Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v. Cnty. of Ventura Envtl. Health Div.

17 Cal.App.5th 1082

225 Cal.Rptr.3d 885

SANTA CLARA WASTE WATER COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.COUNTY OF VENTURA ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH DIVISION, Defendant and Appellant.

2d Civil No.B278967

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 6, California.

Filed November 30, 2017

Leroy Smith, County Counsel and Eric J. Walts, Assistant County Counsel, for Defendant and Appellant.

Musick, Peeler & Garrett, Barry C. Groveman, William W. Carter, Marc R. Greenberg, Los Angeles, K. Ryan Hiete, Westlake Village, Cheryl A. Orr and Andrew Gilford, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

GILBERT, P. J.

A division of the county declares plaintiff to be in violation of regulations governing hazardous waste. It writes to plaintiff that it is referring the matter to the district attorney and it is not seeking administrative penalties. Plaintiff brings an action asserting its right to an administrative hearing to determine whether its chemicals constitute hazardous waste. Plaintiff complains that the division has no right to state plaintiff's chemicals are hazardous prior to such a hearing. The division responds with an anti-SLAPP motion to strike plaintiff's petition and complaint. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.¹ ) The trial court denied the motion. We reverse. Even the government has first amendment rights.

FACTS

The County of Ventura Environmental Health Division (Division) is responsible for the Unified Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Materials Management Regulatory Program. ( Health & Saf. Code, § 25404 et seq. ) The Division has jurisdiction over the Santa Clara Waste Water Company (SCWW), a nonhazardous waste treatment facility. SCWW does not have a permit to process hazardous waste.

There are two types of enforcement actions the Division can take. One is formal enforcement that mandates compliance and imposes sanctions. ( Cal. Code Regs., tit. 27, § 15110, subd. (e)(1).) The other is informal enforcement that notifies a regulated business of noncompliance and establishes an action and date for correction, but does not impose sanctions. (Id ., subd. (e)(2).)

In November 2014, there was an explosion and fire at SCWW's treatment facility. That led to a criminal investigation by the Ventura County District Attorney. In November 2015, the Division assisted the district attorney in executing a search warrant on SCWW's Ventura County facility.

The Division discovered nineteen 275-gallon totes and seven 50-gallon drums of a chemical known as "Petromax" at SCWW's facility. The Division determined that 24 of the Petromax totes and drums were hazardous because of their high pH levels and that they were waste because they had been accumulated in lieu of disposal.

The day after the execution of the search warrant, the Division issued SCWW an inspection report and notice to comply (NTC). The report and NTC cited a number of violations, including violations premised on the Division's determination that at least some of the Petromax is hazardous waste.

A letter from SCWW's counsel disputed that any of the Petromax was hazardous waste. A meet and confer between the parties failed to resolve the dispute.

In a letter to SCWW dated February 9, 2016, the Division explained its determination that at least some of the Petromax constituted hazardous waste. The letter stated in part: "Typically, if violations that are listed on a NTC are not corrected by the date specified in the NTC, the Division will issue a Notice of Violation (NOV) and then either pursue formal administrative enforcement or refer the matter to the Ventura County District Attorney's (DA) Office for criminal enforcement. However, since the DA's Office already has an active criminal enforcement case against SCWW, this Division does not anticipate pursuing separate administrative enforcement proceedings in this matter but we intend to refer any violations that remain uncorrected to the DA's Office, to the extent they are not already part of the DA's case."

On March 26, 2016, a grand jury indicted SCWW on the charge that Petromax is a hazardous waste.

The February 9 letter stated the Division would review any further information SCWW wishes to submit. Having received no further information, by letter dated June 15, 2016, the Division wrote to SCWW confirming its determination that SCWW's Petromax is hazardous waste. The letter was headed "Final Determination of Hazardous Waste Violations."

In July 2016, the Division again inspected SCWW's facilities. The Division issued another NTC based on its determination that Petromax is a hazardous waste. SCWW's counsel wrote to the Division disputing that Petromax is a hazardous waste and objecting that the Division's administrative procedures are unfair and inadequate to protect SCWW's due process rights.

The Division again agreed to meet and confer with SCWW on whether Petromax is a hazardous waste. But the Division disputed SCWW's characterization of its administrative process. The Division's letter to SCWW dated July 21, 2016, stated in part:

"It is also important to note that this Division has not initiated a formal administrative enforcement action related to the Petromax violations, which would begin with the issuance of an administrative enforcement order (AEO), and also provides an opportunity for an administrative appeal. Instead, as previously explained, we intend to refer future violations as well as those violations that remain uncorrected to the District Attorney's Office for prosecution, since it has an active case against SCWW which involves violations at this facility."

SCWW's Petition and Complaint

On August 8, 2016, SCWW filed the instant petition for an alternate or peremptory writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief.

In its petition, SCWW alleged that Petromax is not hazardous waste. It further alleged that the Division's unilateral decision determining Petromax to be hazardous waste without a fair and impartial administrative hearing violated the law and its due process rights. SCWW claimed: "[T]he County's unilateral decision that the Petromax purchased by SCWW is a ‘waste’ rather than a beneficial product deprives SCWW of its property and its opportunity to conduct business, but also threatens SCWW and its employees with possible criminal and civil liability. Worse yet, it sets up SCWW as being in violation every day forward with no ability to appeal or challenge the County's determination that the Petromax is a ‘waste’ and no longer a ‘product.’ "

SCWW requested: a stay of enforcement of the NTC and the Division's decision that Petromax is waste; a writ of mandate requiring the Division to allow a fair and unbiased administrative review of its NTC and decision; notice and a hearing before the County may enforce its findings or refer SCWW to criminal or civil prosecution; and restitution.

The trial court denied SCWW's ex parte request for a temporary restraining order on the ground SCWW is not likely to prevail. The court found, "[I]t appears that the [Division] has complied within the letter of the relevant codes and regulations, and that [the Division] has no obligation to proceed in the manner demanded by [SCWW]."

The trial court also sustained the Division's demurrer with leave to amend.

Anti-SLAPP Motion

The Division made a special motion to strike the petition as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP motion). ( § 425.16.) The trial court agreed that the NTC and letters are protected activities. But the court stated that SCWW's petition does not directly attack the NTC and letters. Instead, SCWW objects to the Division's refusal to provide an administrative hearing on whether Petromax constitutes hazardous waste. The court reasoned SCWW's objection is to the lack of an administrative procedure, not the determination that Petromax constitutes hazardous waste. Thus, the court concluded SCWW's petition did not attack a protected activity. The court denied the motion.

DISCUSSION

I

Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) provides: "A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim."

Section 425.16, subdivision (e) provides that such acts include "(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law" and "(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law."

A special motion to strike involves a two-step process. ( Olive Properties, L.P. v. Coolwaters Enterprises, Inc. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1174, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 524 ( Olive Properties ).) First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff's cause of action arises from an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. ( Ibid . ) If the defendant meets this threshold showing, the cause of action will be stricken unless plaintiff can establish a probability plaintiff can prevail on the claim. ( Ibid . )

The " ‘principal threat or gravamen’ " of the plaintiff's claim determines whether the first prong of section 425.16 applies. ( Olive Properties , supra , 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1175, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 524.) The focus is on the allegedly wrongful conduct that provides the foundation for the plaintiff's claims. ( Ibid . ) Our review of the trial court's denial of the motion to strike is de novo. ( Ibid . )

The California Constitution protects the free speech of government entities and public officials and such activities are within the scope of section...