Sandersv. N.M. Corr. Dep't

1

MAUREEN A. SANDERS, as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF KATHERINE PAQUIN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. NEW MEXICO CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT, GREGG MARCANTEL, and CATHELEEN CATANACH, Defendants-Petitioners.

No. S-1-SC-39690

Supreme Court of New Mexico

October 10, 2024

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI

Valerie A. Huling, District Judge Butt, Thornton & Baehr P.C. Agnes Fuentevilla Padilla Rheba Rutkowski Sarah L. Shore Albuquerque, NM for Petitioners Ives & Flores, P.A. Laura Schauer Ives Adam C. Flores Alyssa Quijano Henry A. Jones Martha E. Mulvany Albuquerque, NM for Respondent

OPINION

C. SHANNON BACON, JUSTICE

I. INTRODUCTION

{¶1} The central questions before us concern the scope of the "building waiver," NMSA 1978, § 41-4-6(A) (1977),^[1] and whether it applies to waive the immunity of New Mexico Corrections Department (the Department or NMCD) from suit for failure to exercise care to prevent the off-premises criminal conduct of a third party. Defendants-Petitioners NMCD^[2] erroneously released inmate Christopher Blattner (Blattner) prior to the completion of his sentence. Approximately six months after his release, Blattner murdered Katherine Paquin (Paquin). Plaintiff-Respondent the Estate of Katherine Paquin (Plaintiff) filed suit claiming the Department negligently operated a public facility within the meaning of the building waiver provision of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (TCA), NMSA 1978, §§ 41-4-1 to -27 (1976, as amended through 2020).

{¶2} The district court determined otherwise and granted the Department's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the building waiver did not extend to off-premises injuries. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that an injury incurred as a result of negligent operation is not geographically limited within the waiver. See Sanders v. N.M. Corrs. Dep't, 2023-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 15-16, 528 P.3d 716.

{¶3} We affirm the Court of Appeals, concluding the building waiver contains no geographical limitation. Further, we hold that the negligent release of prisoners, if sufficiently pleaded, may constitute operation of a building within the meaning of the building waiver.

II. BACKGROUND

{¶4} Christopher Blattner began serving a seven-year sentence in 2009 at the Geo Group, Inc. (Geo Group)-operated Guadalupe County Correctional Facility stemming from two convictions for trafficking a controlled substance and possession with intent to distribute. Although Blattner was not scheduled for release until 2015, NMCD and Geo Group employees erroneously processed his release from the facility three years early and prior to the completion of his sentence. Following his release, Blattner sought out and murdered Paquin Subsequently, Blattner was arrested and pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter.

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶5} Plaintiff filed an amended complaint for damages for wrongful death pursuant to the TCA asserting three claims: negligent operation of a public facility, death caused by law enforcement officers, and loss of consortium. The amended complaint named as Defendants the Department, then-department-Secretary Gregg Marcantel, then-department-Deputy-Secretary Joe Booker, Bureau Chief of Records Cathleen Catanach, and private correctional facilities operator Geo Group.

{¶6} All claims against Joe Booker and Geo Group were subsequently dismissed with prejudice. The loss of consortium claim was also dismissed.

{¶7} At issue here is Plaintiff's claim for negligent operation of a public facility, which alleges the Department was negligent in failing to adequately maintain records to ensure inmates served the full duration of their sentences, thereby creating a danger to the public at large.^[3] In response, the Department and NMCD filed a motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity arguing that Section 41-4-6 was inapplicable to waive immunity because the building waiver did not cover negligent performance of administrative functions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of NMCD alternatively concluding, as a matter of law, that the building waiver was inapplicable because Plaintiff's amended complaint did not allege that the wrongful death occurred on or adjacent to NMCD's facilities. In a split opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's law enforcement waiver ruling and reversed as to the building waiver, discerning no basis to support a geographical limitation within the waiver. Sanders, 2023-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 15-16. The dissent disagreed with the majority and argued that case law illustrated a requirement of a "proximity-derived nexus[]" between the injury and the building at issue. Id. ¶ 37 (Hanisee, J., dissenting).

{¶8} Here, the Department argues that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the building waiver conflicts with our precedent and impermissibly expands the waiver's application contrary to legislative intent and public policy. The Department requests our resolution of this alleged conflict and urges us to hold, pursuant to Archibeque v. Moya, 1993-NMSC-079, 116 N.M. 616, 866 P.2d 344, that the Department's conduct constitutes negligent performance of an administrative function and therefore bars Plaintiff's building waiver claim.

{¶9} Because the building waiver "has been the subject of considerable judicial attention since its enactment," our perennial interpretation of the waiver has, in turn, produced extensive and occasionally disparate holdings. Gebler v. Valencia Reg'l Emergency Commc'ns Ctr., 2023-NMCA-070, ¶ 15, 535 P.3d 763; see also Bober v. N.M. State Fair, 1991-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 1, 27, 111 N.M. 644, 808 P.2d 614 (explaining that the building waiver applies beyond a building's physical premises); but see Archibeque, 1993-NMSC-079, ¶ 8 (holding that the purpose of the building waiver is to impose liability for negligence in the operation and maintenance of the physical premises owned by the government). We, therefore, begin our discussion by examining the legislative intent underpinning the TCA and its enumerated exceptions-namely the building waiver-to discern the waiver's scope and application. See Rutherford v. Chaves Cnty., 2003-NMSC-010, ¶ 11, 133 N.M. 756, 69 P.3d 1199 ("In interpreting the meaning of a statute, our primary purpose is to give effect to the Legislature's intent."). We then canvass New Mexico's building waiver jurisprudence to explain what led to our "retreat from th[e] narrow reading of the statute" that now permits Plaintiff to pursue her claim arising from failure of NMCD to exercise care to prevent an off-premises injury caused by a third party. Gebler, 2023-NMCA-070, ¶ 15. Next, we discuss why the Court of Appeals did not err in holding the building waiver does not contain a geographic limitation and that the injury was properly evaluated under a premises liability theory. Lastly, we explain why Plaintiff's claims are not barred by Archibeque.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

{¶10} "The standard of review for determining whether governmental immunity under the TCA bars a tort claim is a question of law which we review de novo." Rutherford, 2003-NMSC-010, ¶ 8.

B. The New Mexico Tort Claims Act

{¶11} The TCA delineates the scope of governmental liability in tort. See § 41-4-2. The TCA embodies the dual public policies of limiting governmental liability while also ensuring fair compensation for those injured by the negligence of public employees owing a duty of reasonable care while acting in the scope of their employment. See § 41-4-2; see also Cobos v. Doha Ana Cnty. Hous. Auth., ¶ 6, 1998-NMSC-049, 126 N.M. 418, 970 P.2d 1143 ("The [TCA] attempts to balance [the] two important but conflicting public policies."). Section 41-4-4(A) of the TCA effects government liability limits by conferring sovereign immunity to governmental entities unless immunity is waived by the exceptions enumerated in Sections 41-4-5 through 41-4-12.

{¶12} The enactment of the TCA was a direct legislative response to the New Mexico Supreme Court's abolition of sovereign immunity in Hicks v. State. See 1975-NMSC-056, ¶ 12, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153, superseded by statute as recognized in Nash v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Catron Cnty., 2021-NMSC-005, ¶ 21, 480 P.3d 842; Brenneman v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M., 2004-NMCA-003, ¶¶ 1, 4-5, 135 N.M. 68, 84 P.3d 685. The act that emerged in the wake of Hicks reestablished sovereign immunity and dissolved "all judicially-created categories such as 'governmental' or 'proprietary' functions and 'discretionary' or 'ministerial' acts previously used to determine immunity or liability." Sections 41-4-4(A), 41-4-2(B). However, the Legislature also "recogniz[ed] the inherently unfair and inequitable results which occur in the strict application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity." Section 41-4-2(A). The Legislature, therefore, created eight exceptions to that doctrine to permit civil actions against government entities through a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. See § 41-4-4. The exceptions serve as discrete limitations designed to expose the government to liability to the extent the exceptions permit. See § 41-4-4(A) (authorizing exceptions as enumerated in Sections 41-4-5 through 41-4-12).

C. Legislative Declaration

{¶13} The TCA's legislative declaration, § 41-4-2, provides useful insight into the Legislature's concerns in enacting the TCA and the relationship between the TCA and traditional tort law. Subsection (A) of the legislative declaration frames the competing considerations balanced by the Legislature:

The legislature recognizes the inherently unfair and inequitable results which occur in the strict application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. On the other hand, the legislature recognizes that while a private party may readily

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