Santiago v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

BENNETT SANTIAGO, Plaintiff, v. COMMISIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY Defendant.

19-cv-2051 (KHP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

April 21, 2020

OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiff Bennett Santiago, represented by counsel, commenced this action against Defendant Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner"), pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking review of the Commissioner's decision finding that he was not disabled under Sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Act from November 1, 2013, Plaintiff's alleged disability onset date ("AOD"), through August 11, 2017, the date of the Commissioner's decision.

The parties submitted a joint stipulation in lieu of cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings (the "Joint Stipulation") pursuant to this Court's order. Plaintiff appeals the administrative law judge's ("ALJ") decision concerning: (1) whether the ALJ properly developed the record to account for the period after Plaintiff had back surgery and in doing so, whether the ALJ properly discounted the opinion of Dr. Paul Brisson, one of Plaintiff's treating medical providers; (2) whether the ALJ properly calculated a specific limitation in his assessment of Plaintiff's residual functional capacity; (3) whether the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff's subjective complaints; and (4) whether the ALJ was able to adjudicate Plaintiff's claim under the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff was born on October 16, 1969 and currently is 50 years old. He has attained his GED. He worked as an exterminator prior to an on-the-job injury. Soon afterwards, he claimed he was unable to work. He currently receives Workers' Compensation payments. As of his hearing on August 11, 2017, he lived with his daughter in an apartment. Plaintiff had a left knee arthroscopy on April 29, 2014 and on March 1, 2016, Plaintiff had surgery on his spine (specifically, an "[a]nterior/posterior lumbar fusion of the L4-L5 and L5-S1 levels," Administrative Record ("Tr") at 410).

Plaintiff filed his initial claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") on October 6, 2014. He asserted conditions including lower back, left knee, and left and right ear stapedectomy as disabling. He claimed an alleged onset date of disability on November 1, 2013, the date he last worked. The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's initial application for benefits on November 6, 2014. Plaintiff contested the denial and filed a request for hearing which was granted. On June 6, 2017, the Commissioner held a hearing on Plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff appeared before ALJ Elias Feuer. During the hearing, Plaintiff primarily testified about his back and knee conditions.

Based on the medical records and on Plaintiff's testimony, the ALJ determined Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC")-the maximum work Plaintiff could do despite his limitations. The ALJ posed a hypothetical based on that RFC to Carl Schultz, a vocational expert ("VE"). The VE testified at the hearing that there were jobs in the national economy for individuals with limitations like those of Plaintiff; namely, a surveillance system monitor, orderclerk, and lens inserter. The ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of Social Security and denied his application for benefits on August 11, 2017. Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council denied his application on February 11, 2019. The instant case followed.

II. The Commissioner's Decision

In rendering his decision, the ALJ first determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirement for DIB under the Social Security Act through December 31, 2018. He then applied 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(4)'s five-step sequential process to evaluate Plaintiff's claim. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his AOD, November 1, 2013. At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: torn meniscus at the left knee and lumbar L4-L5 and L5-S1 disc herniations with nerve root impingement. The ALJ also considered Plaintiff's hearing/ear condition but found it to be non-severe because of a lack of evidence of "significantly limiting effects on Plaintiff's functional capacity." Tr. 15.

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments, individually and collectively, failed to meet or equal the severity of the impairments in the Listings. The ALJ explicitly considered sections of Listing 1 (Musculoskeletal System), specifically Listing 1.04 (Disorders of the spine) but found that the objective medical findings were insufficient to meet a Listing.

At step four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). The ALJ found that, through the hearing date, Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work asdefined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a) subject to certain limitations.¹ These restrictions included certain types of movement such as "occasionally² climbing ramps and stairs, stooping, kneeling, and crouching, as well as "sit[ting] for up to six hours in an eight-hour workday[] and stand and/or walk for up to two hours in an eight hour workday." Tr. 15. Further, Plaintiff "require[d] a sit/stand option allowing for switching positions as often as every 15 minutes and standing for a minimum of 5 minutes, all while remaining on task." Id. Relying on the testimony of the VE, he found that there were jobs, such as surveillance system monitor, order clerk, and lens inserter, that someone with Plaintiff's RFC could perform. Thus, the ALJ held that Plaintiff was not disabled as of November 1, 2013, the AOD.

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable Law

A. Judicial Standard of Review of the Commissioner's Decision

A court's review of the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits is limited to two inquiries. See Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987); Dwyer v. Astrue, 800 F. Supp. 2d 542, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The court must determine whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal principles in reaching a decision and whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2019). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidencein the administrative record, the ALJ's findings as to any facts are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) & § 1383(c)(3).

An ALJ's failure to apply the correct legal standard constitutes reversible error if that failure may have affected the disposition of the case. Kohler v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 2008). This applies to an ALJ's failure to follow an applicable statute, regulation, or Social Security Ruling ("SSR"). See, e.g., id. (discussing failure to follow a regulation); Schaal v. Callahan, 993 F. Supp. 85, 93 (D. Conn. 1997) (discussing failure to follow SSR). In such a case, the court may remand the matter under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), especially if necessary to allow the ALJ to develop a full and fair record or to explain his reasoning. See, e.g., Donnelly v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-7244 AJN RLE, 2015 WL 1499227, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015); Rivera ex rel. S.M.H. v. Colvin, 9 F. Supp. 3d 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

If the reviewing court is satisfied that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards, it must "conduct a plenary review of the administrative record to determine if there is substantial evidence, considering the record as a whole, to support the Commissioner's decision." Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 447 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Donnelly, 2015 WL 1499227, at *8. The threshold is not high. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). Substantial evidence is "more than mere scintilla" and "means—and means only—such relevant evidence as reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Estrella, 925 F.3d at 95. Under the standard, a reviewing court may reject an ALJ's findings of fact "only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise." Brault, 683 F.3d at 448 (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This is a"highly deferential standard of review." Negron v. Berryhill, 733 F. App'x 1, 2 (2d Cir. 2018) (noting that, where there is more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's decision will stand). Under a substantial evidence standard, a court may not substitute its judgment even where a different result may be justifiable upon a de novo review. Marshall v. Colvin, No. 16-CV-5631(NSR)(JCM), 2019 WL 1529377, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2019) (citing Ortiz v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-4751(RWS), 2018 WL 3360755, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2018)).

To be supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ's decision must be based on a consideration of all the evidence available in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c); Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App'x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013). While the ALJ's decision need not "mention[] every item of testimony presented," Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam), or "reconcile explicitly every conflicting shred of medical testimony," Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), the ALJ may not ignore or mischaracterize evidence of a person's alleged disability. See Ericksson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 557 F.3d 79, 82-84 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing mischaracterizing evidence); Kohler, 546 F.3d at 268-69 (discussing overlooking evidence); Ruiz v. Barnhart, No. 01-cv-1120 (DC), 2002 WL 826812, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2002) (discussing ignoring evidence). If the decision applies the correct legal standards and is based on substantial evidence, the reviewing...