Santay v. ICE House LLC

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VIVIAN TZOC SANTAY, Plaintiff, v. ICE HOUSE LLC d/b/a ICE HOUSE SPORTS BAR Defendant.

Civil Action No. 24-cv-11583-ADB

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

November 15, 2024

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLISON D. BURROUGHS U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Vivian Tzoc Santay (“Plaintiff” or “Tzoc Santay”) brings this action against her former employer, Defendant Ice House LLC d/b/a Ice House Sports Bar (“Ice House” or “Defendant”) alleging that her supervisor, Mr. Nieves, discriminated against her on the basis of race, national origin, and sex and failed to pay earned and overtime wages in violation of Massachusetts and federal law. Currently before the Court is Defendant's partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See [ECF No. 8 (“Mot.”)]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

The following relevant facts are taken primarily from the well-pleaded allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint, [ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”) or (“Compl.”)], which the Court, as it must, assumes to be true, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, when considering a motion to dismiss. Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 766 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2014).

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff, a non-English-speaking Black woman of Guatemalan origin, worked for Defendant from October 2021 until March 16, 2023. See [Compl. ¶¶ 3-4, 32]. During that time, her supervisor, Mr. Nieves, often made offensive comments to Plaintiff in Spanish. See [id. ¶ 7]. For example, he would regularly tell her:

• “You are a nobody in this country.”

• “You have to do what I tell you.”

• “You don't have papers.”

• “You don't pay taxes.”

• “Whenever I want, I can call immigration.”

• “I am Puerto Rican; [I] grew up in New York; you don't have papers and we can throw you out of here at any time.”

• “We Puerto Ricans have all the rights, buy a house, go on a trip, you don't have papers; you can be deported at any moment.”

[Id.]. On one occasion, after Plaintiff complained of a toothache, Mr. Nieves said he knew a dentist, but that the dentist “was for U.S. citizens only.” [Id. ¶ 8].

On more than one occasion, Mr. Nieves showed Plaintiff videos and pictures of male and female genitalia, as well as regularly made sexual comments, which Plaintiff found to be extremely unwelcome and made her feel uncomfortable and unsafe. See [Compl. ¶¶ 9-13]. For example, on one occasion, Mr. Nieves showed Plaintiff a video of women with tattooed backs and told Plaintiff certain tattoos mean a woman is “for sale.” [Id. ¶ 12]. He then suggested that Plaintiff get such a tattoo and “put on a short blouse,” and said that he would “be [Plaintiff's] first customer.” [Id.]. On other occasions, Mr. Nieves asked Plaintiff if she was “horny,” [id. ¶ 14], described his sex life with his wife and his wife's buttocks implants in detail, [id. ¶¶ 14, 16], said women who “dress in office clothes” turn him on, [id. ¶ 15], asked Plaintiff to say the names of sexual parts in K'iche', a language Plaintiff speaks, [id. ¶ 17], and told Plaintiff that he had “two women,” referring to his wife at home and Plaintiff at work, [id. ¶ 18]. Mr. Nieves also physically touched Plaintiff's behind twice. [Id. ¶ 19]. When she asked why he touched her inappropriately, he replied, “It's not my fault that you have a big ass,” and, “I am a man; it is not my fault you provoke me.” [Id.].

Plaintiff always rejected Mr. Nieves's advances, which caused him to become angry and upset with her and eventually to threaten her. [Compl. ¶¶ 21-22]. For example, Mr. Nieves often told Plaintiff that he had been in jail, his son was in prison, and that he was not afraid to “do things,” elaborating by saying, “[i]f I ever wanted to do something to someone, I would do it to their children,” and, “I wouldn't hurt my enemy, but I would hurt his family.” [Id. ¶¶ 23-25]. One day, Mr. Nieves showed Plaintiff a knife and told her, “I am well protected because here, you never know, nobody messes with me. I have my knife; they taught me to fight in jail.” [Id. ¶ 26]. On another occasion, Mr. Nieves told Plaintiff that his wife carries a gun and that he knew “where to stick [a] knife.” [Id. ¶ 27].

While Plaintiff worked at Ice House, she was paid in cash, and not paid for overtime. [Compl. ¶ 28]. She also never received any benefits, including sick days, vacations and meal breaks. [Id. ¶ 29]. She complained to Mr. Nieves about not being paid overtime and benefits like her coworkers, [id. ¶ 31], and shortly thereafter, on March 16, 2023, Mr. Nieves informed her that she had been terminated for complaining about being underpaid, [id. ¶ 32].

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant on June 18, 2024. See [Compl.]. The Complaint asserts fifteen counts, which include:

• race, national origin, and sex discrimination in violation Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151B (“Chapter 151B”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), see [Compl. ¶¶ 35-48 (Counts I and II alleging racial discrimination)]; [id. ¶¶ 49-62 (Counts III and IV alleging national origin discrimination)]; [id. ¶¶ 63-76 (Counts V and VI alleging sex discrimination)]; [id. ¶¶ 77-84 (Counts VII and VIII alleging sexual harrassment)]^[1];

• retaliation in violation of Chapter 151B and Title VII, [id. ¶¶ 85-92 (Counts IX and X)];

• failure to pay earned wages in violation of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 149, §§ 148 and 150, [id. ¶¶ 93-98 (Count XI)];

• failure to pay overtime wages in violation of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151, § 1A [id. ¶¶ 99-102 (Count XII)]; • failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 207, [id. ¶¶ 103-06 (Count XIII)];

• wage-based retaliation in violation of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 149, §§ 148 and 150 and Chapter 151, § 1A, [id. ¶¶ 107-10 (Count XIV)]; and,

• wage-based retaliation in violation of the FLSA, [id. ¶¶ 111-14 (Count XV)].

Defendant moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on July 19, 2024, seeking to dismiss only Counts I-VI, Count XII, and Count XIV. See [Mot.]. Plaintiff opposed Defendant's motion on August 23, 2024. [ECF No. 12].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint “must provide ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Cardigan Mt. Sch. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). This pleading standard requires “more than labels and conclusions,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007), and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rather, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court “first must ‘distinguish the complaint's factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited).'” Cardigan Mt. Sch., 787 F.3d at 84 (further internal quotations and citation omitted) (quoting Garda-Catalan v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 2013)). “Second, the court must determine whether the factual allegations are sufficient to support the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Garda-Catalan, 734 F.3d at 103 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In conducting this analysis, the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and analyze those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff's theory, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. U.S. ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 383 (1st Cir. 2011).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Title VII and Chapter 151B Claims (Counts I-VI)^[2]

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of race, national origin, and sex in violation of Title VII and Chapter 151B. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges disparate treatment and hostile work environment claims, alleging for each protected class that 1) she was fired “because of” her membership in that protected class, [Compl. ¶¶ 40, 47 (race discrimination); 54, 61 (national origin discrimination); 68,^[3] 75 (sex discrimination)]; and, 2) she was subjected to discrimination “which had the purpose of creating a hostile and humiliating work environment,” [id. ¶¶ 38, 45 (race discrimination); 52, 59 (national origin discrimination); 66, 73 (sex discrimination)]. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under either of these statutes for any protected class because she has failed to allege that she suffered an adverse employment action “based upon her protected class” or that “there lies some plausible causal connection between her protected class and the alleged hostile work environment.” [ECF No. 9 at 4, 6].

1. Disparate Treatment

To make out a prima facie case for disparate treatment under either Title VII or Chapter 151B, a plaintiff must show: “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) her employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (4) some evidence of a causal link between her protected status and the adverse employment action.” Evans v. Staples, Inc., 375 F.Supp.3d 117, 123 (D. Mass. 2019) (citing Bhatti v. Trs. of Bos Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 70 (1 st Cir. 2011)). Although, at the pleading stage, a plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case,...