Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Newsweek Magazine LLC

661 F.Supp.3d 159

The SATANIC TEMPLE, INC., Plaintiff, v. NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE LLC and Julia Duin, Defendants.

1:22-cv-1343 (MKV)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

Signed March 8, 2023

Matthew Henry Sheppe, Reiss Sheppe LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Cameron Altman Stracher, New York, NY, Sara Tesoriero, Stracher Law, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, United States District Judge:

The Satanic Temple, Inc. ("The Satanic Temple" or "Plaintiff") filed this defamation case against Newsweek Magazine LLC ("Newsweek") and Julia Duin (together, "Defendants") in connection with numerous statements contained in an article titled "Orgies, Harassment, Fraud: Satanic Temple Rocked by Accusations, Lawsuit." Defendant Duin moves to dismiss the claim against her for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and separately moved with Newsweek to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, the jurisdictional motion is granted, while the merits motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND¹

The Satanic Temple is a religious organization which "venerates (but does not worship) the biblical adversary as a promethean icon against tyranny." [ECF No. 1] ("Compl.") ¶ 12. The organizational mission of The Satanic Temple is to propagate its Seven Tenets, which it does by engaging in various charitable activities, holding weekly services, having a structured ministry program, providing a sobriety program, and offering after-school childcare. Compl. ¶ 14.

The Satanic Temple also brings plenty of lawsuits. Many of these lawsuits purport to protect the religious rights of the organization's members and tend, as a corollary, to capture public attention. Compl. ¶ 15. But these are not the only headline-grabbing suits that Plaintiff has brought. As relevant to this case, Plaintiff also brought a defamation suit in the Western District of Washington against several of its former members, who ascribed extremist ideologies and affiliations to the organization. Compl. ¶ 19; see also United Fed'n of Churches v. Johnson, 522 F. Supp. 3d 842 (W.D. Wash. 2021) (the "Johnson Case"). After the defamation claims from that suit were dismissed, Newsweek published an article on its website titled "Orgies, Harassment, Fraud: Satanic Temple Rocked by Accusations, Lawsuit." Compl. Ex. 1 (the "Article").

The Article, which was written by Julia Duin, discusses not only the claims involved in the Johnson Case, but also new accusations leveled against The Satanic Temple. Compl. Ex. 1. As the Article's title suggests, these accusations concern, among other things, a pattern of sexual deviancy and abuse, as well as a history of harassing dissenters. Compl. Ex. 1.

The Satanic Temple brought this libel lawsuit against Defendants alleging that numerous statements contained in the Article were independently defamatory or defamatory by implication. Defendant Duin moved to dismiss the claim against her for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) [ECF Nos. 16, 17], and Defendants both moved to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) [ECF Nos. 19, 20].²

LEGAL STANDARDS

To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 495 (2d Cir. 2006). "In evaluating whether the requisite showing has been made," the Court must "construe the pleadings and any supporting materials in the light most favorable" to the plaintiff. Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 167 (2d Cir. 2013).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

DISCUSSION

I. JURISDICTION

Duin moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. When responding to a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden to make a prima facie showing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant. See Thomas, 470 F.3d at 495. Personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in a diversity action is governed by the law of the state in which the federal district court sits, which, in this case, is New York. See Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994).

New York's long-arm statute provides for general and specific personal jurisdiction.³ Pursuant to that long-arm statute, a court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that "in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state." New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") Section 302(a)(1).⁴ Specific jurisdiction over the non-domiciliary also requires that the cause of action arise from the enumerated acts. See Biro v. Nast, No. 11-cv-4442, 2012 WL 3262770, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2012). With respect to the "transacting business" part of the analysis, courts look to "the totality of the defendant's activities within the forum." Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Fidelity Mortg. Inv'rs, 510 F.2d 870, 873-74 (2d Cir. 1975).

In defamation cases, New York courts construe "transacts any business within the state" more narrowly than in other types of litigation. Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 248 (2d Cir. 2007). The Second Circuit has explained that "the single act of uttering a defamation, no matter how loudly, is not a transact[ion of] business that may provide the foundation for personal jurisdiction." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Something "more than the distribution of a libelous statement must be made within the state to establish long-arm jurisdiction over the person distributing it." Id. at 249. Courts have considered the requirement that the Defendant do "something more" to be satisfied "when at least part of the defamatory content was created, researched, written, developed, or produced in New York." Goldfarb v. Channel One Russia, 442 F. Supp. 3d 649, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (collecting cases).

Here, Plaintiff has not sufficiently identified an utterance, much less "something more," to establish personal jurisdiction over Duin. Plaintiff admits that the Article refers to conduct that took place outside of New York and does not contend that Duin conducted any research in New York, interviewed any sources in New York, or otherwise drafted any portion of the Article in New York. Specific jurisdiction considers the totality of the defendant's activity in the forum, but Plaintiff has failed to allege that Duin has engaged in any activity in the forum. Rather, Plaintiff argues that Duin is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York because she allegedly is employed by Newsweek, which is a New York company. Plaintiff has failed, however, to provide any reasoning or case law to support that conclusion.

The two cases on which Plaintiff principally relies are entirely inapposite. In the first case, Goldfarb, the court found that the defendant, a Russian television company, was subject to personal jurisdiction in New York because it operated a studio in Manhattan, conducted an interview with Plaintiff pertaining to the claims in that case at that New York studio, and distributed its programing throughout Manhattan. 442 F. Supp. 3d at 658. And even with those alleged New York contacts, the Court (while refusing to dismiss) deemed the jurisdictional inquiry "a close case." Id. at 662 (emphasis added). And in the second case, Sovik v. Healing Network, 244 A.D.2d 985, 665 N.Y.S.2d 997 (4th Dep't 1997), the Fourth Department concluded that an allegedly defamatory letter sent by the defendants could provide a basis for personal jurisdiction where the defendants had "drafted the letter and either distributed or authorized the distribution of the letter in the Buffalo area," thereby demonstrating the defendants' "active involvement and personal control [in New York] over the writing and distribution of the allegedly defamatory statement." Id. at 987, 665 N.Y.S.2d 997. That is a far cry from what is alleged in this case.

Plaintiff argues that the Court should grant it jurisdictional discovery before determining that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant Duin. The purpose of such discovery, as set out by Plaintiff, would be to determine the true relationship between Duin and Newsweek, given that the Complaint alleges that she is an employee (Compl. ¶ 10), while Duin filed a declaration in support of her motion to dismiss attesting that she is an independent contractor (ECF No. 18 ¶ 3). But that factual dispute need not be resolved because, for the reasons discussed above, the Court would lack jurisdiction regardless of Duin's employment status.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that if the Court decides it does not have jurisdiction, it should transfer the case to the District of Massachusetts, which, according to Plaintiff, would have jurisdiction over both defendants. Plaintiff does not explain the basis for this assertion, but it presumably rests on the allegation that Plaintiff is incorporated in the state of Massachusetts. Plaintiff has cited no authority, however, for the proposition that Massachusetts has personal...