Santor v. Harwell

LEANN SANTOR, Plaintiff v. KATHRYN M. HARWELL, et al., Defendants

CASE NO. 1:19-CV-1593 AWI SKO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

August 24, 2020

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

(Doc. Nos. 18, 20)

This case stems from the removal of Plaintiff Lean Santor's ("Santor") children by personnel from the County of Stanislaus ("the County") and the City of Newman Police Department ("the City"). Santor alleges three causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and for Monell liability. Currently before the Court are two Rule 12(b)(6) motions, one by the City and one by the County and County personnel. For the reasons that follow, the motions will be granted in part and denied in part.

RULE 12(b)(6) FRAMEWORK

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. See Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences are made in the non-moving party's favor. United States ex. rel. Silingo v. Wellpoint, Inc., 904 F.3d 667, 676 (9th Cir. 2018). However, complaints that offer no more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Johnson v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 793 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court is "not required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint, or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Seven Arts Filmed Entm't, Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Mollett, 795 F.3d at 1065. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). "Plausibility" means "more than a sheer possibility," but less than a probability, and facts that are "merely consistent" with liability fall short of "plausibility." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Somers, 729 F.3d at 960. The Ninth Circuit has distilled the following principles for Rule 12(b)(6) motions: (1) to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively; (2) the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation. Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014). If a motion to dismiss is granted, "[the] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made . . . ." Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2016). However, leave to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile or the plaintiff has failed to cure deficiencies despite repeated opportunities. Garmon v. County of L.A., 828 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2016).

BACKGROUND

From the Complaint, on May 8, 2018, Santor was spending the evening with her two children (O.L. and A.L.)¹ and their father at his mobile home. Santor smoked a small amount of medical marijuana and the father had a small amount of beer. Santor chose to remain at the mobile home with her two children, and the three of them slept in a bed. At some point in the night, Santor awoke to find O.L. unresponsive with fluid coming out of his mouth. An ambulance was summoned and O.L. arrived at the hospital at 2:00 a.m. on May 9, 2018. O.L. died. At 2:55 a.m., the emergency department noted that O.L. suffered acute cardiopulmonary arrest and the treating physician, Dr. Coon, believed that O.L's death was the result of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome ("SIDS").

At 4:15 a.m., Defendants Tanya Laster ("Laster") and Margo Kilgore ("Kilgore"), social workers from the County, arrived at the mobile home. They entered the mobile home without permission and without a warrant. While on the premises, Laster and Kilgore observed numerous empty beer cans and, outside, what they believed to be "some amount" of marijuana.

At 5:26 a.m., Kilgore and Laster met with hospital staff. The staff informed Laster and Kilgore that O.L had arrived at the hospital without a heartbeat, had blood in his ear, and was cold, stiff, unbreathing, and blue in the face and extremities. They were advised that Dr. Coon suspected that O.L. had died of SIDS. Thereafter, they met with Dr. Coon.² Dr. Coon explained that O.L. appeared to have suffered acute cardiopulmonary arrest, there was a suspicion of SIDS, there were no bruises or marks on O.L., and O.L. and A.L. appeared to be well cared for.

The social workers then interviewed Santor and the father. Although they were dealing with the loss of their son, there is no indication that any medical professional, law enforcement officer, or social worker believed that either Santor or the father were incapacitated or under theinfluence of drugs or alcohol. Kilgore and Laster explained their concerns to Santor and the father.

At 7:30 a.m., Laster, Kilgore, Juan Perez ("Perez"), and Joseph Greene ("Greene") met at their offices and determined to remove A.L. from the custody of Santor and the father. There was no attempt to obtain a warrant for the removal of A.L. However, there was also no reasonable basis for believing that A.L. was in imminent danger of sustaining serious bodily injury or death within the time it would have taken the social workers to obtain a warrant for either the removal or examination of A.L. There was no information that A.L had suffered any type of harm or abuse at the hands of Santor, and she had never in fact abused A.L. or O.L. Kilgore, Laster, Greene, and Perez³ conspired to allege false and fraudulent facts of imminent risk to substantiate their efforts to remove A.L. Kilgore, Laster, Greene, and Perez knew that no reasonable judge would grant a warrant on the facts and circumstances as they existed, particularly given the statements by the hospital physician that A.L. and O.L. appeared well cared for and that O.L. appeared to have died as a result of SIDS. Kilgore, Laster, Greene, and Perez enlisted the aid of the City to remove A.L.

Later on May 9, Laster and Kilgore, along with City police officers, without cause or a warrant, seized, detained and removed A.L. from Santor's care and delivered A.L. to the County Department of Health and Human Services. The seizure was unlawful as there was no reasonable or articulable evidence that suggested A.L. was in immediate danger at the hands of Santor. At the time of seizure, A.L. was in good health, had no need of medical care, was not in a physical home environment that posed a threat to her health and safety, and was in the presence of both her parents and maternal grandparents. There was also no reason to believe that Santor was not entitled to custody of A.L. or that Santor had committed a crime. When A.L. was removed, this caused a strong and emotional outburst from Santor, as she was already grieving the loss of O.L.The outburst was used by "Defendants" as pretext to detain her for involuntary treatment and further keep A.L from Santor.

On May 11, 2018, County social workers Defendants David Granados ("Granados") and Maria Pasillas ("Pasillas") drafted a Detention Report for the Stanislaus County Superior Court.⁴ The report was drafted in order to begin dependency proceedings. The Dependency Report is relied upon by the Superior Court to determine whether continued detention is necessary. Detention Reports are to be verified and are not to contain false information. Granados and Pasillas included key false information including: (1) Santor consistently slept with her children (including O.L.) on a twin sized bed (even though Santor slept in a much larger bed with ample room for her children); (2) Santor's newborn was found unresponsive as a result of co-sleeping and later died (even though the cause of death was found to be Congestive Heart Failure); (3) there was a marijuana pipe within easy access of A.L (even though the marijuana pipe was empty and located outside the mobile home while the children were sleeping inside the mobile home); (4) Santor has mental health issues (even though the emotional outburst was simply the result of being emotionally upset by the loss of O.L. and the removal of A.L.); and (5) the residence that Santor and the father shared has health and safety issues (even though Santor resides with her parents but would occasionally visit the father with her children). These are only examples of the inaccurate information that was included in the Dependency Report, not to mention the suppressed exculpatory information.

I. COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISMISS

1. First Cause of Action - Unconstitutional Removal/Unwarranted Seizure Defendants' Argument

Defendants argue that Santor's rights were not violated when A.L. was taken into custody. The Complaint acknowledges essentially that O.L. was found dead with drugs and alcohol in close proximity...