Sanford v. Colvin

RASHIDA NAJA SANFORD, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN,Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

1:14CV885

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

March 9, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Rashida Naja Sanford ("Plaintiff") brought this action pursuant to Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), as amended (42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3)), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claims for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under, respectively, Titles II and XVI of the Act. The parties have filed cross-motions for judgment, and the administrative record has been certified to the Court for review.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income Benefits on July 10, 2009, alleging a disability onset date of March 31, 2007. (Tr. at 278-83.)¹ Her applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. at 105-08). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing de novo before anAdministrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Tr. at 176-77.) Following the subsequent hearing on January 13, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Tr. at 112-19). However, on June 14, 2012, the Appeals Council vacated the hearing decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. (Tr. at 125-27.) Plaintiff therefore appeared and testified at a second hearing on February 6, 2013, following which the same ALJ issued another unfavorable decision. (Tr. at 14-24.) On August 27, 2014, the Appeals Council denied review, thereby making the ALJ's conclusion the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review (Tr. at 1-5).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal law "authorizes judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of social security benefits." Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, "the scope of [the] review of [such an administrative] decision . . . is extremely limited." Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981). "The courts are not to try the case de novo." Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, "a reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ [underlying the denial of benefits] if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard." Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal brackets omitted).

"Substantial evidence means 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). "It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "If there isevidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence." Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).

"In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court should not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ]." Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). "Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ." Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. "The issue before [the reviewing court], therefore, is not whether [the claimant] is disabled, but whether the ALJ's finding that [the claimant] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law." Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).

In undertaking this limited review, the Court notes that in administrative proceedings, "[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving a disability." Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981). In this context, "disability" means the "'inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).²

"The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate disability claims." Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4)). "Under this process, the Commissioner asks, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the requirements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not, could perform any other work in the national economy." Id.

A finding adverse to the claimant at any of several points in this five-step sequence forecloses a disability designation and ends the inquiry. For example, "[t]he first step determines whether the claimant is engaged in 'substantial gainful activity.' If the claimant is working, benefits are denied. The second step determines if the claimant is 'severely' disabled. If not, benefits are denied." Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).

On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at each of the first two steps, and establishes at step three that the impairment "equals or exceeds in severity one or more of the impairments listed in Appendix I of the regulations," then "the claimant is disabled." Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and two, but falters at step three, i.e., "[i]f a claimant's impairment is not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment, the ALJ must assess the claimant's residual function[al] capacity ('RFC')." Id. at 179.³ Step four then requires the ALJ to assess whether, based on that RFC, the claimant can"perform past relevant work"; if so, the claimant does not qualify as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the claimant establishes an inability to return to prior work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step, which "requires the Commissioner to prove that a significant number of jobs exist which the claimant could perform, despite [the claimant's] impairments." Hines, 453 F.3d at 563. In making this determination, the ALJ must decide "whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering both [the claimant's RFC] and [the claimant's] vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work experience) to adjust to a new job." Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the Government cannot carry its "evidentiary burden of proving that [the claimant] remains able to work other jobs available in the community," the claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.

III. DISCUSSION

In the present case, the ALJ considered the period "from March 31, 2007 through the date of [the] decision [May 13, 2013]" (Tr. at 15), and concluded that Plaintiff engaged in substantial gainful activity from January 2010 through December 2011, but that "there has been a continuous 12-month period during which [she] did not engage in substantial activity." Plaintiff therefore met her burden at step one of the sequential evaluation process, and the ALJ went on to make findings addressing "the period(s) the claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity." (Tr. at 17.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from a single severe impairment: bipolar disorder with psychotic features. (Tr. at 17.) The ALJ found at step three that this impairment failed to meet or equal a disability listing. (Tr. at17-19.) Therefore, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's RFC and determined that she could perform medium work with further limitations to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, only occasional exposure to the public, and no quota requirements. (Tr. at 19.) The ALJ next determined that the demands of Plaintiff's past relevant work exceeded her RFC. (Tr. at 22.) However, he concluded at step five, that, given Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, along with the testimony of the vocational expert regarding those factors, she could perform other jobs available in the national economy and therefore was not disabled. (Tr. at 22-23.)

Plaintiff now argues that substantial evidence fails to support the ALJ's decision, although Plaintiff does not set out specific assignments of error, and instead generally challenges the ultimate disability determination and asserts that the ALJ "got it wrong." As discussed above, this Court undertakes only a limited review of the ALJ's decision to determine whether it was supported by substantial evidence, and the Court will not review the decision de novo to determine whether the ultimate disability determination was "right" or "wrong." See supra Part II. Nevertheless, upon review of Plaintiff's briefing, it appears that Plaintiff intends to raise two challenges to the ALJ's determination. First, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's determination at step two of the sequential process, contending that the ALJ erred in including only bipolar disorder as a severe impairment, without considering Plaintiff's other alleged impairments. Second, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's mental impairments and the formulation of her residual functional capacity. In her supplemental brief, Plaintiff raises an additional challenge, contending that the ALJ failed to assess her credibility in accordance with the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015). Having considered these contentions, for the reasons set out below,the Court concludes...