Santana v. Quiros

LUIS A. SANTANA, JR., Plaintiff, v. ANGEL QUIROS, ET AL., Defendants.

Case No. 3:21cv376(KAD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

May 26, 2021

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER

Plaintiff, Luis A. Santana ("Santana"), a sentenced inmate confined at the Cheshire Correctional Institution ("Cheshire"), filed this civil rights action against Commissioner of Correction Angel Quiros, Wardens Kenneth Butricks and Denise Walker, Deputy Warden Jennifer Peterson¹ and District Administrator John Doe/Nick Rodriguez. He alleges, principally, that the defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by limiting the number of hours he is permitted outside his cell for purposes of engaging in exercise or recreational activities. For the reasons set forth below, the complaint is dismissed in part.

Standard of Review

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the court must review prisoner civil complaints against governmental actors and "dismiss ... any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," or that "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Id. In undertaking this review, the court is obligated to "construe" complaints "liberally and interpret[] [them] to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Although detailed allegations are not required under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that includes only "'labels and conclusions,' 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action' or 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement,'" does not meet the facial plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).²

Allegations

In 2012, prison officials at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution ("MacDougall-Walker") transferred Santana to Cheshire, a Level 4 prison facility. See Compl., ECF No. 1, at 7 ¶ 8; at 9 ¶ 18. At the time, Santana had been placed in but had not completed the administrative segregation program. Id. at 7 ¶ 8.

On July 29, 2020, Santana sent an Inmate Request to Warden Butricks regarding thenumber of hours that he and other inmates in his housing unit were permitted to engage in out-of-cell activities each day and week, including indoor recreation or "leisure" activities, indoor and outdoor exercise activities and meals. Id. at 7-8 ¶¶ 9-14; at 17-21, Ex. A. At the time, Santana was confined in South Block 1 unit. Id. at 9 ¶ 21. Santana complained that Warden Butricks had limited him to: two hours each day for out-of-cell indoor recreational activities, including showers and making telephone calls; two hours each week for out-of-cell physical exercise; 15 to 20 minutes each day to eat lunch with other inmates, and 15 to 20 minutes to eat dinner with other inmates. Id. at 8 ¶¶ 13-14. He acknowledged that Butricks also permitted him to leave his cell on days that he was required to perform his prison job. Id. at 20, Ex. A. Santana informed Butricks that the insufficient opportunities to engage in outdoor and/or indoor physical exercise and indoor recreational activities had affected his mental health and could cause him "severe psychiatric harm." Id. at 8-9 ¶¶ 15, 17.

In his Inmate Request, Santana relied on the August 27, 2019 ruling granting summary judgment in favor of Inmate Richard Reynolds on an Eighth Amendment claim challenging conditions of confinement at Northern on the ground that the conditions constituted solitary confinement that posed a risk of substantial harm to Reynolds' mental health. Id. ¶ 19; at 46-102, Ex. E (Reynolds v. Arnone, Case No. 3:13cv1465(SRU) (Memorandum of Decision, ECF No. 155).³

Santana proposed that Warden Butricks permit him to engage in indoor recreational activities for three to four hours each day; to permit him to exercise or recreate outside each day; and to provide him with additional programming options. Id. ¶ 20. Santana also pointed out that prison officials at Cheshire were not using a courtyard that was adjacent to the South Block housing units for outdoor recreation. Id. ¶ 21. Warden Butricks did not respond to Santana's request and retired from his position as warden at Cheshire at some point before September 28, 2020. Id. at 7, 10, 12 ¶¶ 10, 26, 41.

On August 18, 2020, Santana filed a Level 1 grievance setting forth his complaints regarding the limited recreational and exercise opportunities that had been offered to him. Id. at 10 ¶ 23; Ex. A, ECF No. 1, at 22-23. He claimed that Warden Butricks was treating him differently than other similarly situated inmates in the TRUE unit at Cheshire and other inmates at MacDougall-Walker who had been convicted of similar criminal offenses and had more serious disciplinary histories. Id. at 10 ¶ 25; Ex. A, at 22. On September 28, 2020, after reviewing and investigating the allegations asserted by Santana, Deputy Warden Peterson concluded that prison officials had provided Santana with adequate opportunity for out-of-cell recreation, and that the periods of recreation provided met the standard under prevailing case law and did not violate the Constitution. Id. at 10-11 ¶¶ 27-30; Ex. A, at 22. Accordingly, she denied the grievance. Id. at 10 ¶ 26.

On September 30, 2020, Santana filed a Level 2 appeal of Deputy Warden Peterson's response to his Level 1 grievance. Id. at 11 ¶ 32; Ex. B, ECF No. 1, at 25. On November 12, 2020, District Administrator Doe/Rodriguez rejected the Level 2 appeal for two reasons and indicated that an appeal of his response to Level 3 would not be answered. Id. at 11-12 ¶¶ 33-36;Ex. C, ECF No. 1, at 31. On November 25, 2020, Santana filed a Level 3 appeal of District Administrator Doe/Rodriguez's rejection of his Level 2 appeal. Id. at 12 ¶¶ 38-39; Ex. D, ECF No. 1, at 40-41. On November 30, 2020, an administrative remedies coordinator returned the Level 3 appeal to Santana because District Administrator Doe/Rodriguez had checked off the box on the Level 2 appeal form indicating that an appeal to Level 3 would not be answered. Id. at 12 ¶ 40; Ex. D, ECF No. 1, at 39.

Discussion

Based on these allegations, Santana asserts that the defendants violated his rights under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages.

Claims Asserted on Behalf of Other Inmates

As an initial matter, the court notes that Santana refers to conditions of confinement that have impacted him as well as other inmates in his housing unit at Cheshire. See Compl. at 13-14 ¶¶ 47-49; Ex. A. As a pro se litigant, Santana does not have standing to assert claims or requests for relief on behalf of other inmates who may be confined in his housing unit. See Am. Psychiatric Ass'n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 821 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Another prudential [limit on standing is the] principle is that a plaintiff may ordinarily assert only his own legal rights, not those of third parties.") (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976)). Thus, to the extent that Santana intended to assert any claims on behalf of other inmates, those claims are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

Official Capacity Claims

Santana sues the defendants in their individual and official capacities. To the extent that he seeks compensatory and punitive damages from the defendants in their official capacities, those requests are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (Eleventh Amendment, which protects the state from suits for monetary relief, also protects state officials sued for damages in their official capacity).

Santana also seeks declaratory judgment that the defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), a plaintiff may seek only prospective injunctive and declaratory relief to address an ongoing or continuing violation of federal law or a threat of a violation of federal law in the future. See In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612, 618 (2d Cir. 2007); Ward v. Thomas, 207 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2000). Santana's requests for a declaration that the defendants violated his federal constitutional rights in the past are therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment as well. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (the Eleventh Amendment "does not permit judgments against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past"); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) ("We have refused to extend the reasoning of Young . . . to claims for retrospective relief") (citations omitted). Accordingly, the requests for declaratory relief are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

Eighth Amendment Claims

Santana's Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim arises out of a combination of an inadequate opportunity for out-of-cell physical exercise and the concomitantextended in-cell isolation. He also complains of inadequate visitation with family members.

Prison conditions that are "restrictive or even harsh" do not violate the Eighth Amendment because "they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Rhodes v. Chapman, ...