Sandoval v. Lee

CRISTIAN SANDOVAL, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM LEE, Respondent.

14-CV-5187 (JMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

May 20, 2016

For Online Publication Only

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

APPEARANCES:

Cristian Sandoval, prose

For Petitioner

Cristin Connell, Andrea M. DiGregorio, and Alyson Gill

Assistant District Attorneys

Madeline Singas, District Attorney of Nassau County

262 Old Country Road

Mineola, NY 11501

For Respondent

AZRACK, United States District Judge:

Cristian Sandoval ("Sandoval"), proceeding pro se, petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After a jury trial in state court, Sandoval was convicted of first-degree manslaughter and criminal possession of a weapon. Sandoval was sentenced to twenty-five years of imprisonment for second-degree manslaughter and one year of imprisonment for the use of a weapon, plus five years of post-release supervision. He unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief.

In the pending petition, Sandoval asserts five grounds for habeas relief: (1) the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of gang membership and the uncharged crime of statutory rape; (2) Sandoval suffered prejudice from the alleged deficiencies of the Nassau County crime laboratory; (3) the trial court erroneously denied Sandoval's Batson challenge; (4) the cumulative effect of various errors deprived Sandoval of a fair trial; and (5) New York's sentencing statutes are unconstitutional. For the following reasons, Sandoval's petition is DENIED in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the petition and the underlying record.¹ In light of Sandoval's conviction, the Court discusses the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. Garbutt v. Conway, 668 F.3d 79, 80 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

A. The Trial

According to the trial testimony, on August 7, 2009, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Jobani Reyes and Zachary Rosales were walking home when they passed Sandoval and a group of men. (Tr. 396, 398, 407-08.) Reyes testified that Sandoval called them "chevala," before flashing a knife and repeating, "la mara, la mara." (Tr. 398-401.) Reyes testified that as Sandoval flashed the knife, he made gang signs with his fingers. (Tr. 400-01.) Detective George Colby, of Nassau County Police Department's gang section, explained that "chevala" is a derogatory Spanish term meaning "kid," "punk," or "enemy." (Tr. 946-47, 952-53.) He also explained that "la mara" is the shortened version of "mara salvatrucha," the full name of the MS-13 gang. (Tr. 951-52.) He testified that MS-13 members would use "la mara" as a greeting, or—when involved in a fight or assault—they would announce "la mara" to victims and witnesses of their crimes to instill fear. (Tr. 951-52.)

Reyes testified that he and Rosales ran but were chased down. (Tr. 403-04.) They split up, and Rosales was caught by Sandoval and another individual, who would be named as Sandoval's co-defendant. (Tr. 403-04.) Sandoval repeatedly stabbed Rosales with a knife whilethe co-defendant beat Rosales with a belt buckle. (Tr. 403-05, 410.) During the attack, a van of Rosales' friends drove by the scene, and Reyes heard the co-defendant say, "Vamanos, Lucky," or "let's go, Lucky." (Tr. 405, 417, 449, 552-54.) Sandoval and the co-defendant then fled the scene. (Tr. 433.)

At trial, the sole defense witness was Kristie Fuentes, Sandoval's fourteen-year-old ex-girlfriend. (Tr. 963-64, 966, 970-71.) Fuentes testified that she saw Sandoval in front of his home at 10:00 p.m. and that she stayed with him for twenty minutes, establishing Sandoval's alibi for the murder. (Tr. 965-66.)

Sandoval, who was seventeen years old at the time, was charged with second-degree murder and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. See N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(1); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01(2). The jury convicted him of first-degree manslaughter, which had been submitted as a lesser offense, and one count of criminal possession of a weapon. See N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1). He was sentenced to twenty-five years of imprisonment for the manslaughter conviction and one year of imprisonment for the weapon conviction, plus five years of post-release supervision. (S. 21.)

B. Post-Conviction Proceedings

1. The Direct Appeal

Sandoval, through counsel, appealed his conviction to the Second Department of the New York Appellate Division. On appeal, Sandoval argued: (1) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of gang membership; (2) the prosecutor solicited prejudicial testimony that Sandoval committed an uncharged crime of statutory rape; (3) the Nassau County crime laboratory potentially made errors in its handling of evidence; (4) the cumulative effect of these errors and others deprived Sandoval of a fair trial; and (5) the prosecutor violated the Supreme Court'sdecision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), by exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.² (See Def.'s App. Br., Apr. 14, 2011 ("App. Div. Br."), at 16-27, Ex.1, ECF No. 8-1; Def.'s Pro Se Suppl. Br., Ex. 4, ECF No. 8-1.)³

On November 28, 2012, the Second Department affirmed Sandoval's conviction. People v. Sandoval, 100 A.D.3d 1025, 1027-28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2012). The court determined that three of Sandoval's claims were unpreserved for appellate review: (1) the trial court erred by admitting evidence that Sandoval committed the uncharged crime of statutory rape; (2) Sandoval suffered prejudice from the alleged deficiencies of the Nassau County crime laboratory; and (3) the trial court erred by denying Sandoval's Batson challenge. Id. at 1027. The court also found that the evidence involving gang references established motive and that "the cumulative effect of these alleged errors" did not deprive Sandoval of a fair trial. Id. at 1027-28. In a catchall provision, the court concluded that "[t]he defendant's remaining contentions are without merit." Id. at 1028.

On May 30, 2013, the New York Court of Appeals denied Sandoval's request for leave to appeal. People v. Sandoval, 21 N.Y.3d 946 (N.Y. 2013). Sandoval did not petition to the United States Supreme Court.

2. The Section 440.20 Motion

Sandoval then filed a motion under Section 440.20 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law. (See Def.'s Mot. to Vacate Sentence ("440.20 Mot."), June 17, 2014, Ex. 7, ECF No. 8-1.) Essentially, he contended that New York's sentencing statutes are unconstitutional because they "exclude 16 and 17 year olds as juveniles and subject[] them to adult punishment without taking into account youth and its attendant characteristics." (Id. at 133.) In December 2014, the CountyCourt of Nassau County denied this motion. (Court Order Denying Def.'s Mot. ("440.20 Ct. Order"), Dec. 31, 2014, at 157, Ex. 10, ECF No. 8-1.) It appears that Sandoval has yet to seek further state court relief on this issue.

3. The Instant Petition

Sandoval filed a petition for habeas relief on August 25, 2014. He asserts the following five claims, all of which have been raised in either his direct appeal or Section 440.20 motion: (1) the trial court incorrectly admitted evidence that Sandoval was a gang member and that Fuentes is the mother of Sandoval's child (the "evidentiary rulings claims"); (2) the Nassau County crime laboratory may have mishandled evidence (the "crime lab claim"); (3) the trial court failed to fulfill its obligations under Batson (the "Batson claim"); (4) Sandoval was deprived of a fair trial because the prosecutor made an improper remark during summations and because his defense counsel was ineffective (the "fair trial claims"); and (5) New York's sentencing statutes are unconstitutional, under both facial and as-applied challenges (the "sentencing claim"). (See Pet. at 1-12, ECF No. 1; see also App. Div. Br. at 16-27; 440.20 Mot. at 133.)

For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Sandoval's petition in its entirety. The two grounds properly presented for review—part of the evidentiary rulings claims and the fair trial claims—are meritless. The remaining grounds are either unexhausted or procedurally barred. Moreover, even if the Court were to reach the merits of the barred claims, they too would fail.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standards of Review

1. Overview of AEDPA

Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), to restrict "the power of federal courts to grant writs of habeascorpus to state prisoners." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Under AEDPA, a prisoner may file a habeas petition "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). To make that showing, the petitioner must satisfy three hurdles: (1) the exhaustion of state remedies, (2) the absence of a procedural bar, and (3) the satisfaction of AEDPA's deferential review of state court decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

2. Exhaustion

Generally, a court cannot review a habeas petition unless the petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available" in state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The purpose of this requirement is to provide state courts with the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.'" Jackson v. Edwards, 404 F.3d 612, 619 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). Therefore, petitioner must show that he fairly presented his federal claim to the highest state court from which a decision can be rendered. Daye v. Att'y Gen. of N.Y., 696 F.2d 186, 190 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982) (en banc). Although the petitioner need not "'cite chapter and verse of the Constitution in order to satisfy this requirement,' he must tender his claim 'in terms that are likely to alert the state courts to the claim's federal nature.'" Jackson v. Conway, 763 F.3d 115, 133 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Carvajal v. Artus, 633 F.3d 95, 104 (2d Cir. 2011)).

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