Santos-Santos v. Puerto Rico Police Dep't

63 F.Supp.3d 181

Wilmary SANTOS–SANTOS, Plaintiff

v.PUERTO RICO POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 11–1072 PAD.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed Nov. 20, 2014.

Frank D. Inserni—Milam, Frank D. Inserni Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Yadhira Ramirez—Toro, Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PEDRO A. DELGADO–HERNÁNDEZ, District Judge.

Before the Court is defendants' “Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof” (Docket No. 133), with a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) from Magistrate Judge Justo Arenas recommending that the motion be granted and the case dismissed (Docket No. 153). For the reasons explained below, the Court adopts the R & R, grants the motion and dismisses the complaint with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Wilmary Santos–Santos, a policewoman, initiated this action against defendants Reynaldo Torres–Centeno (Director of the Caguas Strike Force of the Police of Puerto Rico (“PRPD”), Gregorio Merced–Vázquez (Director of the PRPD in the Caguas Region), William Ruiz–Borrás (Commander of the Caguas Criminal Investigation Corps Division), Miguel A. Santiago–Rivera (Director of the Caguas Criminal Investigation Corps), the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the PRPD, asserting (i) to have been discriminated and retaliated against under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) ; (ii) violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989; (iii) conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1988 ; and (iv) supplemental state claims (Docket No. 1 at pp. 1–2).

Defendants answered the complaint denying liability (Docket No. 11), and moved for summary judgment (Docket No. 25). Defendants' request was partially granted (Docket No. 58), leaving only the Title VII and Puerto Rico Act 115 claims. Subsequently, the Title VII claims brought against defendants Merced–Vázquez, Torres–Centeno, Ruiz–Borrás and Santiago Rivera in their personal capacities, and the Law 115 claims against Ruiz–Borrás were dismissed as well (Docket No. 83).

On June 24, 2013, the Supreme Court decided University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013). Based on this new authority, defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 130). The Court denied without prejudice defendants' motion given the First Circuit's holding in Grajales v. Puerto Rico Ports of Authority, 682 F.3d 40, 46 (1st Cir.2012), that “... once the parties have invested substantial resources in discovery,” a district court should hesitate to entertain a Rule 12(c) motion focused on a complaint's failure to satisfy the plausibility requirement. Defendants, however, were authorized to file a second motion for summary judgment addressing the merits of plaintiff's remaining claims in light of Nassar, which they did (Docket No. 130).

The Court referred the motion to Magistrate Judge Justo Arenas for a Report and Recommendation. On October 24, 2014, the magistrate judge recommended that defendants' motion be granted and the case dismissed accordingly. The R & R included a warning that failure to file specific objections within fourteen days would constitute a waiver of the right to appellate review (Docket No. 153 at pp. 14–15). No objection has been filed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Referral

A district court may refer a pending motion to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) ; Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) ; Loc. Civ. Rule 72(b). Any party adversely affected by the report and recommendation may file written objections within fourteen days of being served with the magistrate judge's report. Loc. Civ. Rule 72(d). See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A party that files a timely objection is entitled to a de novo determination of “those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which specific objection is made.” Ramos–Echevarria v. Pichis, Inc., 698 F.Supp.2d 262, 264 (D.P.R.2010) ; Sylva v. Culebra Dive Shop, 389 F.Supp.2d 189, 191–92 (D.P.R.2005) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) ).

“Absent objection, ... [a] district court ha[s] a right to assume that [the affected party] agree[s] with the magistrate judge's recommendation.” Lopez Mulero v. Velez Colon, 490 F.Supp.2d 214, 217–218 (D.P.R.2007) (internal citations omitted). In reviewing an unopposed report and recommendation, the court “needs only [to] satisfy itself by ascertaining that there is no ‘plain error’ on the face of the record.” Lopez Mulero, 490 F.Supp.2d at 218 ; see also, Toro–Méndez v. United States of America, 976 F.Supp.2d 79, 81 (D.P.R.2013).

B. Recommendation

The magistrate judge recommended that defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted (Docket No. 153 at p. 14). After a thorough analysis of the applicable law, he concluded that (i) defendants made a sufficient prima facie showing of legitimate reasons for transferring plaintiff, which would defeat plaintiff's Title VII and Puerto Rico Law 115 claims;¹ (ii) plaintiff has not been able to show that defendants' action against her involve discriminatory work practices; (iii) she has not been fired nor demoted, and her salary has suffered no adverse change; (iv) any business decision made regarding plaintiff's employment has been legitimately explained by defendants; and (v) no proof was provided of actions undertaken in violation of any existing statute or regulation (Docket No. 153 at pp. 12–14). The Magistrate Judge concluded that “[t]here is neither a scintilla nor an inkling of information regarding pretext...” Id. at p. 14.

The Court has made an independent examination of the entire record in this case and determines that the magistrate judge's findings are well supported in the record and the law. For the same reason, it adopts the R & R in its entirety.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment at Docket No. 133 is granted. Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice.

Judgment shall be entered accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JUSTO ARENAS, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Wilmary Santos–Santos, a policewoman, first filed a Complaint against defendants Reynaldo Torres–Centeno (Director of the Caguas Strike Force of the Police of Puerto Rico (PRPD)), Gregorio Merced–Vázquez (Director of the Police of Puerto Rico (PRPD) in the Caguas Region), William Ruiz–Borras (commander of the Caguas Criminal Investigation Corps Division (CIC)), Miguel A. Santiago–Rivera (Director of the Caguas Criminal Investigation Corps), the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rico Police Department on January 212, 2011 (Docket No. 1 at 5–6) alleging retaliatory and discriminatory actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) ; violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Conspiracy Claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1988, violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (which is not applicable in this case, see 5 U.S.C. § 2302, and violation of rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Docket No.1, pp. 1–2). Supplemental claims were also included in the complaint. Defendants answered the complaint (Docket No. 11) and raised an affirmative defense that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that co-defendants had acted at all times according to law, in good faith and within the established framework of their authority and duties. (Docket No. 11, p. 7, ¶¶ 1, 6).

Subsequently, defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 25) for the court to dismiss the complaint because plaintiff lacked the factual grounds to support her claims (Docket No. 25, p. 1). On August 9, 2012, the motion was partially granted in a painstakingly written order (Docket No. 58), leaving only the Title VII and Act 115 allegations as the only surviving claims. The Title VII retaliation claims brought against individual defendants Gregorio Merced–Vázquez, Reynaldo Torres–Centeno, William Ruiz–Borrás and Miguel A. Santiago–Rivera in their personal capacities, and the Title 115 claims brought against William Ruiz–Borrás were eventually dismissed as well. (Docket No. 83).

Following the court's instructions of August 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on August 27, 2012, related to the claims under Title VII and Act 115 (Docket No. 68) stating that defendants' had not met their burdens for the court to grant a summary judgment in their favor (Docket No. 68, pp. 23–24) since there was existing issue regarding the reasons given by defendants for plaintiff's transfer (Docket No. 69, pp. 2–13).

On May 6, 2014, the court authorized the defendants to file a Second Motion for Summary Judgment based on the new authority of Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013).

On June 9, 2014, defendants filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 133), based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013), which provides that the “but-for” causation standard must be applied to retaliation claims. Consequently, the defendants argue that plaintiff has defeated her claim for retaliation by contending two separate, discrete and distinctive conducts from her that caused the retaliation suffered by her. (Docket No. 133, p. 3). In her Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 141) plaintiff alleged that such interpretation was a misconstruction of the central holding in Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517 (Docket No. 141, p. 14) ; since the plaintiff does not need to prove that engaging in the protected activity was the...