Santiago v. City of Rochester

481 F.Supp.3d 152

Carlos A. SANTIAGO, Plaintiff,

v.The CITY OF ROCHESTER, et al., Defendants.

Case # 14-CV-6719-FPG

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed August 24, 2020

Chad A. Davenport, R. Anthony Rupp, III, Rupp, Baase, Pfalzgraf, Cunningham & Coppola LLC, Buffalo, NY, for Plaintiff.

Christopher Noone, Patrick Beath, City of Rochester Law Department, Rochester, NY, for Defendant Officer Shawn Jordan.

Christopher Noone, City of Rochester Law Department, Rochester, NY, James D. Lantier, Christopher F. DeFrancesco, Smith Sovik Kendrick & Sugnet, P.C., Syracuse, NY, for Defendant Jeananne Odell, RN.

DECISION & ORDER

FRANK P. GERACI, JR., Chief Judge

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Carlos A. Santiago brings this civil rights action against Defendants City of Rochester, Officer Shawn Jordan, RN Jeananne Odell, and Monroe County. ECF No. 82 (second amended complaint). His claims arise out of his arrest by Officer Jordan in March 2012. Presently before the Court is Officer Jordan and the City of Rochester's motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) ECF No. 87. For the reasons that follow, their motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

LEGAL STANDARD

"The standard for addressing a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Cleveland v. Caplaw , 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006). A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) when it states a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A claim for relief is plausible when the plaintiff pleads sufficient facts that allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. In considering the plausibility of a claim, the Court must accept factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011). At the same time, the Court is not required to accord "[l]egal conclusions, deductions, or opinions couched as factual allegations ... a presumption of truthfulness." In re NYSE Specialists Secs. Litig. , 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007). "[O]n a 12(c) motion, the court considers the complaint, the answer, any written documents attached to them, and any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case." Sarikaputar v. Veratip Corp. , 371 F. Supp. 3d 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the amended complaint, unless otherwise noted. In essence, Santiago alleges a case of mistaken identity. At 2:45 A.M. on March 6, 2012, Officer Jordan, who was then monitoring traffic from a parking lot near East Main Street in Rochester, noticed a red Toyota run a red light at an excessive speed as it turned onto East Main Street from Birch Crescent. See ECF No. 86 at 2; ECF No. 94 at 10. The vehicle proceeded to drive out of Officer Jordan's sight. At the same time, another vehicle stopped near Officer Jordan. The driver informed him that his vehicle had been rear ended by that Toyota vehicle "on Goodman Street and East Avenue." ECF No. 82 at 4. After some delay—perhaps a few seconds, but in any case less than one minute¹ —Officer Jordan pulled out of the parking lot and drove down East Main Street in search of the Toyota. Officer Jordan was in a marked police car. See ECF No. 86 at 3.

At the same time, Santiago was driving a red Toyota on East Main Street. He avers, however, that he had not been involved in the hit-and-run and had not turned onto East Main Street from Birch Crescent. See ECF No. 82 at 4-5.

Officer Jordan caught up to Santiago's Toyota and "began to approach [ ] [Santiago] at a dangerously high rate of speed without turning on the emergency lights and siren." Id. at 5. As a result, Santiago—who was not aware that he was being chased by a police officer—became "startled and attempted to escape," fearing that the approaching vehicle "intended to cause him harm." Id. A car chase ensued. Santiago travelled "north on Kingston Street, east on Garson Avenue, and north on Greeley Street." Id. Santiago states that it was not until "after he turned northbound on Greeley Street [that] Officer Jordan turned on his emergency lights and sirens for the very first time." ECF No. 94 at 7.

The chase ended when Officer Jordan rear ended Santiago's vehicle off Greeley Street and onto the adjacent grass. Santiago claims that at that point, he was still not aware that "the car that struck his vehicle was a police vehicle." Id. at 6. Panicking, Santiago fled from his vehicle and began running. A second chase ensued by foot.

Santiago alleges that during the foot chase, he surrendered and did not resist, but Officer Jordan still tackled him to the ground and "improperly and aggressively handcuffed" him. Id. Santiago warned Officer Jordan to be careful while handcuffing him because "he had a minor tear in his left shoulder," but Officer Jordan told Santiago to "shut the f*** up," "slammed [Santiago's] head into the ground," yanked Santiago's arms up, pepper sprayed Santiago, and then pulled Santiago up from the ground so forcefully that Santiago's right shoulder was dislocated. Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). Santiago screamed in pain and told Officer Jordan that his right shoulder had been dislocated, but Officer Jordan replied that he did not care and again told Santiago to "shut the f*** up." Id.

Santiago continued to complain and request medical attention, but Officer Jordan and the other officers on scene ignored him and did not provide him with medical assistance. Officer Jordan placed Santiago under arrest and "aggressively threw" him into a police cruiser. Id. at 6. While in the cruiser, Santiago heard officers laughing at him. Santiago continued to scream for medical attention and denied doing anything wrong. In response, Officer Jordan told Santiago to shut up and sprayed him with pepper spray. Officer Jordan ultimately issued Santiago 23 tickets related to the incident, including for failing to comply with a police order under New York Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1102. See ECF No. 94-2 at 28.

Officers transported Santiago to the Monroe County Jail. Santiago spoke with Defendant Jeananne Odell, a registered nurse, asking for medical attention for his injuries. He alleges that Odell refused to provide proper medical care and only provided him with a Motrin. Santiago claims that he never received adequate medical care during the few hours he was at the jail before he was released on bail.

After his release, Santiago went to the emergency room at Highland Hospital. Medical personnel there "immediately diagnosed [him] with a dislocated shoulder" and a right rotator cuff tear. Id. at 10. Santiago underwent surgery to correct the injury.

All charges against Santiago were subsequently dismissed. In December 2014, he brought this action. In his amended complaint, he raises the following claims: (1) false arrest against Officer Jordan and the City of Rochester; (2) false imprisonment against Officer Jordan and the City of Rochester; (3) malicious prosecution against Officer Jordan and the City of Rochester; (4) excessive force against Officer Jordan and the City of Rochester; (5) deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Officer Jordan, the City of Rochester, Nurse Odell, and Monroe County; (6) unlawful policies and practices and failure to supervise and train against the City of Rochester; and (7) unlawful policies and practices and failure to supervise and train against Monroe County.

DISCUSSION

The City of Rochester and Officer Jordan (hereinafter "Defendants") move to dismiss all but the excessive force claim against Officer Jordan, arguing that Santiago's allegations are insufficient to state valid claims. The Court address each claim in turn.

I. False Arrest Claim

The first claim is a false arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Santiago alleges that Officer Jordan did not have probable cause to arrest Santiago after the chase. Defendants argue that Officer Jordan had probable cause because (1) when Santiago turned onto East Main Street from Birch Crescent, Officer Jordan observed the vehicle turn at "excessive speed" and "against a steady, red traffic signal," ECF No. 86 at 2; and (2) soon thereafter, a person informed Officer Jordan that a Toyota had rear ended his car and fled the scene. Santiago alleges that he was not, in fact, driving the Toyota that committed those infractions, and had instead been driving near a different section of East Main Street prior to the chase. See ECF No. 94 at 10-11.

"The elements of a claim of false arrest under § 1983 are substantially the same as the elements of a false arrest claim under New York law." Maron v. Cty. of Albany , 166 F. App'x 540, 541 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary order) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[U]nder New York law, the elements of a false arrest claim are: (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged." Id. "The existence of probable cause to arrest" renders the confinement privileged "and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest." Horvath v. City of New York , No. 12-CV-6005, 2015 WL 1757759, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2015). "Probable cause exists when one has knowledge of, or reasonably trustworthy information as to, facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested." Martinez v. City of New York , 340 F. App'x 700, 701 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

Furthermore, it is well-established that "a mistaken identity can...