Satterwhite v. Ashtabula Cnty. Metroparks

514 F.Supp.3d 1014

Shalana SATTERWHITE, Plaintiff,

v.ASHTABULA COUNTY METROPARKS, Defendant.

Case No. 1:19-CV-02690

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

Signed January 19, 2021

Brian C. Mulhall, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff.

John D. Latchney, O'Toole McLaughlin Dooley & Pecora, Sheffield Village, OH, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

PAMELA A. BARKER, U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint and Join Required Party for Just Adjudication ("Motion for Leave to Amend") filed by Plaintiff Shalana Satterwhite ("Plaintiff" or "Satterwhite") on November 4, 2020. Defendant Ashtabula County Metroparks ("Defendant" or "ACMP") filed an Opposition to Satterwhite's Motion for Leave to Amend on November 19, 2020. (Doc. No. 21.) Satterwhite filed a Reply in Support of her Motion for Leave to Amend on November 25, 2020. (Doc. No. 24.)

Also before the Court is ACMP's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Summary Judgment Motion") filed on September 5, 2020. Satterwhite filed an Opposition to the Summary Judgment Motion on November 27, 2020. (Doc. No. 25.) ACMP filed a Reply in Support of its Summary Judgment Motion on December 11, 2020. (Doc. No. 26.)

For the following reasons, Satterwhite's Motion for Leave to Amend is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Further, ACMP's Summary Judgment Motion is GRANTED.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

1. Satterwhite's Employment with ACMP

This matter stems from Defendant ACMP's termination of Plaintiff Shalana Satterwhite's employment as an AMCP park ranger. Satterwhite, an African American woman, worked for ACMP from February 7, 2019 until ACMP terminated her employment on April 26, 2019. (Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 11, 12, 44.) On April 14, 2019, Satterwhite arranged for three African American youth volunteers to assist with an ACMP-sponsored Easter egg hunt. (Id. at ¶ 33.) According to Satterwhite, after the egg hunt ended, the youth volunteers told Satterwhite that they felt as though another ACMP park ranger, who was white, and other ACMP supervisors, who were also white, treated them "like slaves." (Id. at ¶ 36.) According to Satterwhite, the youth volunteers described the other park ranger as ordering them around while she and the ACMP supervisors declined to assist in the operation of the egg hunt. (Id. at ¶ 34, 35.) Sometime after the event, Satterwhite brought these concerns to ACMP's Executive Director, Larry Frimerman ("Frimerman") and the other ranger during a meeting. (Id. at ¶ 39.) Frimerman requested that Satterwhite join him for a drive through the parks and during the drive, brought up the topic of slavery. (Id. at ¶ 41.) After Frimerman's drive with Satterwhite, Frimerman terminated Satterwhite's employment with ACMP. (Id. at ¶ 42.) Frimerman told Satterwhite she was being terminated because she failed his "vehicle evaluation" and because she was unfamiliar with how to navigate the parks while operating a vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 43.)

2. Creation and Governance of ACMP

The ACMP was created via an Order from the Ashtabula County Probate Court on November 18, 1959, pursuant to Ohio Rev. C. § 1545.02. (See Doc. No. 14-3, PageID# 81, Exhibit A to Declaration of Larry Frimerman.) ACMP is governed by a board of park commissioners. (Doc. No. 14, PageID# 68.) There are five board members, none of whom is paid for their board service. (Id. at PageID# 68, 72.) The ACMP board created and maintains its own bylaws and rules for governance. (Id. ) Pursuant to ACMP's bylaws, the ACMP executive director was "responsible for hiring, promotions, demotions, or terminations of any other individual employee who is hired, promoted, or demoted ...." (Doc. No. 14-4, PageID# 91.) Also pursuant to those bylaws, the ACMP adopted an employee handbook. (Doc. No. 14-5, PageID# 93.) The employee handbook addresses ACMP's general employment policies and practices. (Id. ) During 2019, nine employees worked for ACMP.¹ (Doc. No. 14, PageID# 72.) Of those nine employees, only six employees worked twenty or more weeks in 2019. (Id. )

B. Procedural History

On November 15, 2019, Satterwhite filed a Complaint against ACMP, alleging a single count of racial discrimination, in contravention of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 50-59.) On January 14, 2020, ACMP filed its Answer and asserted the affirmative defense that it was not an employer covered under Title VII because ACMP claimed that it had a maximum of eight employees and did not meet Title VII's numerosity threshold of "fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." (Doc. No. 5, PageID# 36.)

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f), the parties met on January 30, 2020 to formulate a discovery plan. (Doc. No. 8.) The parties stipulated in their Report of Parties’ Planning that they would exchange initial disclosures by February 20, 2020. (Id. ) Following the Case Management Conference on February 6, 2020, the Court set the following scheduling deadlines: the parties agreed to file all amended pleadings and join all parties without leave of Court on or before March 8, 2020; non-expert discovery would be completed on or before August 7, 2020; expert discovery would be completed on or before November 30, 2020; and dispositive motions would be filed on or before January 15, 2021. (Doc. No. 10.)

On September 5, 2020—three days prior to the parties’ scheduled mediation—ACMP filed the instant Summary Judgment Motion, which focused solely on the legal issue of Title VII numerosity. (Doc. No. 14.) On September 9, 2020, the Court held a status conference with both parties. (Doc. No. 16.) The Court granted Satterwhite additional time to engage in discovery with respect to ACMP's Summary Judgment Motion. (Id. ) During this additional discovery, Satterwhite deposed Ashtabula County Auditor David Thomas on October 13, 2020. (Doc. No. 20, PageID# 235.)

Subsequently, Satterwhite filed the instant Motion for Leave to Amend on November 4, 2020, in which she seeks leave to amend her Complaint to add Ashtabula County as a named defendant and also to supplement her Complaint with pendent state law claim. (Id. at PageID# 236.) Moreover, Satterwhite also seeks to extend the current fact discovery deadline to remedy the disjointed discovery process that has played out in this matter. (Id. ) ACMP filed its Opposition to Satterwhite's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint on November 19, 2020. (Doc. No. 21.) Satterwhite filed a Reply in Support of her Motion on November 25, 2020. (Doc. No. 24.) Thus, Satterwhite's Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint became ripe for resolution on November 25, 2020.

Additionally, on November 27, 2020, Satterwhite filed her Opposition to ACMP's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 25.) On December 11, 2020, ACMP filed its Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 26.) Thus, ACMP's Motion for Summary Judgment became ripe for resolution on December 11, 2020.

II. Standard of Review

A. Motion for Leave to Amend

A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within twenty-one days after serving it or within twenty-one days after service of a responsive pleading or motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Otherwise, "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2), a court "should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires." Id. ; see also Morse v. McWhorter , 290 F.3d 795, 799-800 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Generally, leave to amend is ‘freely given when justice so requires.’ ") (quoting Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. State of Michigan , 11 F.3d 1341, 1348 (6th Cir. 1993) ). "Though the decision to grant leave to amend is committed to the trial court's discretion, that discretion is limited by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) ’s liberal policy of permitting amendments to ensure the determination of claims on their merits." Marks v. Shell Oil Co. , 830 F.2d 68, 69 (6th Cir. 1987). However, "[a] motion for leave to amend the complaint may be denied when the motion is the product of undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive, amendment would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party, the plaintiff repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies in the complaint with previous amendments, or amendment of the complaint would be futile." Springs v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury , 567 F. App'x 438, 443 (6th Cir. 2014).

Moreover, once the scheduling order deadline for amendments without leave of court has passed, "a plaintiff first must show good cause under Rule 16(b) for failure earlier to seek leave to amend before a court will consider whether amendment is proper under Rule 15(a)." Leary v. Daeschner , 349 F.3d 888, 909 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc. , 133 F.3d 1417, 1419 (11th Cir. 1998) ). To demonstrate good cause, a plaintiff must show that the original deadline could not have been met despite due diligence, and that the opposing party will not suffer prejudice by the amendment. Id.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A dispute is ‘genuine’ only if based on evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party." Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Sch. , 469 F.3d 479, 487 (6th Cir. 2006). "Thus, ‘the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.’ " Cox v. Kentucky Dep't of Transp. , 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). A fact is "material" only "if its resolution might affect the outcome of the suit under the...