Santiago v. City of Chicago

ANDREA SANTIAGO, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant.

No. 19 C 4652

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

April 5, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, DISTRICT JUDGE.

In 2019, Andrea Santiago sued the City of Chicago in state court for towing, impounding, and disposing of her vehicle. The City removed the case to federal court and then moved to dismiss Santiago's claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Court dismissed some of her claims and declined to dismiss others. Santiago then moved to certify two classes under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). The Court granted the motion with respect to the 23(b)(3) classes but did not certify the proposed 23(b)(2) classes. Following the City's interlocutory appeal from the Court's class certification order, the Seventh Circuit vacated the order and remanded the case for further consideration. Santiago has now filed an amended complaint. The City again moves to dismiss her claims under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons below, the Court grants the motion in part, denies the motion in part and remands some of Santiago's claims to state court.

Background

A. Factual background

Andrea Santiago is a senior citizen who suffers from multiple sclerosis and is confined to a wheelchair. Because of her disabilities, she relies on her daughter, Lisandra Velez, to drive her around. Velez also assists Santiago with translating her mail and other English-based transactions because Santiago's primary language is Spanish. During the time period relevant to this lawsuit, Santiago's primary form of transportation was a van she owned, a 1998 GMC Savana 1500 that was fitted with special lift equipment for her wheelchair. Santiago regularly parked the van on the public street in front of her home because her garage did not have enough space for her to get in and out of the van while in her wheelchair.

On June 5, 2018, a City employee placed a sticker on the van's window that stated that the van was deemed abandoned and would be towed if not moved within seven days. At that time, the van was legally parked on the street in front of Santiago's house, as it usually was. Velez saw the notice while she was on her way to retrieve the van to drive Santiago to run some errands. Velez removed the notice from the window, drove the van to a different location on the same street, and placed signs in the windows of the van stating that the van was not abandoned. But she did not tell her mother about the tow-notice sticker.

On June 13, the City towed the van. It later mailed Santiago two notices of vehicle impoundment, both on the same day. The notices contained instructions regarding how to retrieve the vehicle, the procedure to request a hearing to contest the validity of the tow, and a warning that the vehicle would be disposed of if not claimed within fifteen days.

Sometime before July 5, 2018, Velez attempted to retrieve the van from the impound lot but was told that she needed a notarized letter to retrieve it because she was not the van's registered owner. She returned with a notarized letter later that month but was told that the vehicle had been disposed of on July 16.

B. Legal background

Under an Illinois statute and a City of Chicago ordinance, it is unlawful for a person to abandon a vehicle on public property. 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-201(b); Chi. Mun. Code § 9-80-110(a). Vehicles are "deemed to have been abandoned if . . . [they have] not been moved or used for more than seven consecutive days and [are] apparently deserted." Chi. Mun. Code § 9-80-110(a). If a vehicle is determined to have been abandoned, City employees may issue a notice of parking violation and authorize the towing and impoundment of the vehicle. Id. § 9-92-030. For unregistered vehicles, like Santiago's van, the City's practice is to provide a sticker notice on the window of the vehicle. Dkt. no. 62-1 at 4-5. It does not mail any notice warning that a vehicle has been deemed abandoned and is subject to tow. Id.

Once the City tows a vehicle, it is required by ordinance to identify the owner within ten days and send the owner a notice of the impoundment. Chi. Mun. Code § 9-92-070(a). For unregistered vehicles, a notice must be sent by first-class mail to the last registered owner. Id.

The City is authorized by statute and ordinance to dispose of abandoned vehicles that remain unclaimed. 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-209; Chi. Mun. Code § 9-92-100(a). To do so, the City must send an additional notice by first class mail to the vehicle's registered owner within eighteen days after the provision of the initial notice. 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-208(a); Chi. Mun. Code § 9-92-100(a). The registered owner of the impounded vehicle may request one fifteen-day extension before the vehicle's disposal. Chi. Mun. Code § 9-92-100(a). According to the complaint, if a vehicle is not claimed within the relevant time period, the City typically disposes of the vehicle by selling it to United Road Towing, Inc., a City contractor, for fifteen dollars. Am. Compl. ¶ 17.

C. Procedural history

Santiago filed a state-court lawsuit against the City after it towed, impounded, and disposed of her van. The City removed the case to federal court and then filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court granted in part. Santiago then moved to certify two classes for the remaining claims. The Court certified two Rule 23(b)(3) classes, but the ruling was reversed by the Seventh Circuit. Santiago v. City of Chicago, 19 F.4th 1010 (7th Cir. 2021). On remand, Santiago filed an amended complaint on behalf of two classes of similarly situated individuals: (1) a "Tow Class" and (2) a "Vehicle Disposal Class." The City has filed a motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) seeking dismissal of all of Santiago's claims.

Discussion

A. The Tow Class claims

1. Due process

Count 3 of the amended complaint is a section 1983 claim on behalf of the Tow Class. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Santiago alleges that "the City deprived [her] and members of the Tow Class of their constitutional rights to due process" in three ways.

Am. Compl. ¶ 52. First, she argues that the method of notice that the City gives people before towing their cars-namely sticker notice-is insufficient to afford proper notice. Santiago's second challenge concerns the content of the sticker notice, contending that the City must provide notice of its standards for determining that a car is abandoned. And lastly, Santiago alleges that the City's failure to provide pre-tow hearings is a due process violation.

a. Method-of-notice claim

Santiago first argues that mailed notice, rather than sticker notice, is required to protect vehicle owners' due process rights. The City argues that Santiago doesn't have standing to bring this claim and that, even if she does, the City's practice of using sticker notices comports with the requirements of due process. On the first point, the City offers two reasons for why Santiago lacks standing to bring her method-of-notice claim.

First, the City argues that Santiago lacks standing because she received actual notice that her car was going to be towed. Thus, the City contends, her injuries are not fairly traceable to the alleged inadequacies in the City's sticker notice method. More specifically, the City argues that Santiago received actual notice because her daughter Velez received the sticker, and Velez's knowledge is imputed to Santiago because Velez was her agent.

The Court disagrees. Even if Velez was Santiago's agent for some purposes, it is not at all clear from the complaint that Velez was authorized to deal with legal notices on Santiago's behalf. The complaint alleges that Velez was allowed to drive Santiago's car and translate her mail into Spanish, but there is nothing to suggest that Velez handled legal matters for Santiago or was authorized to do so. Indeed, the record suggests the opposite: Santiago personally purchases and coordinates legal matters like car registration; she was the sole policy holder on the vehicle's liability insurance; and she personally reviews all her mail.

Even if Velez was Santiago's agent and removing the City's sticker was within the scope of her agency, her knowledge would not be imputed to Santiago. Under Illinois law, "knowledge acquired by an agent within the scope of [her] agency . . . is not imputed where the agent has an interest or motive in concealing such knowledge from the principal." Tomasiewicz v. Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 141147-U. It is undisputed on the present record that Velez had a personal interest in concealing the notice from Santiago. Thus her knowledge of the notice is not imputed to Santiago as a matter of agency law.

The City's second argument regarding standing is that Santiago cannot meet the traceability element of Article III standing. See Cothron v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 20 F.4th 1156, 1160 (7th Cir. 2021) ("At the pleading stage, standing requires allegations of a concrete and particularized injury in fact that is traceable to the defendant's conduct and redressable by judicial relief."). The City argues that Santiago lacks standing to assert this particular claim because Velez's concealment of the sticker breaks the causal chain between the City's actions and the injury. Causation is severed for purposes of the standing inquiry when the injury resulted because of the independent actions of third parties not before the court. J.B. v. Woodard, 997 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2021). The City contends that it was Velez's concealment of the notice, not the method of notice, that resulted in Santiago's injury.

In response, Santiago argues that Velez's actions do not sever...