Sanders v. Vincent

BRETT MICHAEL SANDERS, Plaintiff, v. LIEUTENANT MIKE VINCENT, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-2782-D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

September 21, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Brett Michael Sanders ("Sanders")—who was attempting to videotape members of the Addison Police Department—brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Lieutenant Mike Vincent ("Lt. Vincent"), Officer T. Bagley ("Officer Bagley"), Officer B. Jones ("Officer Jones"), and the Town of Addison, alleging that they violated his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants move to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), contending that Sanders has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted and that the defendants sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity. Alternatively, defendants move the court to require that Sanders file a Rule 7(a) reply. For the following reasons, the court grants defendants' motion to dismiss Sanders' claims against the Town of Addison; grants in part and denies in part defendants' motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity; denies (in part as moot, and in part on the merits) defendants' motion to dismiss Sanders' claims against the individual defendants for failure to state a claim; and denies defendants' alternative motion to require Sanders to file a Rule 7(a) reply.

I

On June 25, 2015, at approximately 12:30 p.m., Sanders set up his personal video camera on a tripod on the sidewalk across the street from the Addison Police Department in order to videotape police cars as they left the parking lot.¹ Sanders alleges that photography and videography were hobbies, and that he had decided to audit police use of seat belts with his video camera. According to Sanders' first amended complaint ("amended complaint"), he was standing in plain view wearing shorts, a T-shirt, and a cap, and he had camera equipment in a backpack on his back. Sanders also had an unloaded pre-1899 black powder pistol in a holster in plain view on the outside of his clothing, and his T-shirt was tucked inside the holster so that the pistol could be seen. Sanders alleges that he was exercising his clearly established First Amendment rights to observe and videotape the routine activities of the Addison Police Department.

While Sanders was videotaping the Addison Police Department, Officer Bagley approached him and asked him for identification, but Sanders refused. Officer Bagley then explained to Sanders that he was under detention; that his videotaping the police departmentwas making the officers "nervous" because they did not know if Sanders was plotting "to do something to the police department or something like that," Am. Compl. ¶¶ 52, 54; and that videotaping the police department was "suspicious activity," id. ¶ 65, and "violated a policy," id. ¶ 67. Sanders still refused to provide identification to Officer Bagley. Instead, he reached for his cell phone so that he could connect his camera to the Internet to broadcast Officer Bagley's actions. Officer Bagley asked Sanders not to use his cell phone, stating, "I don't know that you're calling somebody over here to do something to me." Id. ¶ 85. Sanders responded that he had no "ill will," and he continued to attempt to connect his camera to the Internet with his cell phone. Id. ¶ 88.

According to the amended complaint, instead of ordering Sanders not to use his cell phone or telling Sanders that, if he used his cell phone, Officer Bagley would be forced to use violence against him, Officer Bagley suddenly performed a leg sweep and took Sanders to the ground, knocking Sanders' cell phone out of his grasp and injuring Sanders' leg.² Officer Bagley then got on top of Sanders, handcuffed him, and called for backup. After Lt. Vincent and Officer Jones arrived at the scene, Sanders was kept in handcuffs for approximately 20 minutes.

Sanders brings this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Bagley, Lt. Vincent, and Officer Jones, all in their individual capacities, and the Town of Addison violated his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants move to dismissthe amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), contending that Sanders has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted and that the individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Alternatively, they request that Sanders be required to file a Rule 7(a) reply. Sanders opposes defendants' motion but requests leave to conduct discovery and to amend his amended complaint if the court decides that it might grant all or part of defendants' motion.

II

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court evaluates the pleadings by "accept[ing] 'all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). To survive defendants' motion, Sanders' amended complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ("Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]"). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'shown'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal,556 U.S. at 679 (brackets omitted) (quoting Rule 8(a)(2)). Furthermore, under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Although "the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,'" it demands more than "'labels and conclusions.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). And "'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U. S. at 555).

III

The court begins by considering Sanders' § 1983 claim against the Town of Addison.

A

A municipality is a "person" subject to suit under § 1983 under certain circumstances. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Although a municipality cannot be held liable simply on a theory of respondeat superior, id. at 691, it can be held liable if a deprivation of a constitutional right was inflicted pursuant to an official policy or custom, Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001). Municipal liability requires proof of three elements: "(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose 'moving force' is that policy or custom." Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)).

The first element requires that Sanders adequately plead an official policy or custom. "[A] policy can be shown through evidence of an actual policy, regulation, or decision thatis officially adopted and promulgated by lawmakers or others with policymaking authority." Id. at 542 (citing Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 2003)). Although a "single decision by a policy maker may, under certain circumstances, constitute a policy for which a municipality may be liable[,] . . . this 'single incident exception' is extremely narrow and gives rise to municipal liability only if the municipal actor is a final policymaker." Id. (citations, brackets, and some internal quotation marks omitted). A custom is "a persistent, widespread practice of City officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy." Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579 (quoting Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per curiam)).

To satisfy the second element, Sanders must adequately plead the identity of a policymaker with "final policymaking authority." Rivera v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)). "A 'policymaker' must be one who takes the place of the governing body in a designated area of city administration." Webster, 735 F.2d at 841 (citing Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 769 (5th Cir. 1984)). "City policymakers not only govern conduct; they decide the goals for a particular city function and devise the means of achieving those goals. . . . [T]hey are not supervised except as to the totality of their performance." Bennett, 728 F.2d at 769. "[The court's] analysis must also take into account the difference between final decisionmaking authority and final policymaking authority, a distinction that this circuitrecognized as fundamental[.] . . . [D]iscretion to exercise a particular function does not necessarily entail final policymaking authority over that function." Bolton v. City of Dallas, 541 F.3d 545, 548-49 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 1241, 1247 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining distinction between final policymaking authority and mere decisionmaking).

The third element requires that Sanders adequately plead that the municipal policy or custom was the "moving force" of the constitutional deprivation, which requires a ...