Sanderson v. Louisville Metro Gov't

1

ANTONIO D. SANDERSON PLAINTIFF v. LOUISVILLE METRO GOVERNMENT, et al. DEFENDANTS

Civil Action No. 3:23-CV-00138-JHM

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division

August 23, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOSEPH H. MCKINLEY JR., SENIOR JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiff Antonio D. Sanderson filed this pro se 42 U.S.C § 1983 prisoner civil-rights action. This matter is before the Court on initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the Court will allow some of Plaintiff's claims to proceed and dismiss other claims.

I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS

On March 22, 2023, Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, initiated this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil-rights action. [DN 1]. Plaintiff sues Louisville Metro Government (“LMG”), Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (“LMDC”), and WellPath. Plaintiff contends that one or more of these Defendants violated his freedom of religion under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”); acted with deliberate indifference to his health, safety, and serious medical needs by withholding medications/medical care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments because of the conditions of confinement at the LMDC, including overcrowding, lack of recreation, illegal searches, expired food, lack of access to phones, and constant light and no pillows in the dorms; and denied him access to the courts in violation of his Fifth, Sixth Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff also alleges numerous state law claims. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief “preventing Defendant from further violation of Plaintiff's constitutional and other rights.”

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights but merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere. Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).

A. LMDC

LMDC is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 because municipal departments, such as detention centers, are not suable under § 1983. Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a police department may not be sued under § 1983); see also Marbry v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 99-6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (holding that a jail is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983). In this situation, LMG is the proper defendant. Smallwood v. Jefferson Cnty. Gov't, 743 F.Supp. 502, 503 (W.D. Ky. 1990). The Court therefore will construe the claims against LMDC as a claim brought against LMG. See Matthews v. LMPD, No. 3:19-CV-P581-RGJ, 2019 WL 5549209, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 25, 2019).

B. LMG and WellPath

“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality such as Louisville Metro Government or private corporation such as WellPath^[1], the Court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether Plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality as an entity is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation' in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)); see also Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7 Fed.Appx. 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2001) (“CMS's [Correctional Medical Systems, Inc.,] liability must also be premised on some policy that caused a deprivation of [plaintiff's] Eighth Amendment rights.”).

1. First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion and RLUIPA

The Court construes the complaint as alleging claims for violation of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against both LMG and WellPath.

“The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' U.S. Const. amend. I.” Gill v. Coyne, No. 3:18-CV-00631-CHL, 2021 WL 4811300, at *10 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 14, 2021). “Prisoners retain the First Amendment right to the free exercise of their religion.” Hayes v. Tenn., 424 Fed.Appx. 546, 549 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 929 (6th Cir. 1985)). A violation of the First Amendment requires the imposition of a “substantial burden” on a plaintiff's exercise of his religion. Welch v. Spaulding, 627 Fed.Appx. 479, 485 (6th Cir. 2015). To establish that this right has been violated, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) the belief or practice he seeks to protect is religious within his own “scheme of things,” (2) that his belief is sincerely held, and (3) that the defendant's behavior infringes upon this practice or belief. Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) (same); Bakr v. Johnson, No. 95-2348, 1997 WL 428903, at *2 (6th Cir. July 30, 1997) (noting that “sincerely held religious beliefs require accommodation by prison officials”).

Similarly, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) prohibits the governmental imposition of a “substantial burden on the religious exercise” of an inmate unless the government establishes that the burden furthers a “compelling governmental interest” through the “least restrictive means[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); Fox v. Washington, 949 F.3d 270, 277 (6th Cir. 2020) (“RLUIPA provides greater protections than the First Amendment.”). Under RLUIPA, a plaintiff must show “that the government substantially burdened [his] religious exercise.” Cavin v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 927 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 2019). An action substantially burdens religion if “that action forced an individual to choose between ‘following the precepts of [his] religion and forfeiting benefits' or when the action in question placed ‘substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.'” Barhite v. Caruso, 377 F. App'x. 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Living Water Church of God v. Charter Tp. of Meridian, 258 Fed.Appx. 729, 734 (6th Cir. 2007)).

Plaintiff practices the Muslim religion and observes Ramadan which requires Plaintiff to fast from sunrise to sunset. First Plaintiff alleges that during Ramadan 2022, April 1 to April 30, his religious beliefs and practices were violated by LMG's knowing failure to accommodate...