Sarwar v. Om Sai, LLC

SAIM SARWAR, Plaintiff, v. OM SAI, LLC, Defendant.

Docket no. 2:20-cv-00483-GZS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

May 18, 2021

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint (ECF No. 10). Via this Motion, Defendant asks the Court to find that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his claim under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189. For reasons explained herein, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendant's Motion invokes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which requires dismissal of claims over which this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. A federal court is obligated to ensure the existence of subject matter jurisdiction before considering the merits of any complaint. See, e.g., United States v. University of Mass., Worcester, 812 F.3d 35, 44 (1st Cir. 2016). Plaintiffs generally bear the burden of demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1209-10 (1st Cir. 1996). Faced with a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, the Court applies the same "plausibility standard applicable under Rule 12(b)(6)" to the operative complaint. Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 730 (1st Cir. 2016). However, the Court may also consider additional materials submitted by either side that allow it to resolve the jurisdictional challenge. See Valentin v. Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 363-64 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting that "plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations . . . [may be] augmented by an explanatory affidavit or other repository of uncontested facts").

In accordance with Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may only decide cases that "embody a genuine, live dispute between adverse parties." Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 498 (2020) (explaining that this requirement "prevent[s] the federal courts from issuing advisory opinions"). The doctrine of standing implements this requirement by imposing three key requirements on a plaintiff: "(1) . . . an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). "The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing these elements and must plead sufficient factual matter to plausibly demonstrate standing to bring the action." Perez-Kudzma v. United States, 940 F.3d 142, 145 (1st Cir. 2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 796 (2021) ("The doctrine of standing generally assesses whether [a plaintiff's personal] interest exists at the outset.")

As to injury in fact, the "first and foremost of standing's three elements," the Supreme Court has explained that "Congress cannot erase [the injury-in-fact requirement] by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing." Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547-48 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, even when a plaintiff bases his case on the violation of a federal statute, "[t]o establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered 'an invasion of a legally protected interest' that is 'concrete and particularized' and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'" Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); seealso Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 140 S. Ct. 1615, 1620 (2020) ("This Court has rejected the argument that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Saim Sarwar is a resident of New York. He "is unable to engage in the major life activity of walking more than a few steps without assistive devices." (Am. Compl. (ECF No. 8), PageID # 25.) He also has "limited use of his hands," which impacts his ability to grasp objects. (Id.) Outside his home, he "often uses a wheelchair." (Id.) Sarwar is a self-proclaimed "advocate" for "similarly situated disabled persons." (Id., PageID # 26.) His advocacy focuses on working as "a 'tester' for the purpose of asserting his civil rights and monitoring, ensuring, and determining whether places of public accommodation and their websites are in compliance with the ADA." (Id.) More specifically and as it relates to this case, Sarwar tests online reservation systems ("ORS") of hotels and lodging establishments to ensure that these systems comply with ADA regulations regarding making reservations for accessible guest rooms. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1).

Defendant Om Sai, LLC ("Om Sai") owns and operates the Brookside Motel, which is located in Saco, Maine. By operating this lodging establishment, Om Sai is subject to the various regulations that seek to ensure places of public accommodation are accessible to disabled persons. Prior to December 30, 2020, Sarwar visited the ORS for the Brookside Motel multiple times "for the purpose of reviewing and assessing the accessible features at the Property and ascertain[ing] whether they meet the requirements of 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e) and his accessibility needs." (Am.Compl., PageID # 28.) Sarwar has "had plans to travel to New England, including Maine to sightsee" in Maine's coastal towns "since before [he] filed this case." (Sarwar Decl. (ECF No. 13-1), PageID #s 95-96.) He "intend[s] to travel in August 2021." (Id., PageID # 96.)

Prior to December 30, 2020, when Sarwar visited www.brooksidemotelandcottages.com, the ORS "failed to identify accessible rooms, failed to provide an option for booking an accessible room, and did not provide sufficient information as to whether the rooms or features at the hotel are accessible."¹ (Am. Compl., PageID # 29.) Sarwar asserts that the failure to include this accessibility information deprives him of the ability "to make meaningful choices for travel." (Id., PageID # 30.) He further asserts that the conditions he encountered when visiting the ORS from his home caused him to suffer "frustration and humiliation as the result of the discriminatory conditions present at [this] website" and "contribute[d] to [his] sense of isolation and segregation." (Id.)

In other similar cases filed in this District² and federal courts in various other states, Sarwar claims to have documented similar problems with the ORS of other lodging establishments. In total, he has filed at least 248 similar cases involving non-compliant ORS. (See Def. Ex. A (ECF No. 10-1).) Sarwar "maintains a list of all hotels he has sued . . . [and] continually updates this list." (Am. Compl., PageID # 30.)

In this case, Sarwar ultimately seeks a declaratory judgment, an injunction requiring Defendant to bring its ORS into compliance with 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1), as well as attorney's fees and costs.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant urges the Court to dismiss this action due to Plaintiff's lack of standing; more specifically, due to Plaintiff's lack of any plausible injury that is concrete and imminent. (See Def. Mot. (ECF No. 10), PageID #s 37-40.) At the outset, it is important to note that Sarwar is only alleging a violation of the ADA's "Reservations Rule"³ found in 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1). He does not allege that Defendant's establishment has physical barriers that violate applicable ADA building standards, nor does he allege that the ORS itself is inaccessible. Thus, his claimed injury is an informational injury, which Plaintiff insists is sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. (See Pl. Response (ECF No. 13), PageID #s 77-92.) On the record presented, the Court disagrees.

The Supreme Court has recognized informational injuries as a basis for standing previously. First, in Havens Realty Corp v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a tester had standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act when he was denied "truthful information concerning the availability of housing." Id. at 373. Then, in Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989), the Court found that an advocacy group suing for information under the Federal Advisory Committee Act could establish standing by showing"that they sought and were denied" information subject to disclosure under this statute. Id. at 449. Almost a decade later, in Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), the Supreme Court found that voters had standing under the Federal Election Campaign Act to obtain information subject to disclosure under that Act. See id. at 21. In considering these Supreme Court precedents, the First Circuit has explained that all "relied on Congress's power to identify 'previously inadequate' intangible injuries and protect them with 'procedural right[s]' whose infraction 'constitute[s] injury in fact' without proof of 'any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.'" Amrhein v. eClinical Works, LLC, 954 F.3d 328, 333 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). However, in the same decision, the First Circuit acknowledged, "[t]here are limits; even Congress can't spin a 'bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm' into an 'injury-in-fact.'" Id. (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549).

Plaintiff asserts that by seeking to vindicate the Reservations Rule, he "falls squarely within the holding of Havens Realty and its progeny." (Pl. Response, PageID # 91.) However, in the Court's assessment, finding standing based solely on Plaintiff's status as an e-tester who sustained an informational injury while generally conducting online research of lodging options would require an expansion of the holdings of Havens Realty, Akins, and Public Citizen into the ADA context. See, e.g., Carello v. Aurora Policemen Credit Union, 930 F.3d 830, 835 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J.) (...