Santos v. City of Providence

1

EDUARDO SANTOS, LYDIA CAMACHO, EDUARDO SANTOS and LYDIA CAMACHO as Parent and Guardian of E.S., EDUARDO SANTOS as Parent of J.S., LYDIA CAMACHO as Parent of I.P., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE, by and through its acting treasurer, Lance Cardillo, STEVEN PARE, in his individual and official capacity, HUGH T. CLEMENTS, in his individual and official capacity, SEAN COMELLA, in his individual and official capacity, DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY LLC, and ABC COMPANY, Alias Officers JOHN & JANE DOE, Alias 1-10, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.

C. A. No. 23-221 WES

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island

March 20, 2024

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIAM E. SMITH, DISTRICT JUDGE

This civil rights action arises from the severe injuries that Plaintiff Eduardo Santos sustained when a Providence police officer shot him in the face with a less-than-lethal munition. The purported manufacturer of the weapon and munition at issue -Defendant Defense Technology LLC (“Defense Technology”) - moves to dismiss the claims against it. See Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 29.

Defense Technology asserts, inter alia, that the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”), 15 U.S.C. § 7903, precludes Plaintiffs' claims. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defense Technology's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Like in other cities across the country, thousands of protestors flooded the streets of Providence, Rhode Island in the summer of 2020 following the murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers. First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 19, ECF No. 27. During the height of those protests Providence police officer Sean Comella shot Eduardo Santos - a bystander not involved in the protests - in the face with a less-than-lethal munition, causing Santos to lose his left eye and sustain additional life altering injuries. Id. ¶¶ 36-38, 48-53. At the time, Santos and his wife, Lydia Camacho, were video recording the protests from their vehicle located approximately twenty yards from Officer Comella. Id. ¶¶ 28-30, 45-46.

The shooting occurred in Kennedy Plaza in the early morning hours of June 2, 2020, right when tensions between protestors and police had come to a head. Id. ¶¶ 24-28. Plaintiffs allege that, prior to the shooting, they were merely driving through Kennedy Plaza and were not involved in the protests. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. As they drove along, Camacho began video recording a group of officers as they chased, tackled, and violently beat a young black man. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. While Camacho recorded, Santos shouted to the officers to stop the beating. Id. At no point did Santos or Camacho exit the vehicle, threaten the officers, or commit a crime. Id. ¶¶ 30, 45.

Moments later, and without warning, one of those officers -Officer Comella - turned toward the vehicle and fired a kinetic impact projectile (“KIP”).^[1] Id. ¶ 36. The KIP struck Santos's left eye, face, and head, causing his eye and face to erupt; Camacho, who was sitting in the passenger seat, was dosed in blood and other body matter. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. As a result, Santos lost his left eye and sustained other severe injuries that required numerous surgeries. Id. ¶¶ 47-50. His injuries included a traumatic subarachnoid hemorrhage, extensive facial and cranial fractures, respiratory failure, ruptured globe of the left eye with uveal prolapse, seizures, loss of smell, disfigurement, and other cognitive disorders. Id. ¶ 47. Such injuries will require Santos to undergo lifelong medical care. Id. ¶ 49.

Years later, on May 25, 2023, Santos and Camacho commenced this civil rights case on behalf of themselves and their minor children. They assert twenty counts against Officer Comella, the City of Providence, the City of Providence Commissioner of Public Safety Steven Pare, Providence Police Lieutenant James Barros, several unnamed Providence police officers, Defense Technology, and ABC Company. This order solely addresses the four counts that Plaintiffs assert against Defense Technology, which purportedly manufactured and marketed the KIP launcher and KIP that injured Santos.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Said differently, the complaint need only provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). In reviewing such motions, the court “indulg[es] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996).

Under this standard, the Court employs a two-step inquiry to determine the plausibility of the claims at issue. DiCristoforo v. Fertility Sols., P.C., 521 F.Supp.3d 153, 155 (D.R.I. 2021). First, the Court “distinguish[es] ‘the complaint's factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory allegations (which need not be credited).'” Id. (quoting García-Catalán 734 F.3d at 103)). “Second, the [C]ourt must determine whether the factual allegations are sufficient to support the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). Ultimately, “the plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but asks for more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully.” inMusic Brands, Inc. v. Roland Corp., No. 17010M, 2017 WL 2416228, at *2 (D.R.I. May 22, 2017) (quoting Twombly, 556 U.S. at 663), adopted by text order (D.R.I. June 9, 2017).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs assert claims for failure to warn and for negligent marketing against Defense Technology. Id. ¶¶ 204-28. Plaintiffs allege that Defense Technology, as the manufacturer and seller of the weapons and munition at issue,^[2] is liable for failing to provide essential safety warnings and for falsely marketing its products. Id. ¶¶ 205, 212. Specifically, they aver that Defense Technology marketed its products to the Providence Police Department as “non-lethal” means of crowd control and did not warn of their unreasonably dangerous nature, despite knowing that those products had the potential to cause significant injury, disability, or death. Id. ¶¶ 205-06.

Defense Technology moves to dismiss on the basis that the PLCAA immunizes it from Plaintiffs' claims. Def.'s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Def.'s Mem.”) 10-11, ECF No. 29-1. It contends that Plaintiffs' claims constitute a “qualified civil liability action” under the PLCAA, and moreover, that they do not fall under the PLCAA's product liability exception. Def.'s Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Def.'s Reply”) 2-3, ECF No. 33. The following recitation addresses those arguments and finds that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for relief.

A. Application of PLCAA

The PLCAA immunizes businesses in the firearm and ammunition industry from “qualified civil liability actions” involving their products.^[3] 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5). Congress enacted the PLCAA in 2005 to shield firearm and ammunition businesses from causes of action stemming from the criminal or unlawful use of their products, particularly when the products function as designed and intended. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(1). As a result, the Act attempts to protect the First Amendment rights of businesses in the firearm industry, as well as to ensure that citizens have access to a supply of firearms and ammunition for lawful purposes. Id. § 7901(b)(2), (5).

Although the PLCAA immunizes firearm businesses from qualified civil liability actions, it carves out exceptions for when parties may bring suit. Travieso v. Glock Inc., 526 F.Supp.3d 533, 537-38 (D. Ariz. 2021) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(i)-(iv)). The Court therefore invokes a two-step inquiry to determine the applicability of the PLCAA. Heikkila v. Kahr Firearms Grp., No. 1:20-CV-02705-MDB, 2022 WL 17960555, at *10 (D. Colo. Dec. 27, 2022). First, it determines whether the claims constitute a qualified civil liability action. Id. Second, the Court examines whether any of the PLCAA's exceptions apply. Id.; Ryan v. Hughes-Ortiz, 959 N.E.2d 1000, 1007 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012).

1. PLCAA's General Prohibition on Qualified Civil Liability Actions

A “qualified civil liability action” includes claims “brought by any person against a manufacturer . . . of a qualified product . . . resulting from the criminal or unlawful use of a qualified product by the person or a third party.” 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A).

Defense Technology contends that Plaintiffs' claims constitute a qualified civil liability action because Officer Comella unlawfully used the weapons and munition when he shot Santos. Def.'s Mem. 11; Def.'s Reply 5-6. Because there is no dispute that the KIPs and KIP launchers are qualified products,^[4] the Court need only address whether Officer Comella used those products in a criminal or unlawful manner. See Ryan, 959 N.E.2d at 1007.

The Court agrees that Officer Comella's use of the KIPs and KIP launcher was unlawful. “Unlawful misuse” is a term of art under the PLCAA that encompasses “conduct that violates a statute, ordinance, or regulation as it relates to the use of a qualified product.”^[5] 15 U.S.C. § 7903(9). Here, the Amended Complaint expressly alleges that Officer Comella used excessive force against Santos, which violated his constitutional rights.^[6] FAC ¶¶ 133-54. Thus, because the Court must assume that those allegations are true, Plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 trigger the PLCAA's general prohibition on qualified civil liability actions.^[7] See Doyle v. Combined Sys., Inc., ...