Santiago v. City of Rochester Police Dep't

CARLOS SANTIAGO, et al. Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF ROCHESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

No. 19-CV-6859-FPG

United States District Court, W.D. New York

July 30, 2021

DECISION AND ORDER

HON FRANK P. GERACI, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

On November 19, 2019, Plaintiffs Carlos A. Santiago (“Santiago”) and Melissa A. Laffredo (“Laffredo”) (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint against the Rochester Police Department, Officers Tyshon Williams, Joseph Bonnacci, and Mary Barnes, Sergeant Melanie Rivera, Assistant District Attorney Kristen Sippel, and unknown officers and lieutenants, raising various 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. ECF No. 1. Each Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP motions”). ECF Nos. 2, 3. The Court granted the IFP motions and screened the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. ECF No. 4. The Court dismissed all claims. Id. Specifically, the claims against the City of Rochester Police Department and Sippel were dismissed with prejudice and the Court provided Plaintiff until December 23, 2019 to file an amended complaint as it pertained to Plaintiffs' additional claims. Id.

Plaintiffs retained counsel, were provided an extension of time to file an amended complaint, ECF No. 6, and filed the Amended Complaint on February 13, 2020, ECF No. 7. The Amended Complaint asserts nine causes of action against the City of Rochester, Officers Tyshon Williams, Joseph Bonnacci, Brad Elliot, Mary Barnes, Sergeant Melanie Rivera and John Doe(s) (collectively, “Defendants”) for: (1) unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) false arrest pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) false imprisonment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) failure to intervene pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (6) conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (7) improper policy custom, and practice of Defendants and failure to supervise pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (8) replevin; and (9) conversion. See ECF No. 7.

Defendants each answered the Amended Complaint, see ECF Nos. 9 14, 20, and the case proceeded to discovery. On October 16 2020, Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). ECF No. 21. Plaintiffs responded on November 9, 2020, ECF No. 23, and Defendants replied on December 1, 2020, ECF Nos. 28, 29.

For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint unless otherwise indicated. ECF No. 7.

Plaintiffs allege that on August 22, 2018, at 10:45 p.m., Laffredo's neighbor, Gary Cook, threatened to kill the Plaintiffs, their daughter, their dog and their neighbor. Id. ¶ 16. In response, Santiago called the police and pressed charges against Mr. Cook. Id. ¶ 17. Mr. Cook was arrested and released on bail a few hours later. Id. ¶¶ 18, 19.

On August 23, 2018, at 1:45 a.m., Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Cook was drinking on his front porch when he again threated Laffredo and her neighbor.^[1] Id. ¶¶ 21-23. Mr. Cook then called the police and allegedly told the responding officers that Santiago “threatened him with a .22 caliber pistol.” Id. at 24, 25. Specifically, based on a recording of Mr. Cook's 911 call and the “Body Worn Camera” (the “BWC”) video from the officers on scene, Mr. Cook stated that “an individual named Carlos Cruz pointed ‘a .22' at him.” Id. ¶ 26.

Based upon the statements by Mr. Cook, the responding officers detained Santiago and, Sergeant Rivera subsequently began questioning Laffredo about the alleged pistol. Id. ¶¶ 30, 31. In response, Laffredo stated that Santiago did not have a pistol and that Plaintiffs had had an altercation with Mr. Cook just hours earlier-for which, Plaintiffs assert, Mr. Cook sought revenge. Id. ¶ 32. Sergeant Rivera then allegedly threatening to take Plaintiffs' daughter away and have them arrested if the pistol was not produced. Id. ¶ 33. Further, she told Laffredo that she “knew” Santiago had hidden the pistol on the premises-specifically, under a mattress in the downstairs apartment accessible from the front porch at 32 Woodlawn Street, Rochester, New York 14607.^[2] Id. ¶ 34. However, according to Mr. Cook, the weapon was on the first floor accessible from the front of the building. Id. ¶ 38.

Sergeant Rivera then demanded that Laffredo allow the officers to search the building; she allegedly stated that the officers had a search warrant; and she stated that if Laffredo did not sign an index card providing consent to search the officers would “tear her place apart” and take Plaintiffs' child. Id. ¶¶ 40-42, 45. Plaintiffs contend that in response to this threat Laffredo informed the officers that she owned a shotgun and that it was in the attic. Id. ¶ 43. She then signed the consent to search. Id. ¶ 49. According to Plaintiffs, after Laffredo signed the consent, Sergeant Rivera told Officer Williams to continue talking to Laffredo so that she would not revoke her consent. Id. ¶ 50.

After officers found the shotgun, Santiago was placed into the back of a police vehicle and was taken downtown for further questioning and investigation. Id. ¶¶ 55-56. Laffredo later called the jail and was informed that Santiago was arrested on a gun charge and would have court the following morning. Id. ¶ 57. He was then charged with a felony gun charge, spent six days in jail, and was released after the Grand Jury did not find enough evidence to indict him. Id. ¶¶ 58-60. The charge was later reduced to Menacing in the Second Degree. Id. ¶ 61. All such charges were ultimately dismissed, id. ¶ 64, and Laffredo's shotgun was returned. ECF No. 23-1 at 22.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”^[3] The standard for deciding a Rule 12(c) motion is “the same . . . standard [that is] applicable to dismissals pursuant to [Rule] 12(b)(6). Thus, [courts] will accept all factual allegations in the [C]omplaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor.” L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 429 (2d Cir. 2011).

On a Rule 12(c) motion, courts consider “the complaint, the answer, any written documents attached to them, and any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.” Id. at 422 (quoting Roberts v. Babkiewicz, 582 F.3d 418, 419 (2d Cir. 2009)). “A complaint is [also] deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit materials incorporated in it by reference, and documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are integral to the complaint.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 56 (2d Cir. 2004)) (additional citations and quotations omitted). But if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56” and “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).

“When matters outside the pleadings are presented in support of, or in opposition to a [Rule 12(c)] motion, a district court must either exclude the additional material and decide the motion on the [pleading] alone or convert the motion to one for summary judgment under [Rule 56] and afford all parties the opportunity to present supporting material.” Stephens v. Bayview Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., No. 07-CV-0596 (JFB)(AKT), 2008 WL 728896, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Federal courts have complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings offered in conjunction with a [Rule 12(c)] motion, and thus complete discretion in determining whether to convert the motion to one for summary judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

Because discovery remains ongoing, the Court declines to convert Defendants' motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Cf. Hellstrom v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Aff., 201 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Only in the rarest of cases may summary judgment be granted against a plaintiff who has not been afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery.”). Accordingly, the Court will not consider anything “submitted by either party, by affidavit or otherwise, outside of the [c]omplaint and [a]nswer.” Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Time Inc., 785 F.Supp. 371, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).

However, the Court will consider the BWC footage. The Second Circuit has emphasized that for a document outside the complaint to be considered at a motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff must have relied upon it in drafting the complaint. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1991)). Indeed, it is not sufficient that the plaintiff merely had notice or possession of the document, but it should be clear that plaintiff relied on such document. Id.

Here Plaintiffs assert that the mention of the BWC video in their Amended Complaint for various limited purposes does not permit the Defendants to submit the footage for consideration herein, ECF No. 23-1 at 7. Despite this assertion, it is readily apparent that Plaintiffs relied upon the BWC video recording in drafting their Amended Complaint as the video footage, and observations from the interactions depicted, are explicitly referenced at various points throughout the Amended Complaint. See, e.g., ECF No. 7 ¶¶...