Sanderson v. Myrdal

1

2024 ND 202

Mitchell S. Sanderson, Plaintiff and Appellant v. Janne Myrdal, Defendant and Appellee and The State of North Dakota, Intervenor and Appellee

No. 20240091

Supreme Court of North Dakota

November 8, 2024

Appeal from the District Court of Walsh County, Northeast Judicial District, the Honorable Kari M. Agotness, Judge.

Mitchell S. Sanderson, self-represented, Park River, N.D plaintiff and appellant.

Howard D. Swanson, Grand Forks, N.D., for defendant and appellee.

Courtney R. Titus, Assistant Attorney General, Bismarck N.D., for intervenor and appellee.

OPINION

TUFTE, JUSTICE.

[¶1] Mitchell Sanderson appeals from a district court judgment dismissing his complaint with prejudice and from an order denying relief from judgment. On appeal, Sanderson argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Myrdal and dismissing his complaint with prejudice. Sanderson also argues that the district court abused its discretion in (1) denying his various motions; (2) denying his requests for hearings on those motions; and (3) awarding Myrdal attorney's fees. We affirm.

I

[¶2] On May 1, 2023, Sanderson brought an action against North Dakota state senator Janne Myrdal under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Myrdal had violated his First Amendment rights when she blocked him on Facebook. Sanderson argued that Myrdal's Facebook page constituted a public forum and that he had a First Amendment right to see her posts and comment on them. Sanderson sought compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief enabling him to see, share, and comment on Myrdal's Facebook posts.

[¶3] On June 12, Myrdal filed and served her answer, denying that Sanderson was entitled to relief and alleging that her Facebook page was not an official State website. Four days later, Sanderson filed a motion for default judgment pursuant to N.D.R.Civ.P. 55(a), asserting that Myrdal had failed to answer within twenty-one days of being served with the summons and complaint. Myrdal responded that Sanderson was not entitled to default judgment because he had been served with her answer before he moved for default judgment. In an affidavit filed with the motion, Myrdal stated that Sanderson served her with the summons and complaint by mail on May 2, 2023, but she was out of state and did not become aware of the suit until late May when she received notification and assignment of its case number. Immediately thereafter, she contacted the county clerk and her attorney. The district court denied Sanderson's motion for default judgment.

The State of North Dakota moved to intervene and the district court granted intervention as a matter of right.

[¶4] Sanderson filed numerous motions seeking rulings on his allegations relating to evidence tampering and spoilage, forgery, First and Fourteenth Amendment violations, qualified immunity, obstruction, and public forum and color of law. The district court denied each of Sanderson's requests for a hearing because he failed to either timely request or schedule a hearing. The district court found three of Sanderson's motions frivolous (evidence tampering and spoilage, obstruction, and forgery) and awarded Myrdal attorney's fees for having to respond to them. The district court construed the other three motions as motions for summary judgment and denied them in its order granting summary judgment in favor of Myrdal.

[¶5] The district court concluded that Sanderson had raised no genuine issue of material fact and that the § 1983 claim failed as a matter of law. Because its order granting summary judgment in favor of Myrdal resolved all pending claims, the district court dismissed the State's motion for declaratory judgment as moot. The district court then dismissed Sanderson's complaint with prejudice.

II

[¶6] We first address Sanderson's challenge to the judgment on jurisdictional grounds. Sanderson argues the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Myrdal due to Sanderson's insufficient service of process on Myrdal. The district court rejected this argument in its denial of Sanderson's motion for relief from judgment. The district court's ruling regarding personal jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Wilkens v. Westby, 2019 ND 186, ¶ 4, 931 N.W.2d 229.

[¶7] A district court "may acquire personal jurisdiction over any person through service of process as provided in this rule or by statute, or by voluntary general appearance in an action by any person either personally or through an attorney or any other authorized person." N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(b)(4). Sanderson alleged in his complaint that the district court had personal jurisdiction over him and Myrdal; Myrdal admitted to personal jurisdiction over both parties in her answer. Although initial service of process on Myrdal was improper, under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(1), any "lack-of-personal-jurisdiction defense is waived if it is neither made by motion nor included in a responsive pleading." Intercept Corp. v. Calima Financial, LLC, 2007 ND 180, ¶ 10, 741 N.W.2d 209.

[¶8] A plaintiff who commences an action alleging a district court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant cannot later challenge that court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Here, Sanderson chose to initiate his action against Myrdal in district court. The court acquired personal jurisdiction over Myrdal under N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(b)(4) when she answered the complaint, admitting the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint about both parties and submitting herself to the court's jurisdiction. United Accounts, Inc. v. Lantz, 145 N.W.2d 488, 491 (N.D. 1966) ("The service of an answer . . . constitutes a general appearance when such answer . . . does not object to the jurisdiction of the court."). Sanderson cites decisions holding a defendant may defeat personal jurisdiction for lack of personal service on the defendant. We are aware of no authority for the proposition that a plaintiff may challenge the court's jurisdiction over a defendant who admits personal jurisdiction on the basis of defects in the plaintiff's service of process on the defendant. Sanderson's jurisdiction argument is without merit.

III

[¶9] Sanderson argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for default judgment.

[¶10] We review a district court's denial of a motion for default judgment for an abuse of discretion. Suburban Sales and Service, Inc. v. District Court of Ramsey Cnty., 290 N.W.2d 247, 251 (N.D. 1980). The court abuses its discretion when it "acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or when it misinterprets or misapplies the law." State v. $33,000 U.S. Currency, 2008 ND 96, ¶ 6, 748 N.W.2d 420.

[¶11] On May 2, 2023, Sanderson attempted service of the summons and complaint on Myrdal by mail. Myrdal was out of state at that time, and someone else at her residence signed Myrdal's name on the return receipt. Myrdal first became aware of the suit in late May when she received notification and assignment of its case number. Immediately thereafter, she contacted the county clerk and her attorney. On June 12, 2023, Myrdal filed and served her answer. Four days later, Sanderson filed a motion for default judgment pursuant to N.D.R.Civ.P. 55(a), asserting that Myrdal had failed to answer within twenty-one days of being served with the summons and complaint.

[¶12] Under Rule 55(a), a district court has discretion to direct entry of default judgment. Here, the district court noted that Sanderson moved for entry of default judgment after receiving Myrdal's answer, and that under our precedent, a plaintiff is generally not entitled to default judgment when the plaintiff moves for default judgment after being served the defendant's answer. See United Accounts, Inc., 145 N.W.2d at 491 ("The service of an answer to a complaint invokes the authority of the court to determine a controversy on its merits . . . ."). The district court also noted "North Dakota's strong preference that cases be decided on their merits." See Filler v. Bragg, 1997 ND 24, ¶ 14, 559 N.W.2d 225. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sanderson's motion for default judgment.

IV

[¶13] Sanderson argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Myrdal.

[¶14] Summary judgment allows for the prompt resolution of a controversy on the merits without trial when there are no disputed issues of material fact or disputed inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts. Lupo v. McNeeley, 2019 ND 104, ¶ 4, 925 N.W.2d 457.

The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding whether the district court appropriately granted summary judgment, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and the opposing party will be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the record. On appeal, we decide whether the information available to the district court precluded the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitled the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Whether a district court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law this Court reviews de novo on the entire record.

Id.

A

[¶15] The district court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact. In support of her motion for summary judgment, Myrdal filed an unsworn declaration stating facts that are consistent with Sanderson's statement of facts in his affidavit in support of his complaint. Sanderson never claimed existence of a genuine issue of fact, neither in his appellate brief...