Sathre v. Davis

1

CURTIS J. SATHRE III, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAIMIE DAVIS, Defendant and Appellant.

B324459

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Seventh Division

June 17, 2024

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No BS136533, Richard L. Fruin, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

Jaimie Davis, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

Reif Law Group, Brandon S. Reif, Marc S. Ehrlich, and Drew Frey for Plaintiff and Respondent.

SEGAL J.

INTRODUCTION

In 2012 Jaimie Davis lost an arbitration she filed against her former investment advisor, Curtis J. Sathre III, and his company to recover losses she incurred in risky investments. The judgment confirming the arbitration award included an award against Davis of over $135,000 in costs and expert fees, an award Davis has never paid. As the 10-year anniversary of the judgment approached, Sathre filed a renewal of judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 683.110,^[1] and the court ordered the judgment renewed. Davis appeals from the trial court's orders denying her motions to vacate the renewal of judgment and an amended renewal of judgment. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Sathre and Others Obtain an Arbitration Award of Costs and Fees Against Davis, the Trial Court Confirms the Award, and We Affirm

In 2010 Davis filed a statement of claim against WFP Securities, Inc., an independent broker-dealer and licensed member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA);^[2] John Schooler, WFP Securities' president; and Sathre, a registered representative with WFP Securities. Davis alleged she lost $350,000 in fraudulent investment products Sathre falsely told her were safe, income-producing investments. She further alleged she was in jeopardy of losing $1,862,500 in risky, illiquid limited partnerships and non-publicly traded investments. Davis asserted causes of action for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, failure to supervise, control person liability, and violation of the Corporations Code. She sought more than $2 million in compensatory damages.

The parties arbitrated the dispute under FINRA's rules and procedures. The arbitration proceeded before a panel of three arbitrators in 2011 and 2012. During the arbitration the arbitrators excluded the testimony of Davis's expert witness as a discovery sanction. The arbitrators ultimately ruled against Davis, finding that she "failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence any of the causes of actions or allegations alleged" and that her causes of action were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The arbitrators also ruled that Davis had filed duplicative claims in other fora, that it was "highly likely" she was seeking double recovery, and that her actions violated Rule 12209 of the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (which provides that, "[d]uring an arbitration, no party may bring any suit, legal action, or proceeding against any other party that concerns or that would resolve any of the matters raised in the arbitration"). The arbitrators ordered Davis to pay Sathre, Schooler, and WFP Securities $135,755.89 in costs and expert witness fees, plus interest at 10 percent per year, and $21,000 in arbitration fees. The arbitrators also recommended FINRA expunge the arbitration from Sathre's and Schooler's registration records maintained in FINRA's Central Registration Depository (CRD).^[3]

In 2012 the trial court confirmed the arbitration award and ordered FINRA to expunge references to the arbitration from Sathre's and Schooler's CRD records. Davis appealed from the order confirming the award and denying her petition to vacate it, arguing the trial court should have vacated the award because the arbitrators erred in excluding her expert's testimony and because WFP Securities intimidated another investor from testifying on her behalf. We affirmed. (WFP Securities, Inc. v. Davis (Apr. 15, 2014, B244528) [nonpub. opn.].)

B. Davis Tries To Prevent Sathre from Enforcing the Judgment and Asserts New Claims Against Him

In 2019 Sathre, seeking to enforce the judgment against Davis, obtained an order requiring her to appear for a judgment debtor examination. After the trial court denied various motions and ex parte applications by Davis to prevent her judgment debtor examination from occurring, Davis filed a petition for a writ of mandate. We granted the petition and held the trial court erred in denying Davis's motions and applications without allowing her to appear telephonically at, and without providing a court reporter for, the hearings. We reversed the orders and directed the superior court to designate a different judge to hear Davis's motions. (Davis v. Superior Court (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 607.)

Meanwhile, in 2019 Davis moved to compel arbitration of various new claims she was trying to assert against Sathre, Schooler, and WFP Securities, as well as requests to stay Sathre's efforts to enforce the judgment against her and to vacate certain abstracts of judgment and notices of lien. The trial court denied Davis's motion to compel arbitration, and Davis appealed. We held that the trial court erred in denying Davis's motion to compel arbitration of her tort claims, but that the court did not err in denying some of her other requests for relief. (WFP Securities, Inc. v. Davis (May 14, 2021, B304048) [nonpub. opn.].)

C. The Trial Court Denies Davis's Motions To Vacate the Renewal of Judgment

All this took time, and the clock was ticking on the 2012 judgment. So, on June 7, 2022 Sathre filed an application for renewal of judgment under section 683.110, and the clerk of the court renewed the judgment. A few days later, Sathre filed an amended application for renewal of judgment to correct some typographical errors in the original application. On July 8, 2022 the court granted Sathre's amended application, and on July 14, 2022 the court entered a signed order granting the amended application.

Davis filed motions to vacate both the original renewal of judgment and the amended renewal of judgment. The trial court denied both motions. Davis timely appealed from the orders denying both motions.^[4]

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

A money judgment is enforceable for 10 years from the date of its entry and may be renewed for another 10 years. (Fidelity Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 195, 200201.) A "judgment creditor has two distinct methods by which to continue to pursue collection of a judgment as it nears expiration of the 10-year period of enforceability: the renewal of judgment provisions set forth in section 683.110 et seq., or an independent action on the judgment. Although the two methods are distinct, the defenses available to the judgment debtor in the statutory procedure are the same as in an independent action on the judgment." (Goldman v. Simpson (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 255, 260-261.) The trial court may vacate a renewal of a judgment "on any ground that would be a defense to an action on the judgment, including the ground that the amount of the renewed judgment . . . is incorrect." (§ 683.170, subd. (a); see Altizer v. Highsmith (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 331, 339.)

"In an independent action on a judgment, the debtor may challenge the judgment 'in accordance with the rules and principles governing collateral attack.'" (Goldman v. Simpson, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 261.) "Collateral attack is proper to contest lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction or the granting of relief which the court has no power to grant [citations]. Nonjurisdictional errors, however, are not appropriate procedural targets within this context." (Armstrong v. Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d 942, 950; see People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 661 [when "a court has fundamental jurisdiction, but acts in excess of its jurisdiction," its judgment should be challenged directly and is "generally not subject to collateral attack once the judgment is final"].)

Section 683.170 is derived from section 1710.40, which governs motions to vacate judgments entered in California based on judgments from other states. (Fidelity Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 202.) Section 1710.40 contains language similar to section 683.170: It provides a judgment "may be vacated on any ground which would be a defense to an action in this state on the sister state judgment . . . ." (§ 1710.40, subd. (a).) The Law Revision Commission comment to section 1710.40 lists common defenses to enforcement of a sister state judgment: "the judgment is not final and unconditional . . .; the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud; the judgment was rendered in excess of jurisdiction; the judgment is not enforceable in the state of rendition; the plaintiff is guilty of misconduct; the judgment has already been paid; suit on the judgment is barred by the statute of limitations in the state where enforcement is sought." (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 20 West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (2007 ed.) foil. § 1710.40, p. 385.)

In the trial court Davis had the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, she was entitled to vacate the renewal of judgment under section 683.170, subdivision (a). (See American Contractors Indemnity Co. v. Hernandez (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 845, 848; Rubin v. Ross (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 153, 161.) On appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a renewal of judgment under section 683.170 "we examine the evidence in a light most favorable to the order under review and the trial court's ruling for an abuse of discretion." (Fidelity Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 199.) We independently review issues...