Santiago-Rivera v. Hosp. Gen. Menonita de Aibonito

GLORIA SANTIAGO-RIVERA Plaintiff v. HOSPITAL GENERAL MENONITA DE AIBONITO, ET AL. Defendants

CIV. NO.: 18-1084 (SCC)

UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

April 27, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Gloria Santiago-Rivera ("Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera" or "Plaintiff") worked as a nurse at Hospital General Menonita Aibonito ("Defendant HGMA", "HGMA", or "Defendant"). She claims that she was unlawfully discharged from her employment because of her depressive disorder condition. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera also claims that Defendant HGMA's managerial staff and her supervisor harassed her and created a hostile work environment for her.

Pending before the Court is Defendant HGMA's Motion for Summary Judgment, see Docket No. 48,¹ which PlaintiffSantiago-Rivera timely opposed ("Plaintiff's Opposition"), see Docket No. 58. Defendant HGMA subsequently filed a Reply. See Docket No. 65. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant HGMA's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

I. Background

Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera filed this action against Defendant HGMA and its insurance company² under the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. See Docket No. 26.³ Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera also sued Defendant HGMA under Puerto Rico law analogous statutes, namely, Law No. 80 of May 30, 1976, P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 29, § 185(a) et seq. Law No. 44 of July 2, 1985, P.R. Laws Ann. tit.1, § 500 et seq.; Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959, P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 29, § 146 et seq.⁴ Id.

Defendant HGMA moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the uncontested material facts show that Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera is not a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. See Docket No. 48 at 2. In addition to its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant HGMA filed a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("DSUMFs"). See Docket No. 49. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera opposed Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment by stating that she has established a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA. See Docket No. 58 at 18. She also contested the DSUMF, ("Plaintiff's Opposition to DSUMF") and filed a Statement of Additional Material Facts ("PSAMF"). See Docket No. 59. Subsequently, HGMA filed its Reply, see Docket No. 65, and filed a separate response to Plaintiff'sOpposition to DSUMF and PSAMF ("Response to Plaintiff's Opposition to DSUMF and PSAMF"), see Docket No. 64.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

A party may move for summary judgment if the evidence on the record "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings" and evaluate the evidence to assess whether a trial is necessary. Theriault v. Genesis HealthCare LLC, 890 F.3d 342, 348 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Kearney v. Town of Wareham, 316 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2002)).

In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the judge must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir. 2006)). In conducting this review, "the judge's function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Finally, the Court must deny a motion for summary judgment if it finds that a genuine issue of material fact remains. Id. at 248.

III. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera's Failure to Comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and the Sham Affidavit Rule

Before turning to the undisputed facts of this case there are several matters that the Court must first address. In its Response to Plaintiff's Opposition to DSUMF and PSAMF, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to duly oppose its DSUMF. See Docket No. 64 at 2-5. First, Defendant claims that Plaintiff's Opposition to DSUMF contains factual assertions that are not supported by the record or by admissible evidence. Id. at 3. Second, Defendant avers that Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera's denials are lengthy, argumentative, and in narrative form, contrary to the requirements of Local Rule 56. Id. Third, Defendant contends that many of Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera's denials and qualifications to Defendant's DSUMF, contain additional facts in violation of Local Rule 56(c). Id. at 4. Finally, Defendant HGMA alleges that Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera violated the sham affidavit rule by submitting a sworn statement that was signed on the same day that she filed her Opposition. Id. at 5. The Court will first address Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera's violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ("Rule 56") and Local Rule 56(c) and then the sham affidavit rule.

1. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera's Failure to Comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56(c)

To dispute a material fact, the nonmoving party must offer "hard proof rather than spongy rhetoric." Kearney v. Town of Wareham, 316 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2002). Specifically, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)(A) states that the nonmoving party may use "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials [,]" in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). For its part, Local Rule 56(c) further zeroes-in on this point and mandates that, the nonmoving party must, with his or her opposition, admit, deny or qualify the statement of facts filed by the moving party. L. Cv. R. 56(c). And "[u]nless a fact is admitted, the opposing statement shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation[.]" Id.

In this case, many of Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera's denials are unsupported because they either lack record citations or solely cite to the Second Amended Complaint.⁵ To comply with Local Rule 56(c) and properly create a factual dispute, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera had to deny Defendant HGMA's DSUMF with a reference to a record citation. See L. Cv. R. 56(c). As for Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera's constant reliance on the Second Amended Complaint, the Court notes that a complaint is not proper evidence to oppose a motion for summary judgment. The reason being that, "[o]rdinarily, statements in a complaint are not part of the summary judgment record[,]" unless the complaint has been verified, for then it can be used to "consider factual averments based on personal knowledge . . . as the equivalent of an affidavitfor purposes of summary judgment." See Doherty v. Donahoe, 985 F. Supp.2d 190, 195 (D. Mass. 2013) (citing Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927 F.2d 1259, 1262-63 (1st Cir. 1991)). Here, the Second Amended Complaint was not verified, as such, it cannot be considered as the equivalent of a sworn statement. The Court reminds Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera that the purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings." Theriault, 890 F.3d at 348 (citing Kearney v. Town of Wareham, 316 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2002)). Therefore, the pleadings alone do not suffice.

Furthermore, the Court does not need to consider Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera's unsupported factual propositions. See Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2010) (upholding district court's decision to exclude plaintiff's unsupported denials because his did not provide appropriate citations to the record). Hence, the Court will disregard Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera's denials that contain unsupported factual assertions. Id.; see also L. Cv. R. 56(e).

Besides requiring an opposing party to support its denials with record citations, Local Rule 56(c) mandates an opposing party to comply with two additional requirements. First, an opposing party's statement of material facts must be short and concise. L. Cv. R. 56(c). Second, additional facts are to be submitted in a separate section. See id. Some of Plaintiff's denials do not comply with the short and concise mandate as they are lengthy and argumentative.⁶ In this same vein, some of these lengthy and argumentative denials contain additional facts that were not filed in a separate section.⁷ See Natal Rivera v. Oriental Bank & Trust, 291 F. Supp.3d 215, 218 (D.P.R. 2018). Failure to submit additional facts in a separate section allows the Court to disregard such facts. Carreras, 596 F.3d at 32. In light of Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera's failure to comply with the requirements of Local Rule 56(c), the Court will not consider the argumentative denials and the additional facts which were not submitted in accordance with the aforementioned Local Rule.

2. Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera's Sworn Statement

Besides violating Rule 56 and Local Rule 56(c), Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera also infringed the sham affidavit rule. This rule posits that a nonmoving party cannot contest a motion for summary judgment with a sworn statement that contradicts what a party has answered unambiguously during the discovery stage. Escribano-Reyes v. Professional Hepa Certificate Corp., 817 F.3d 380, 386 (1st Cir. 2016). The only exception to the rule is if the nonmoving party provides a good explanation as to why his or her testimony changed. Id.

Here, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera submitted a sworn statement tailored to contradict crucial facts in Defendant's DSUMF, without providing any explanation or justification as to why her testimony changed.⁸ See Docket No. 58-1. It is particularly revealing that the sworn statement was signed the same day that Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera opposed Defendant HGMA's Motion for Summary Judgment. See id.

In brief, Plaintiff Santiago-Rivera's sworn statement states that: (1) she did not authorize Hospital Menonita-CIMA⁹ ("CIMA") to release her medical records; (2)...