Santos v. A.C. McLoon Oil Co.

NANCY SANTOS, as Executrix of the Estate of JOHN JOSEPH SOUZA

v.A.C. McLOON OIL CO., et al.

C.A. No. PC 2009-5475

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

Filed: February 22, 2013

DECISION

GIBNEY, P.J. In this asbestos action filed by Nancy Santos ("Plaintiff"), Executrix of the Estate of John Joseph Souza ("Souza"), six of the named defendants¹ ("Defendants") have brought identical Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) (the "Motions"). Defendants argue that this Court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over them because they are non-resident parties who have not established sufficient "minimum contacts" with the State of Rhode Island. Defendants further contend that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief in her Amended Complaint because they have never produced or sold asbestos or asbestos-containing products. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-14.

IFacts and Travel

Souza, a Massachusetts resident, worked for Blount Marine Corporation ("Blount"), a Rhode Island corporation with its principal place of business in Warren,Rhode Island, from 1952 until 1993 as a welder, carpenter, finisher, crane operator, and yard foreman. Throughout its existence, Blount has specialized in the construction, maintenance, and repair of a variety of water-going vessels. Defendants are all nonresident businesses providing ferry, shuttle, and other water-based transportation services to local residents. All six Defendants purchased at least one passenger boat from Blount during Souza's term of employment there.

Plaintiff alleges that when ordering boats from Blount, Defendants specified the use of asbestos and asbestos-containing products in the boats. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made such specifications, despite knowing of the dangers that the asbestos products presented to Blount's workforce as foreseeable users of those products. As such, Plaintiff claims that Defendants owed duties of care to Blount's employees, including Souza, to warn them of the dangers of working with asbestos and to avoid exposing them to those dangers. Plaintiff claims that Defendants breached these duties by failing to label the asbestos products with proper warnings and handling instructions, failing to inform Souza of the dangers of working with asbestos, and negligently exposing Souza to asbestos in the first instance. Such misconduct, Plaintiff alleges, also subjects Defendants to strict products liability pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants expressly and impliedly warranted that the asbestos products were safe and of merchantable quality by specifying their use in the boats. Plaintiff claims that Defendants made these warranties knowing that the products were defective and dangerous to humans. Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendantsbreached the warranties because the asbestos products were, in fact, "inherently dangerous" and unsuitable for use by humans.

As the result of Defendants' alleged misconduct, Plaintiff claims that Souza was exposed to, and breathed in, asbestos fibers, thereby contracting malignant mesothelioma and other asbestos-related diseases. Plaintiff maintains that Souza suffered physical and financial injuries and eventually died from his sickness. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages from Defendants as redress for their alleged misconduct and Souza's wrongful death.

Plaintiff filed this action on September 17, 2009, and Defendants responded with the instant Motions. Defendants argue that this Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims against them on two grounds. Defendants contend that they are all out-of-state parties with insufficient "minimum contacts" with Rhode Island. Defendants also assert that Plaintiff has failed to state any claim against them upon which relief may be granted. Specifically, Defendants argue that they owed Souza no duty to warn or duty of care as a matter of law because they did not produce any asbestos or asbestos-containing products. Defendants contend that they cannot be liable in strict products liability or for breach of any warranties because they are not asbestos "sellers" or "manufacturers" within the meaning of the applicable statutes. As such, Defendants assert that they cannot be liable for Souza's wrongful death because they did not engage in any negligent actions or other misconduct directed at Souza.

IIMotion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

AStandard of Review

When ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), a Rhode Island court must "examine the pleadings, accept the facts alleged by the plaintiff as true, and view disputed facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Cassidy v. Lonquist Management Co., LLC, 920 A.2d 228, 232 (R.I. 2007) (citing Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, LLP, 836 A.2d 1113, 1117 (R.I. 2003)). The reviewing court may also examine "affidavits and discovery to establish the jurisdictional facts." Ben's Marine Sales v. Sleek Craft Boats, 502 A.2d 808, 810 (R.I. 1985). In ruling on Defendants' Motions, this Court examines Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Answers to Interrogatories along with the parties' affidavits.

BPersonal Jurisdiction in Rhode Island

Our Supreme Court has held that "to withstand a defendant's Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss a complaint for lack of in personam jurisdiction, a plaintiff must make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction." Cerberus Partners, L.P, 836 A.2d at 1118 (citing Ben's Marine Sales, 502 A.2d at 809). A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction only when two requirements are met: "the complainant [must] allege facts sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rhode Island's 'long-arm' statute, and [must demonstrate] that the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the requirements of constitutional due process." Rose v. Firstar Bank, 819 A.2d 1247, 1250(R.I. 2003); Casey v. Treasure Island at the Mirage, 745 A.2d 743, 744 (R.I. 2000); Ultra Scientific, Inc. v. Yanusas, 687 A.2d 1247, 1248-49 (R.I. 1997). (Emphasis added.)

Rhode Island's "Long-arm" Statute

Rhode Island's "long-arm" statute is codified in G.L. 1956 § 9-5-33(a).² "'[Section] 9-5-33(a) permits the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent allowed by the United States Constitution.'" Cerberus Partners, L.P, 836 A.2d at 1118 (quoting Rose, 819 A.2d at 1250); see also Conn v. ITT Aetna Finance Co., 105 R.I. 397, 402, 252 A.2d 184, 186 (1969). Therefore, the existence of personal jurisdiction in a given case often turns on whether the requirements of constitutional due process have been met. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Tourism & Development Corp., 455 F. Supp. 981, 983 (D.R.I. 1978); Porter v. Porter, 684 A.2d 259, 262 (R.I. 1996) (citing Nicholson v. Buehler, 612 A.2d 693, 696 (R.I.1992)).

Constitutional Due Process Requirements

A Rhode Island court's exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the requirements of constitutional due process when the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant has "'certain minimum contacts with the forum such that maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.''" Rose, 819 A.2d at 1250 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); see also Kalooski v. Albert-Frankenthal AG, 770 A.2d 831, 832-33 (R.I. 2001); Casey, 745 A.2d at 744; Ben's Marine Sales, 502 A.2d at 809. Moreover, "there are no 'readily discernable guidelines for determining what are 'minimum contacts' for the purposes of the long-arm statute.'" Cassidy, 920 A.2d at 232 (quoting ITT Aetna Finance Co., 105 R.I. at 402, 252 A.2d at 187); see also Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1388 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 1994) and acknowledging that "'divining personal jurisdiction is 'more an art than a science''"). Rather, the reviewing court must consider the particular facts of the case at hand to determine "the 'quality and quantity of the potential defendant's contacts with the forum.'" Rose, 819 A.2d at 1250 (quoting Philips Exeter Academy v. Howard Phillips Fund, Inc., 916 F.3d 284, 288 (1st Cir. 1999)); see also Cassidy, 920 A.2d at 232.

i"Minimum Contacts"

A plaintiff satisfies the "minimum contacts" requirement by "alleg[ing] and prov[ing] the existence of either general or specific jurisdiction." Cassidy, 920 A.2d at 232 (citing Cerberus Partners, L.P, 836 A.2d at 1118). General jurisdiction exists whenthe plaintiff establishes that the defendant's "contacts with the forum state are continuous, purposeful, and systematic." Cassidy, 920 A.2d at 232; Rose, 819 A.2d at 1250. When the plaintiff demonstrates that such contacts exist, "'a nonresident defendant will subject itself to the general jurisdiction of that forum's courts with respect to all claims, regardless of whether they relate to or arise out of the nonresident's contacts with the forum.'" Cerberus Partners, 836 A.2d at 1118 (quoting Rose, 819 A.2d at 1250); see Cassidy, 920 A.2d at 232.

Specific jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff demonstrates that "'the claim sufficiently relates to or arises from any of a defendant's purposeful contacts with the forum." Cassidy, 920 A.2d at 232 (quoting Rose, 819 A.2d at 1251). The reviewing court must consider two prongs to determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of specific personal jurisdiction in a given case: the plaintiff's claims must "relate" to the defendant's specific contacts with the forum, and the defendant must have "purposefully" created those specific contacts between itself and the forum. See Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1389; Am. Jur. Products Liability § 1537 at 1 ("in order to determine whether a nonresident defendant . . . has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state . . . , the...