confinement for seven months before being afforded a disciplinary hearing on January 29, 2019. Id. at ¶ 31. Then, according to the Complaint [#1], on February 4, 2019, Arsenault and other unnamed correction officers again assaulted Sanders, spraying him excessively with a chemical agent and attempting to break his fingers. Id. at ¶ 34.

The Proposed Amended Complaint [#35-2] includes these same allegations but also asserts that, because of the correction officers' conduct, Sanders suffered an array of physical symptoms, including "headaches, dizziness, burning and irritation of the flesh and eyes, backpains, soreness of the throat and fingers, loss of consciousness, impairment of vision." Prop. Am. Compl. ¶ 36 [#35-2].

II. Procedural History

On November 7, 2019, Sanders commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Arsenault and Borges violated his Eight and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Compl. [#1]. He also brought claims under state law for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. On August 7, 2020, Arsenault and Borges filed their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [#25]. On September 18, 2020, the court granted Sanders' Motion for Enlargement of Time [#30], see Elec. Order [#31], and on November 2, 2020, Sanders filed his Opposition [#30] and a Motion Requesting a Court-Appointed Lawyer [#32]. The court denied the request for counsel on November 30, 2020. See Order [#34].

On December 21, 2020, Sanders filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint [#35] seeking to add additional facts regarding his purported injuries, as well as three additional claims: failure to protect, conspiracy, and a civil RICO violation. Prop. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41-43 [#35-1]. Arsenault and Borges have opposed amendment as made in bad faith and on grounds of futility as to the new claims and for the reasons set forth in support of their Motion to Dismiss [#25]. Defs' Opp. [#36].

III. Standard of Review

A. Motion to Dismiss

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court assumes "the truth of all well-pleaded facts" and draws "all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor." Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual material to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motionto dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations . . . [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Id. at 555 (internal citations omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009).

In general, a complaint filed pro se is "liberally construed" and held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). That does not mean that pro se plaintiffs need not plead facts sufficient to state a claim, but it does afford them some leniency when facing a motion to dismiss. See Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980) (citation omitted).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, "a judge can mull over 'documents incorporated by reference in [the complaint], matters of public record, and other matters susceptible to judicial notice.'" Lydon v. Local 103, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 770 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2008)) (alteration in original). If other matters outside the pleadings are presented to the court, the court may exclude such matters or may treat the motion as one for summary judgment, with all parties given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

B. Leave to Amend

A party may amend its pleadings once as a matter of course within twenty-one days of serving it or within twenty-one days after service of a responsive pleading or Rule 12 motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the consent of the other party or leave of the court. Id.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend a pleading shall be freely granted "when justice so requires." Nevertheless, a motion for leave to amend may be denied in cases of (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory motive, (3) undue prejudice, or (4) futility of amendment. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Bad faith is a subjective inquiry that requires proof that the moving party acted with an improper motive, such as an intent to deceive, harass, delay, or disrupt. See Black's Law Dictionary 139 (6th ed. 1990) (bad faith "is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; . . . it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will"). As to futility, when leave to amend is sought before discovery is complete, and neither party has moved for summary judgment, futility is gauged by the same standard as legal sufficiency under Rule 12(b)(6). See Hatch v. Dep't for Children, Youth & Their Families, 274 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2001).

IV. Discussion

Given the substantial similarities between the original and amended complaints, and in the interest of judicial economy, the court addresses the pending motions in the following order. First, the court considers the correction officers' arguments concerning Sanders' alleged bad faith in moving for leave to amend. Finding no bad faith, the court considers whether the causes of action in the Complaint [#1] and the additional causes of action in the Proposed Amended Complaint [#35-2] state claims upon which relief may be granted, beginning with the correction officers' arguments that all the claims are barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, and its Massachusetts counterpart, G. L. c 127, §§ 38E.

A. Bad Faith

Arsenault and Borges argue that Sanders' Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint [#35] should be denied because Sanders is acting in bad faith. Defs' Opp. 3 [#36]. Specifically,they claim that Sanders acknowledges that, aided by "another inmate, who is clearly not an attorney," he rushed his Complaint [#1] and filed it knowing that it was "insufficient." Id. They further argue that Sanders "chose not to" file an amended complaint after the court dismissed his claims against Commissioner Mici and Superintendent DeMoura or within twenty-one days of the Motion to Dismiss [#25] and that this points to bad faith. Id.

Given the liberal policy of favoring amendment to pleadings so as to decide cases based on their merits, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), the party opposing amendment bears the burden of demonstrating bad faith, see, e.g., Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 666 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981). The court therefore draws all reasonable inferences in favor of permitting amendment and imputes benign motives to the moving party where plausible.

The court finds that Arsenault and Borges have not shown that Sanders was acting in bad faith. First, their criticism of Sanders for obtaining assistance from another inmate in preparing Sanders' pro se Complaint [#1] is unwarranted. As the Supreme Court has noted, many inmates...