Santiago v. Keyes

890 F.Supp.2d 149

Jerry Luis SANTIAGO, Plaintiff

v.Christopher KEYES, individually and in his capacity as a Massachusetts State Trooper, Carlos Rivera, individually and in his capacity as a Massachusetts State Trooper, Richard Roe, individually and in his capacity as a Hampden County Prosecutor and Commonwealth of Massachusetts State Police, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 11–30248–KPN.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Aug. 21, 2012.

Bernard T. O'Connor, Jr., S. Thomas Martinelli, O'Connor Martinelli, Cohn, Pikula, & Cullinan, Springfield, MA, for Plaintiff.

Joseph G. Donnellan, Rogal & Donnellan, P.C., Norwood, MA, Kerry David Strayer, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Springfield, MA, Joseph P. Kittredge, Margaret A. Rubino, Rafanelli & Kittredge, P.C., Acton, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS KEYES AND RIVERA'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS (Document Nos. 29 and 49)

NEIMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Jerry Luis Santiago (“Plaintiff”) claims that he was arrested and detained because he was wrongfully, and without justification, believed to be the subject of a New York arrest warrant. Asserting violations of both federal and state law, Plaintiff originally filed this action in state court against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of State Police (“Department of State Police”), the arresting state trooper Christopher Keyes (“Keyes”), and two unidentified defendants, John Doe, a state trooper who allegedly interrogated him following his arrest, and Richard Roe, an assistant district attorney who allegedly made misrepresentations regarding his identity in state court. Plaintiff has since amended his complaint to identify Carlos Rivera (“Rivera”) as the state trooper who allegedly interrogated him.

On November 8, 2011, Keyes removed the action to this court because it raised, among other claims, a federal question pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In a prior memorandum and order, the court denied Plaintiff's motion to remand and dismissed certain claims against the Department of State Police. ( See Document No. 15.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Keyes now moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (“MCRA”) claim against him in its entirety as well as all claims asserted against him in his official capacity; other claims against him go unchallenged. For his part, Rivera moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims against him pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The parties have consented to have the undersigned decide all matters in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73. For the reasons that follow, the court will allow Keyes' motion to dismiss in full and Rivera's motion in part.

I. Background

The following facts come directly from the complaint and are stated in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the party opposing dismissal. Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2002).¹

On or about August 20, 2008, Plaintiff, a Massachusetts resident who hails from Puerto Rico, was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by a friend. (Complaint ¶¶ 8–9.) The vehicle was stopped by officers of the Department of State Police and Plaintiff was asked for identification. Plaintiff provided the officers with his Massachusetts driver's license, which contained his photograph and correct birth date. ( Id. ¶ 9.) Ostensibly believing Plaintiff was the subject of an outstanding New York arrest warrant, the officers instructed Plaintiff to exit the vehicle and lie face down on the ground, and then searched him and handcuffed him. ( Id.)

Upon being arrested, Plaintiff was taken to a state police barracks in Springfield, Massachusetts. ( Id. ¶ 10.) At the barracks, Plaintiff informed an officer that he is deaf and does not speak English; as a result, he was interrogated by Rivera, a Spanish-speaking State Trooper. ( Id.) Plaintiff explained to Rivera that his wallet containing identification and motor vehicle license had been stolen from him while he was in Puerto Rico some time before and that he was the victim of identity theft and could not be the subject of the arrest warrant. ( Id.)

Plaintiff was thereafter arraigned in Chicopee District Court. ( Id. ¶ 13.) At Plaintiff's arraignment, the judge allegedly questioned the Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”), an unidentified defendant, as to whether Plaintiff had been correctly identified as the subject of the arrest warrant. It is not clear if the ADA provided an answer at the arraignment, but the ADA appears to have asked the Department of State Police if Plaintiff's fingerprints matched those that it had received from New York and was (mis)informed that they did. ( Id.)

Plaintiff was placed in custody until August 28, 2008, when he was brought back to the Chicopee District Court. Plaintiff asserts that, at that time, the ADA, based on information he had received from the Department of State Police, misrepresented to the court that Plaintiff's fingerprints matched those of the subject of the New York arrest warrant and that Plaintiff had been correctly identified as the subject of that warrant. ( Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff was thereafter extradited to New York State. ( Id. ¶ 15.) On September 19, 2008, a justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York determined that Plaintiff was not the proper subject of the arrest warrant. ( Id.)

In total, Plaintiff spent thirty-two days in custody. ( Id. ¶ 11.) It is Plaintiff's contention that, given the discrepancies between his appearance and the description and photograph of the proper target of the warrant as well as the fact that his fingerprints did not match those of the target of the warrant, he should not have been arrested and his protests of mistaken identity did not produce an adequate or competent investigation by either the Department of State Police or the District Attorney's Office. ( Id. ¶ 12.) It is Plaintiff's belief that, had such an investigation taken place, he would have been released from custody far sooner than he was. ( Id.)

Plaintiff's complaint contains five counts, three of which apply to both Keyes and Rivera: (1) claims of conspiracy to violate, as well as violation of, the Federal Civil Rights Act pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 (Count I), (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count II), and (3) violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (Count V).

II. Discussion

When faced with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994); Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 443 (1st Cir.1992). Moreover, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Sepulveda-Villarini v. Dep't of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir.2010). The Supreme Court has made clear that, under Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief, on its face, will survive a motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1940, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Court explained that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949.

A. Keyes' Motion to Dismiss1. MCRA Claim Asserted Against Keyes in his Individual Capacity (Count V)

To establish an MCRA claim, Plaintiff must prove that his exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the constitution or laws of either the United States or Massachusetts has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion. SeeMass.G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H and 11I. Although the MCRA is the state “counterpart” to section 1983 and is basically “coextensive with” the federal statute, there are some important differences. For example, to succeed on an MCRA claim, a plaintiff, unlike with section 1983, must show that the derogation of rights occurred “by threats, intimidation or coercion.” Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 532 N.E.2d 49, 52 (1989). “A ‘threat’ means the ‘intentional exertion of pressure to make another fearful or apprehensive of injury or harm.’ ” Goddard v. Kelley, 629 F.Supp.2d 115, 128 (D.Mass.2009) (quoting Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Blake, 417 Mass. 467, 631 N.E.2d 985 (1994)). “Intimidation” means putting a person in fear for the purpose of compelling or deterring his or her conduct. Id. “Coercion” means application of physical or moral force to another to constrain him to do against his will something he would not otherwise do. Id. Accordingly, the MCRA contemplates a two-part sequence: liability may be found where (1) the defendant threatens, intimidates, or coerces the plaintiff in order to (2) cause the plaintiff to give up something that he has the constitutional right to do. Id. at 128.

Plaintiff asserts that the arrest conducted by Keyes—which he argues was not based on probable cause—both violated his Fourth Amendment right against unlawful arrest and seizure and constitutes intimidation or coercion under the MCRA. Keyes does not dispute that the arrest, if conducted without probable cause, would violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights; he maintains, however, that Plaintiff's arrest was based on probable cause. Moreover, Keyes asserts that Plaintiff has not pled any facts from which the court may draw a reasonable inference that he engaged in threats, intimidation, or coercion.

As an initial matter, the court notes that Keyes likely did have probable cause on which to make the arrest....