Santos v. Franciscan Health

216 N.E.3d 449

Angela SANTOS, Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.FRANCISCAN HEALTH, Appellee-Defendant.

Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-EX-2611

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed July 24, 2023

Attorneys for Appellant: Daniel A. Korban, George C. Patrick, George C. Patrick & Associates, P.C., Crown Point, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Jenny R. Buchheit, Ann H. Stewart, Ice Miller LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana

Foley, Judge.

[1] Angela Santos ("Santos") appeals from the dismissal of her Application for Adjustment of Claim ("Application") by the Full Board of the Worker's Compensation Board of Indiana ("the Board"), which affirmed the determination of the Single Hearing Member that concluded that her Application was untimely filed. Santos asserts that her Application was timely filed because, although Indiana Code section 22-3-3-3 is a non-claim statute, Indiana Trial Rules 5 and 6 apply to allow an application to be timely filed when the two-year time period after a work injury falls on a Sunday, and the applicant mails the application on the next business day via certified mail. Finding that the Board erred when it dismissed Santos's claim, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 5, 2019, Santos suffered an injury to her lower back during the course of and arising out of her employment with Franciscan Health. Santos's injury was accepted as compensable by Franciscan Health, and she was provided worker's compensation benefits pursuant to Title 22, Article 3 of the Indiana Code.

[3] Santos sought an adjustment of her claim. The deadline for Santos to file her Application was December 5, 2021, which fell on a Sunday. On Monday, December 6, 2021, Santos filed her Application with the Board via certified mail with return receipt requested. The Board received her Application on December 10, 2021. On April 6, 2022, Franciscan Health filed its motion to dismiss Santos's Application, arguing that it was not timely filed, and the Board therefore lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. The Board, by its Single Hearing Member, granted the motion without a hearing, finding that Indiana Code section 22-3-3-3 is a "non-claim statute with requirements that cannot be set aside or excused" and that, under the statute, a claim is "extinguished if not exercised within the proscribed time limit." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 29–30. Because Santos's Application was not filed on or prior to December 5, 2021, it was found to be untimely, and her claim was dismissed. On June 2, 2022, Santos appealed the Single Hearing Member's Order to the Full Board, by filing her Application for Review by Full Board. Both parties filed briefs, and the Full Board held a hearing. On October 3, 2022, the Full Board issued an order affirming the Single Hearing Member's order. Santos now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Santos argues that the Board erred in granting Franciscan Health's motion to dismiss her Application on the ground that it was not timely filed. "In reviewing a worker's compensation decision, an appellate court is bound by the factual determinations of the Board and may not disturb them unless the evidence is undisputed and leads inescapably to a contrary conclusion." Christopher R. Brown, D.D.S., Inc. v. Decatur Cnty. Mem'l Hosp. , 892 N.E.2d 642, 646 (Ind. 2008). We examine the record only to determine whether there is substantial evidence and reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom to support the Board's findings and conclusion. Id. " ‘As to the Board's interpretation of the law, we employ a deferential standard of review of the interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency charged with its enforcement in light of its expertise in the given area.’ " Gilley's Antique Mall v. Sarver , 157 N.E.3d 549, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Brown , 892 N.E.2d at 646 ), trans. denied. The Board will only be reversed if it incorrectly interpreted the Worker's Compensation Act. Id.

[5] Indiana Code section 22-3-3-3 provides that a worker's compensation claim must be filed within two years of an accident:

The right to compensation under IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-6 shall be forever barred unless within two (2) years after the occurrence of the accident, or if death results therefrom, within two (2) years after such death, a claim for compensation thereunder shall be filed with the worker's compensation board.

Ind. Code § 22-3-3-3(a). Section 22-3-3-3 is a non-claim statute that "creates a right of action and has inherent in it the denial of a right of action." Gilley's Antique Mall , 157 N.E.3d at 553 (citations omitted). A non-claim statute should not be seen "merely as a statute of limitations." Ind. State Police v. Wiessing , 836 N.E.2d 1038, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Ry. Exp. Agency v. Harrington , 119 Ind.App. 593, 88 N.E.2d 175, 176 (1949) ), trans. denied. While statutes of limitation create defenses that must be pled and waived, a non-claim statute creates an enforceable right of action unknown under the common law. Blackford v. Welborn Clinic , 172 N.E.3d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2021). It creates "a condition attached to the right to recover" or "a condition precedent to the right to maintain the action." Wiessing , 836 N.E.2d at 1048. A non-claim statute is self-executing–unlike the general statute of limitations—and unless a party files a claim within the prescribed time, no enforceable right of action is created. Blackford , 172 N.E.3d at 1225. "Non-claim statutes generally are not subject to equitable exceptions." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

[6] Here, the Board found that Santos's Application was not timely filed because the time period under Indiana Code section 22-3-3-3 expired on December 5, 2021, and the Application was not filed until December 6, 2021. The Board further found that the statute is a non-claim statute with "requirements that cannot be set aside or excused," there is no ambiguity in the statute, and "the claim is extinguished if not exercised within the proscribed time limit." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 29–30. This determination by the Single Hearing Member was affirmed by the Full Worker's Compensation Board. There is no dispute that December 5, 2021, was the two-year anniversary of the occurrence of Santos's injury. The evidence showed that Santos mailed her Application via certified mail on December 6, 2021, and the Application was received by the Board on December 10, 2021; both of these dates are beyond the two-year deadline for filing the Application under the Worker's Compensation Act.

[7] Santos argues that because the Worker's Compensation Act ("the Act") is silent as to the manner in which an application must be filed, Trial Rules 5(F) and 6(A) apply to the two-year filing deadline under Indiana Code section 22-3-3-3, and as a result, her Application was filed timely. According to Santos, because the last day of the two-year period falls on a weekend or a holiday, the last day of her two-year period should be extended to the next business day after the weekend, which was December 6, 2021. Because she filed her Application by certified mail, return receipt requested, the Application is deemed filed as of the date of the mailing, which was December 6, 2021.

[8] Trial Rule 5 provides, in pertinent part:

The filing of pleadings, motions, and other papers with the court as required by these rules shall be made by one of the following methods:

....

(3) Mailing to the clerk by registered, certified or express mail return receipt requested;

....

Filing by registered or certified mail and by third-party commercial carrier shall be complete upon mailing or deposit.

Ind. Trial Rule 5(F). Trial Rule 6 states in pertinent part:

In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included unless it is:

(1) a Saturday,

(2) a Sunday,

(3) a legal holiday as defined by state statute, or

(4) a day the office in which the act is to be done is closed during regular business hours.

In any event, the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, a legal holiday, or a day on which the office is closed.

T.R. 6(A).

[9] It is generally true that the Indiana Trial Rules do not govern or bind the Board. LaGarda Sec. v. Lawalin , 812 N.E.2d 830, 834 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) ; Josam Mfg. Co. v. Ross , 428 N.E.2d 74, 75 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) ; Davis v. Webster , 136 Ind.App. 286, 198 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1964). "Each of the several administrative agencies is a creature of the Legislature," and "[t]he procedures to be followed in presenting matters to these agencies and in appeals therefrom are specifically set out in the statutes pertaining to each." Clary v. Nat'l Friction Prods., Inc. , 259 Ind. 581, 290 N.E.2d 53, 55 (1972). The Trial Rules, which, as stated in Trial Rule 1, govern the procedure and practice in all courts of the state of Indiana are presumptively not applicable to proceedings before the administrative agencies nor to the proceedings requisite to invoking the jurisdiction of reviewing judicial authority. Id.

[10] The Act itself, however, provides that the Board "may adopt rules ... to carry into effect the worker's compensation law." I.C. § 22-3-1-3. As set forth in Title 631 of the Indiana Administrative Code, the Board affirmed that "[e]xcept as provided," it "will not be bound by any technical rules of practice in conducting hearings ...." 631 Ind. Admin. Code 1-1-3 (emphasis added). This language shows an intent by the Board to not be bound by Trial Rules in its procedure of conducting hearings but not in the filing procedure or the computation of time for filing. Later in the same section, the Board expressly adopted certain Trial Rules, when it stated, "the board incorporates by reference the...