Sanders v. Sanders

PILAR SANDERS, Appellant v. DEION SANDERS, Appellee

No. 05-20-00395-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

November 19, 2021

On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court Collin County Texas Trial Court Cause No. 429-04718-2014

Before Justices Schenck, Smith, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Schenck

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAVID J. SCHENCK, JUSTICE

Pilar Sanders appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of appellee Deion Sanders on his claim for defamation. In four issues, Ms. Sanders^[1] challenges whether the trial court erred in concluding Mr. Sanders had conclusively established the liability and damages elements of his claim, as well as the trial court's rulings sustaining Mr. Sanders's objections to Ms. Sanders's summary judgment evidence. We reverse and remand this case for further proceedings. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex.R.App.P. 47.4.

Background ^[2]

Mr Sanders is a former player in the National Football League and a member of the Pro Football Hall of Fame. He was married to Ms. Sanders. After concluding his NFL career, Mr. Sanders became a commentator on the NFL Network, and he and his children were the subject of a television program called "Deion's Family Playbook" on the Oprah Winfrey Network (OWN). He also endorsed products.

The Sanderses divorced in 2013. Mr. Sanders later sued his ex-wife for defamation per se, alleging that, after the divorce, she made statements on social media, in online videos, and on a national television news program, indicating that Mr. Sanders had physically abused her and their children, had attempted to murder her, and had kidnapped at least one of their children. Mr. Sanders alleged these statements damaged his reputation and caused him economic damages. In addition to the defamation lawsuit, he filed motions to enforce and to modify the terms of the divorce decree. The trial court consolidated the family-law and defamation cases. He moved for summary judgment as to liability on his defamation claim. At the beginning of the consolidated trial, the court announced it was carrying the motion for summary judgment during the trial. At trial, the parties presented evidence regarding the motions pending in the family-law case and the damages amounts claimed in the defamation case. On the last day of the trial, the court granted the motion for summary judgment as to Ms Sanders's liability on the defamation claim. The trial court also announced damages awards related to the defamation claim.

Ms. Sanders appealed the summary judgment to this Court in Sanders v. Sanders, No. 05-16-00248-CV, 2017 WL 3712167, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 29, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). Although she brought five issues challenging that judgment, a panel of this Court addressed only her second issue, namely that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because Mr. Sanders failed to establish conclusively Ms. Sanders's negligence or malice regarding the truthfulness of her statements. We reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the cause to the trial court.

Two years after our prior panel opinion, Mr. Sanders filed his second motion for summary judgment. Ms. Sanders responded, and both parties filed objections to the other's summary judgment evidence. After considering the motion on written submission, the trial court granted the motion and ordered that he recover damages, including $200, 000 for injury to his character and reputation and special and consequential damages in the amount of $2, 774, 500, itemized as follows: (1) cancellation of reality television program with OWN resulting in damages in the amount of $500, 000, (2) termination of two endorsement contracts with Van Heusen and GMC resulting in damages in the amount of $2, 000, 000, (3) reduction in the amount to be paid by the NFL Network resulting in damages in the amount of $200, 000, and (4) investigation defense costs resulting in damages in the amount of $74, 500.

Discussion

The standard for reviewing a traditional summary judgment is well established. See Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). The movant has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c). In deciding whether a disputed material fact issue exists precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts resolved in its favor. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005). We review a summary judgment de novo to determine whether a party's right to prevail is established as a matter of law. Dickey v. Club Corp., 12 S.W.3d 172, 175 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet denied).

To prevail on a defamation claim, the plaintiff must prove the defendant (1) published a statement, (2) that was defamatory concerning the plaintiff, (3) while acting with either actual malice, if the plaintiff is a public official or a public figure, or negligence if the plaintiff is a private individual, regarding the truth of the statement, and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages or the statements were defamatory per se. Sanders, 2017 WL 3712167, at *2.

I. Liability

Mr. Sanders's summary judgment motion and Ms. Sanders's appeal raise two questions necessary to address: liability and damages.^[3] In a previous stage of this litigation, we answered there was not a basis for summary judgment on liability because Mr. Sanders failed to carry his burden to establish that element. See Sanders, 2017 WL 3712167, at *5. On remand, Mr. Sanders filed a second motion for summary judgment, adding evidence he had not included in the first motion. This case could thus present an issue for law-of-the-case doctrine purposes of whether and how many times a party may move for summary judgment after remand for failure to meet his or her burden in the trial court. Generally, under the law-of-the-case doctrine, all determinations necessary to the disposition of the earlier appeal are foreclosed from re-examination on a subsequent appeal. Carruth v. Henderson, 606 S.W.3d 917, 923 n.4 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2020, no pet.). In this case, we prefer to avoid answering this question and the related questions of whether the jury's verdict on custody or the trial court's interlocutory determination in the protective order^[4] resolved as a matter of law the issues now said to be before us.^[5] Instead, we will now pretermit these questions and address whether Mr. Sanders conclusively established general and special damages.

II. Damages

In her fourth issue, Ms. Sanders urges the trial court erred in awarding general and special damages, claiming there was no evidence to support the amounts of damages awarded. The trial court awarded actual damages to Mr. Sanders's character and reputation caused by Ms. Sanders's defamation per se in the amount of $200, 000 and special and consequential damages caused by Ms. Sanders's defamation per se in the amount of $2, 774, 500, itemized as follows: (1) cancellation of reality television program with OWN resulting in damages in the amount of $500, 000, (2) termination of two endorsement contracts with Van Heusen and GMC resulting in damages in the amount of $2, 000, 000, (3) reduction in the amount to be paid by the NFL Network resulting in damages in the amount of $200, 000, and (4) investigation defense costs resulting in damages in the amount of $74, 500.

Damages, however, are not always an essential element of defamation, but if the statement is defamatory per se, as here, ^[6] then nominal damages may be awarded without proof of actual injury because mental anguish and loss of reputation are presumed. Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878, 886 (Tex. 2017). Indeed, a plaintiff may vindicate his or her name and obtain nominal damages without evidence of actual injury. See id. But because Mr. Sanders sought and obtained actual damages for loss of reputation (general damages) and for economic loss (special damages), he must present evidence of the existence and amount of these damages. See id.

As support for his damages to his reputation, Mr. Sanders provided excerpts of his own testimony from a bench trial conducted in 2015 on the consolidated family-law and defamation cases. When asked how much he would quantify his damages for his reputation and character, Mr. Sanders answered at least a million dollars, but when asked for more specific facts to quantify his damages, he pointed to fees he paid to attorneys to defend him in the NFL's investigation, cancelled contracts, and that generally being called "an abuser, a murderer, an attempted murderer, kidnapper, and all that [is] damaging when you're a public figure." When questioned who had told him his reputation was damaged, Mr. Sanders averred no one had approached him, saying he did not believe anyone would have the audacity to tell him his reputation or character had been damaged. He further denied his valuation was subjective but his only support for his valuation was to refer to contracts he testified had been cancelled after Ms. Sanders published her accusations. But again, he did not testify that anyone told him the contracts were cancelled because of her statements' effect on his reputation.

Mr Sanders also testified that at least some of the postings were reported in the media, but showing that the community was aware of and discussed the defamatory statements is not enough to establish lost reputation damages; instead, there must be evidence people believed the statements and the plaintiff's reputation was actually affected. See Brady, 515 S.W.3d at 887...