Sanders v. Lincoln Cnty.

231 F.Supp.3d 290

Matthew SANDERS, Plaintiff,

v.LINCOLN COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 4:15–cv–54

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Winchester Division.

Signed February 8, 2017

Jerry E. Farmer, Law Office Of Jerry E. Farmer, Murfreesboro, TN, L. Gilbert Anglin, Kious, Hall & Anglin, Murfreesboro, TN, for Plaintiff.

Mary Dee Allen, Wimberly, Lawson, Seale, Wright & Daves, Cookeville, TN, for Defendants.

ORDER

HARRY S. MATTICE, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 15) filed by Defendants Lincoln County, Tennessee, Lincoln County Health System, and Lincoln County Medical Center. The Court, having carefully considered the motion, the submissions of the parties, and the applicable law, finds that Defendants' Motion should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This civil action arises from an employment opportunity at the Lincoln County Medical Center—a hospital owned by Lincoln County and operated by Lincoln County Health System—that came about in June 2013. The part-time position was titled "Patient Registration Clerk," and its required skills were listed as follows: (1) proficiency in business-office practices, computers and communications skills; (2) understanding of and ability to use medical terminology and abbreviations; (3) must have good typing and written skills; (4) ability to interact effectively with coworkers, supervisors, management, clients, and others with whom he or she may interact; (5) strong ability to adapt to a rapidly growing and changing work environment; and (6) the ability to bend, reach, lift, carry, push, and pull up to one-third of the work day, and stand and walk between 1–2 hours per day. (Docs. 14 at 2; 15–9 at 12; 17–1 at 80). The individual hired for the job would be working in the offices of Dr. Samad Honarvar, who was an ear, nose, and throat doctor at the hospital at the time. (Doc. 17–2 at 11–14). Dr. Honarvar stressed that he was looking particularly for prior "front office" experience. (Doc. 15–8 at 2–3). On June 7, 2013, hospital administrators posted the position on the Lincoln County Health System internal website. (Doc. 17–1 at 127).

Several individuals applied for the job, including Plaintiff Matthew Sanders, who was already an employee at Lincoln County Medical Center at the time. From 2007 to 2013, Plaintiff was worked as a Mental Health Technician/Driver. The parties dispute the precise nature of Plaintiff's duties in his former job. Plaintiff asserts that he carried out various administrative tasks in addition to transporting patients, including answering the phone, providing orientation for new patients, writing in charts, filing documents, collecting and distributing mail, delivering lab work and documents, scheduling appointments, and other responsibilities relevant to the "front office" experience Dr. Honarvar desired. (Docs. 16 at 2; 17–1 at 60). Defendants appear to either deny that Plaintiff actually performed these tasks or contest that such duties constitute "front office" medical experience. Plaintiff received generally positive reviews and evaluations from supervisors in his prior position. (Doc. 17–1 at 49, 52, 128–73).

Around the same time that the patient registration clerk position became available, Plaintiff learned that his then-current job was soon to be eliminated by the hospital due to a reduction in force. For this reason, Plaintiff applied for the clerk position on June 14, 2013. (Doc. 17–1 at 58). He was 52 years old at the time. (Doc. 16 at 1).

An individual named John Thomas Miles also applied for the job. (Doc. 17–1 at 66, 92). At some point in early June, Lincoln County Health System Practice Manager Robin Matthews and Dr. Honarvar interviewed Miles. (Docs. 15–7 at 2–3; 15–8 at 2). Defendants insist that Miles was exceedingly qualified for the position. First, according to Defendants, Miles came "highly recommended" from another, unnamed employee at the Lincoln County Medical Center. (Doc. 15–7 at 2). Defendants further explain that Miles was willing to work part time and had front office experience in a veterinarian's office, specifically in scheduling appointments, answering the phone, and contacting clients. (Id. at 3; 15–8 at 2). For these reasons, both Honarvar and Matthews felt that Miles was a good fit for the position and extended him an offer of employment.¹ (Docs. 15–7 at3; 15–8 at 2). At the time he was awarded the position, Miles was 29 years old. (Doc. 16–1 at 3).

Although Miles was offered the job, Defendants state that his employment was contingent upon "successful completion of the hiring process and approval from Human Resources." (Doc. 15–7 at 3). During this interim period,² and for reasons that are not entirely clear, Matthews also decided to interview Plaintiff.³

Plaintiff's interview with Matthews and Honarvar took place in mid-June 2013, and he alleges that the first words spoken by Honarvar upon their meeting were, "You are an older man," with emphasis on the word "older." (Docs. 11 at 3; 16 at 3; 16–3 at 2). Plaintiff further alleges that Honarvar expressed concern that due to his age, Plaintiff would leave the position for a better job at the first opportunity. (Docs. 16 at 4; 16–3 at 2–3). According to both parties, the interview was extremely brief. (Docs. 16–3 at 2–3; 17–2 at 15). Dr. Honarvar recommended against hiring Plaintiff. (Id. ). According to Defendants, both Honarvar and Matthews believed that Miles was better qualified for the position, and it was their understanding that Plaintiff wanted full-time employment as opposed to part-time. (Doc. 14 at 12). Neither Dr. Honarvar nor Ms. Matthews, however, reviewed Plaintiff's personnel file before making the decision not to hire him. (Doc. 17–1 at 37).

Shortly thereafter, Ms. Matthews approached Plaintiff and his wife, who also worked at the hospital, to announce that Plaintiff had not been selected. According to Plaintiff, Mathews explained that she "couldn't get [Honarvar] off the age thing." (Docs. 11 at 3; 16 at 4, 9; 16–4 at 2). Plaintiff also states that Matthews did not outline any of the supposed reasons or justifications now offered by Defendants.

Miles only worked a few days before resigning his position. (Doc. 17–2 at 20). Thereafter, Defendants offered the job to another applicant, Tina Allen, who was 38 years old, but she declined the offer. (Docs. 16–1 at 3; 17–1 at 100). Additional facts surrounding the issues in this case are set forth, as necessary, in the Court's analysis below.

In July 2013, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Council ("EEOC"). (Doc. 11 at 2.) On or about December 6, 2015, Plaintiff received notification from the EEOC of his right to sue. (Id. ). Plaintiff commenced this civil action on September 2, 2015. (Doc. 1).⁴ He filed his Amended Complaint on February 2, 2016, in which he alleges claims under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq ., and the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA"), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4–21–101, et seq . (Doc. 11). Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 15) and Memorandum in Support (Doc. 14) on November 17, 2016. On December 6, 2016, Plaintiff file a Response (Doc. 16). Defendants submitted their Reply (Doc. 20) on December 13, 2016. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, the Court finds that this matter has been fully briefed and is ready for disposition.

II. STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs the Court to grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting the presence or absence of genuine issues of material facts must support its position either by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record," including depositions, documents, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, or other materials, or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc. , 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party may discharge this burden either by producing evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or simply "by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Where the movant has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party cannot "rest upon its ... pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Moldowan v. City of Warren , 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ). The nonmoving party must present sufficient probative evidence supporting its claim that disputes over material facts remain and must be resolved by a judge or jury at trial. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co ., 391 U.S. 253, 88 S.Ct. 1575, ...