Sanders v. People

549 P.3d 947

2024 CO 33

Khalil Jamandre SANDERS, Petitioner,

v.The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 22SC413

Supreme Court of Colorado.

May 28, 2024

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 18CA525

Attorneys for Petitioner: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, Tracy C. Renner, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Paul Koehler, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 In this case, we granted certiorari to consider whether a division of the court of appeals erred by determining that a judge who had experienced criminal conduct similar to that at issue in the case was not disqualified under the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions; section 16-6-201(1)(d), C.R.S. (2023), and Crim. P. 21(b); or the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct ("C.J.C.") 2.11; and if so, whether reversal is required.

¶2 Although we conclude that the division applied too strict a standard when it required a showing of actual bias in order to support a disqualification motion, we nonetheless agree that disqualification was not warranted on the facts of this case.

¶3 Accordingly, we affirm the division’s judgment, albeit on somewhat different grounds.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶4 Khalil Jamandre Sanders shot and injured Jamie Vasquez during a road-rage incident.

¶5 Sanders was driving toward a Lowe’s home improvement store in Colorado Springs. He was following his co-worker, David Carter, who was headed to Lowe’s to pick up his girlfriend, after which the three were planning to have lunch.

¶6 At some point along the way, Vasquez cut off Sanders. Sanders repeatedly tried to bypass Vasquez’s car to move back behind Carter, but Vasquez kept bypassing him, preventing him from doing so.

¶7 Frustrated by Vasquez’s behavior, Sanders, who was carrying a firearm, shot at her car and continued driving toward Lowe's. The bullet went through the trunk and the back and driver’s seats of Vasquez’s ear before hitting her, causing a laceration to her spleen and fracturing a rib. Vasquez ultimately required surgery for her injuries.

¶8 Vasquez pulled over and called 911 to report the shooting, and she provided law enforcement with a license plate number that ultimately turned out to be close to the license plate number of the car that Sanders was driving. With this information and video surveillance gathered from nearby businesses, the police identified a car that matched the description of the car involved in the shooting. This car was registered to Sanders, and the police were able to obtain an address in Colorado Springs where Sanders resided.

¶9 The police subsequently arrested Sanders. At the time of his arrest, he was carrying a .40 caliber pistol, which turned out to be consistent with the .40 caliber bullet that was recovered from Vasquez’s body.

¶10 Sanders was ultimately charged with first degree assault, illegal discharge of a firearm, menacing, possession of a weapon by a previous offender, and two crime of violence counts.

¶11 Approximately nine months later, the case proceeded to trial. During voir dire of the jury venire, the prosecution asked prospective jurors about any prior experience that they may have had with road-rage incidents. At the conclusion of this questioning, the trial court advised the parties of an incident in which the court personally had been involved:

Okay. Counsel I don’t think that this is anything that causes the Court to recuse. But I think I would be remiss professionally if I didn’t put it on the record and again I don’t view under the rules it would be grounds for recusal, but if I didn’t put it on the record that would be something that wouldn’t be palatable for the Court. A few years ago I was driving down Nevada and I was shot at. Four bullets, one hit the car. There was not another person in the car, but I was going down Nevada there were people in the middle of the road about to go into my lane. It looked like they were fighting, and I beeped my horn to get out of the way and I heard pop, pop, pop, ping, and it hit the spoiler on my car. I had to duck. And it was the day before an interview with the Colorado Court of [A]ppeals. So I’m putting that on the record, but I feel like you need to understand there was a case filed. There was a case report, I guess, a police report, but there was never any filing of any charges. There was never any person that was identified as the shooter that did the crime. So I think that when it’s something of that nature I think it’s—I would be remiss if I didn’t put it on the record.

¶12 After the court so advised the parties, it asked if counsel had anything that they wanted to put on the record in relation to the court’s comments. Both counsel responded that they had nothing to add at that time, and the court broke for lunch shortly thereafter.

¶13 When the parties returned from lunch, defense counsel indicated that she wanted to put something on the record, and the court gave her the opportunity to do so. Counsel then requested that the judge recuse and disqualify herself from presiding over this case. In support of this request, counsel cited section 16-6-201(1)(d), as well as Sanders’s rights to due process and a fair trial under both the United States and Colorado Constitutions. Counsel explained, "The district attorney is going to present evidence that the facts of this case are that Mr. Sanders was driving, he was involved in a road-rage incident, and he shot at Jamie Vaszquez [sic], who is the victim." Counsel then argued that she did not believe that the judge could be "unprejudiced with respect to the facts of this case," based on her personal experience of a few years before. Counsel thus moved for a mistrial and requested leave to file a motion, supported by affidavits, to appoint a new trial judge in this case. The prosecution opposed Sanders’s mistrial motion because no jury had yet been impaneled, but it otherwise deferred to the court’s discretion as to Sanders’s recusal motion.

¶14 The court then denied Sanders’s motions, finding that (1) she had no interest in the matter and was not prejudiced in any way; (2) she did not know Sanders, and none of the listed witnesses had any relationship to the prior incident in which she was involved; and (3) her incident had occurred about three years earlier. The court further noted that in the time since that incident had occurred, "[t]he Court has presided over numerous cases involving weapons, including guns and including in cars," and the court perceived a distinction between its experience and the present case. In particular, the court observed that the incident in which she was involved did not involve two cars, but rather she was driving with others on the road. Moreover, the court did not view this incident as a "road rage experience, synonymous with the allegations of this complaint and information [in the present case]."

¶15 The trial proceeded, and before the jury returned its verdict, Sanders pleaded guilty to the charge of possession of a weapon by a previous offender. The jury deliberated on the remaining counts and ultimately found Sanders guilty as charged. The court subsequently sentenced Sanders to a controlling term of thirty-two years in the Department of Corrections.

¶16 Sanders appealed, arguing, as pertinent here, that a judge in a criminal case is disqualified from hearing a case when she has experienced criminal conduct that was similar to that at issue in the case before her. People v. Sanders, 2022 COA 47, ¶ 7, 515 P.3d 167, 171. Specifically, Sanders asserted that disqualification was mandated under due process principles and also under section 16-6-201(1)(d) and Crim. P. 21(b), which require judicial disqualification if the court is in any way interested or prejudiced with respect to the case, the parties, or counsel. Id. at ¶¶ 10–12, 515 P.3d at 172. He further contended that C.J.C. 2.11(A), which states that judges must disqualify themselves whenever their impartiality may reasonably be questioned, required recusal in the present circumstances. Id. at ¶ 13, 515 P.3d at 172.

¶17 In a published opinion, the division rejected Sanders’s contentions and affirmed his convictions. Id. at ¶¶ 11–19, 515 P.3d at 172–73.

¶18 The division first explained that because the Due Process Clause, section 16-6-201(1)(d), and Crim. P. 21(b) protect litigants only from a judge with actual bias and Sanders had not challenged the finding that the judge held no actual bias against him, disqualification was not required under those provisions. Id. at ¶¶ 11–12, 515 P.3d at 172.

¶19 As to C.J.C. 2.11(A), the division recognized that this ethical rule provides a broader basis for recusal, but it nonetheless rejected Sanders’s motion for disqualification. Id. at ¶¶ 12–19, 515 P.3d at 172–73. On this point, the division noted that although C.J.C. 2.11(A) requires judges to disqualify themselves in any proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, the record here would not lead a reasonable observer to question the judge’s impartiality. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 19, 515 P.3d at 172–73. In support of this conclusion, the division observed that despite certain similarities between the two incidents, disqualification was not required because (1) the judge was not actually shot or injured; (2) there was no indication that the judge was the target of the shooter or that the shots were fired due to road rage; and (3) the incident had occurred three years earlier, which the division deemed remote. Id. at ¶ 19, 515 P.3d at 173.

¶20 In so concluding, the division rejected the People’s contention that our decision in ...