Sarmiento v. Producer's Gin of Waterproof, Inc.

Page 725

439 F.Supp.2d 725

Pablo SARMIENTO, Plaintiff v. PRODUCER'S GIN OF WATERPROOF, INC., et al Defendants

No. CIV.A. M-06-092.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, McAllen Division.

July 20, 2006.

Benjamin J. Weber, Douglas L. Stevick, Southern Migrant Legal Services, Nashville, TN, Lakshmi Ramakrishnan, Texas Riogrande Legal Aid, Weslaco, TX, for Plaintiff.

Rex N. Leach, Atlas and Hall, McAllen, TX, for Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION TO TRANSFER

CRANE, District Judge.

Defendants Producer's Gin of Waterproof, Inc. and Robert White ("Defendants") move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff Pablo Sarmiento's cause for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 12). Alternatively, Defendants seek a transfer of venue according to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a). Id. Based upon the parties' motions, supporting evidence and arguments, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue and DENIES Defendants' Motion to Transfer for the reasons stated below.

I. Background

Plaintiff, a migrant farm worker and Texas resident, brought this action against Defendants based on alleged violations of his rights under Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("AWPA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq. (Doc. 1). Defendants operate a cotton gin in Louisiana. (Doc. 12). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, acting through an agent in Texas named Guadalupe Gonzalez, recruited him to work in Louisiana. (Doc. 1; Doc. 16). Plaintiff contends that Gonzalez made him promises regarding the amount of work and wages in Louisiana; however, at no time did Gonzalez give Plaintiff a written disclosure of terms or employment contract. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff traveled to Louisiana in the alleged agent's van. (Doc. 1). Upon his arrival, he was terminated by Defendants. (Doc. 1).

In this action, Plaintiff asserts ten claims under AWPA, specifically alleging that Defendants (1) failed to disclose in writing the terms and conditions of employment at the time of recruitment in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a); (2) failed to provide adequate pay statements in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2); (3) violated "the working arrangement without justification" in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1822(c); (4) failed to post in a conspicuous place at the place of employment a poster setting forth the rights and protections afforded to migrant agricultural workers in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1821(b); (5) failed to post in a conspicuous place at the housing or present to Plaintiff a statement of the terms and conditions of occupancy of the housing in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1821(c); (6) housed workers in a facility that did not comply with substantive health and safety standards in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1823(a); (7) failed to post in the housing facility a certificate of compliance with federal and state safety and health standards before allowing Plaintiff to occupy housing in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1823(b); (8) used or caused to be used a vehicle to transport migrant agricultural workers that did not comply with federal safety standards in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1841(b); (9) failed to confirm the registration of a farm labor contractor in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1842; and (10) failed to provide recruitment disclosures and a statement of the terms and conditions of housing occupancy in Spanish in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1821(g). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff does not raise any state law claims. (Doc. 1).

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue according to Rule 12(b)(2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 12). Specifically, Defendants aver that Defendant Producer's Gin of Waterproof, Inc. does not conduct business in the State of Texas, that Defendant Robert White, the general manager of the gin, does not reside or conduct business in the state of Texas, that all material witnesses, except for Plaintiff, and records are located in Louisiana, and that all the work done by Plaintiff and relevant allegations regarding the work conditions took place in Louisiana. (Doc. 12; Defendant's Affidavit). In the alternative, Defendants move to transfer Plaintiffs cause to the Western District of Louisiana under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a). (Doc. 12).

In response, Plaintiff argues that the alleged recruiting agent's actions in Texas constitute minimum contacts, and that several of his AWPA claims arise out of his transactions with the alleged agent, such that this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. (Doc. 16). Plaintiff contends that his arguments are supported by specific evidence, namely his own affidavit. (Doc. 16, Exhibit A). Specifically, Plaintiff avers that he learned that Guadalupe Gonzalez was looking to recruit men for work at a cotton gin, that he met with Gonzalez in Donna, Texas, that Gonzalez made promises about the amount of work and pay, that Gonzalez required Plaintiff to ride in his truck to Louisiana because he would receive extra money for transporting workers, and that Gonzalez did not give Plaintiff anything in writing about the job. Id. Based upon these factual allegations, and because Defendant White did not specifically controvert these facts in his affidavit, Plaintiff argues that sufficient contacts existed to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. (Doc. 16).

II. Analysis

A. Personal Jurisdiction

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that a plaintiff opposing a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Moreno v. Milk Train, Inc., 182 F.Supp.2d 590, 593 (W.D.Tex.2002) citing Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216-17 (5th Cir.1990). In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, the court must accept as true all uncontroverted allegations in the complaint and resolve all factual conflicts contained in the parties' affidavits in favor of the plaintiff. Moreno, 182 F.Supp.2d at 593(internal citation omitted). Therefore, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case supporting personal jurisdiction. Id. (internal citation omitted).

Because AWPA is silent as to service of process, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) permits a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over those defendants who are subject to the jurisdiction of Texas courts. See Aviles v. Kunkle, 978 F.2d 201, 203-04 (5th Cir.1992)(per curiam)(internal citations omitted); Moreno, 182 F.Supp.2d at 593(internal citation omitted). Therefore, the determination of Defendants' amenability to personal jurisdiction depends on the Texas long-arm statute's exercise of jurisdiction. Aviles, 978 F.2d at 204(internal citations omitted); Moreno, 182 F.Supp.2d at 593(internal citations omitted). The Texas long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the constitutionally permissible limits of due process. Aviles, 978 F.2d at 204 citing Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 954 F.2d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 867, 113 S.Ct. 193, 121 L.Ed.2d 136 (1992); Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex.1990); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code §§ 17.041-17.045 (Vernon Supp.2006); Moreno, 182 F.Supp.2d at 593(internal citations omitted). Therefore, the court must determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendants is consistent with the Due Process Clause. Id.

Due Process requires that (1) the defendant have established "minimum contacts" with the forum state; and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice". Ham v. La Cienega Music Co., 4 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir.1993) citing Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987) and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). With regard to the first requirement, "minimum contacts" are established when a nonresident defendant "purposefully avails himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state . .." Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 182 F.3d 291, 294-95 (5th Cir.1999)(internal quotations omitted). The defendant's connection must be such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum state. Id. (internal citation omitted).

Moreover, "the `minimum contacts' prong can be subdivided into contacts that give rise to `specific' personal jurisdiction and those that give rise to `general' jurisdiction." Id. citing Gundle Lining Constr. Corp. v. Adams County Asphalt, Inc., 85 F.3d 201 (5th Cir.1996). The court appropriately exercises specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only when his purposeful contacts with the forum state arise from or are directly related to the cause of action. Id. citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). General jurisdiction, on the other hand, is properly exercised when the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state are continuous, systematic, and substantial, even if they are unrelated to the cause of action. Id. citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415, 104 S.Ct. 1868 and Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 649 (5th Cir.1994).

Plaintiff insists that the Defendants, acting through their agent, established sufficient minimum contacts arising out of or related to his claims for this Court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 16). As an initial matter, the Court notes that the alleged recruitment activities are defined as acts constituting business in this state by the Texas longarm statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.042 ("[a] nonresident does business in this state if the nonresident ... recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in this state, for employment inside or outside this state."). Plaintiff points out that not...