Saulsberry v. Barr

468 F.Supp.3d 340

Terry SAULSBERRY, Plaintiff,

v.William P. BARR,¹ in his capacity as the Attorney General of the United States, Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-00384 (APM)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed June 23, 2020

Michael D. Hall, Pro Hac Vice, Nicholas Harry Hantzes, Hantzes & Associates, PC, McLean, VA, for Plaintiff.

Doris Denise Coles-Huff, Johnny Hillary Walker, III, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Amit P. Mehta, United States District Judge

Before the court is Defendant William Barr's Motion for Summary Judgment on the two remaining counts of Plaintiff Terry Saulsberry's Amended Complaint. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 33, Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 33-1 [hereinafter Def.’s Mot.]. The court previously dismissed Plaintiff's retaliation and retaliatory hostile work environment claims. See generally Order, ECF No. 20. Plaintiff's remaining claims are (1) Defendant, on account of Plaintiff's race and sex, selected a less qualified white woman, Heidi Kugler, for the Chief Chaplaincy Administrator position in violation of Title VII, Am. Compl., ECF No. 6 [hereinafter Am. Compl.], ¶¶ 53–58; and (2) Plaintiff's supervisors engaged in a practice of discriminatory behavior that created a hostile work environment, id. ¶¶ 59–65. For the reasons explained below, the court denies Defendant's Motion as to the non-selection claim and grants it as to the hostile work environment claim.

I.

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it is capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is "genuine" if there is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-movant. Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. , 812 F.3d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Accordingly, the inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the court considers all relevant evidence presented by the parties. Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms , 520 F.3d 490, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor, and if the court determines "no reasonable jury could reach a verdict in [the non-movant's] favor," then summary judgment is appropriate. Wheeler , 812 F.3d at 1113. When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court does not "make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Holcomb v. Powell , 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, conclusory assertions offered without any evidentiary support do not establish a genuine issue for trial. See Greene v. Dalton , 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

II.

A. Plaintiff's Non-Selection Claim

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's non-selection claim fails because the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") had a nondiscriminatory reason for selecting a white woman, Heidi Kugler, as the Chief Chaplaincy Administrator over Plaintiff, an African American man—namely, Kugler was the superior candidate because of "her prior relevant experience as the Assistant Chaplaincy Administrator." Def.’s Mot. at 8.

Claims based on circumstantial evidence, like Plaintiff's, trigger the three-step, burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802–03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817 ; St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). If a plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing "evidence that the adverse employment actions were taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr. , 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. , 509 U.S. at 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (internal quotation marks omitted)). If the defendant rebuts the presumption, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to discredit the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation. Id. at 1288–89. Where, as here, the employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision at issue, "the district court must resolve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer's asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin?" Brady , 520 F.3d at 494 ; see also Hamilton v. Geithner , 666 F.3d 1344, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

There are multiple ways a plaintiff may support an inference that unlawful discrimination, rather than the employer's stated reason, motivated an adverse employment discrimination. The "common ways of proving invidious motive—whether retaliation or discrimination—include pointing to evidence that ... the employer is ‘lying about the underlying facts’ of its decision; that there were ‘changes and inconsistencies’ in the employer's given reasons for the decision; [or] that the employer failed to ‘follow established procedures or criteria.’ " Allen v. Johnson , 795 F.3d 34, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Brady , 520 F.3d at 495 & n.3 ). Where a plaintiff claims discriminatory non-selection, he may present evidence of "disparity in qualifications" as well as "other flaws in the employer's explanation." Hamilton , 666 F.3d at 1352 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff puts forward two principal arguments to attack Defendant's proffered non-discriminatory explanation: (1) Plaintiff has superior qualifications for the position; and (2) there were procedural irregularities in the highly-subjective selection process. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp'n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 39 [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot.], at 5.

The court begins with Plaintiff's claim that he "has significantly more experience than Ms. Kugler and was a more qualified candidate for the Chief of Chaplaincy Services position." Am. Compl. ¶ 31; see also Pl.’s Opp'n at 5–11. Specifically, Plaintiff had served as a staff chaplain at five different correctional facilities covering every security level "and nearly every type of institution under the Bureau's authority." Am. Compl. ¶ 31; see also Pl.’s Stmt. of Disputed Facts, ECF No. 39-1 [hereinafter SDF], ¶ 2. Plaintiff's responsibilities in these positions included "duties [over] male and female inmates, medical centers, prison camps, detention centers, low-, medium-, and high-security units, protective custody units, the death and dying program, domestic terrorists, sexual offender programs, and violent crimes and serious offenders populations." Pl.’s Mot. at 6 (citing Plaintiff's Exhibit ("PEX")² 7 at 969–71, 980–93; PEX 1 at 61:10-19; PEX 17 at 1–2; PEX 21 at 14–16); SDF ¶ 2. Plaintiff also had extensive experience working with inmates from a wide variety of faith groups. SDF ¶ 38. As the Complex Supervisory Chaplain in Butner, North Carolina, for example, Plaintiff had a supervisory role over five correctional institutions, which housed prisoners representing over twenty different religious faith groups. Pl.’s Mot. at 7 (citing PEX 7 at 980–83, PEX 1 at 31:5–32:1).

By contrast, Kugler had worked at only two facilities—the first a low-security, male-only facility, and a second that housed 800 inmates in transit—and she had never worked as a supervisor at a Federal Correctional Complex. Pl.’s Mot. at 7.

Plaintiff maintains that the depth and breadth of his field experience make him a better candidate for the Chief Chaplaincy Administrator position. As he points out, the position description for the Chief Chaplaincy Administrator states that the Chief Chaplain "must have knowledge of the religious beliefs and practices of all faith groups identified within [the] inmate population," "[k]nowledge of the purpose and scope of chaplaincy services within a prison setting," and "[k]nowledge of inmate management (custody, care and treatment)." PEX 19 at 275; see also Pl.’s Mot. at 8. The description further provides that the Chief Chaplain "must have knowledge of the variety of institutions, inmate populations and the resulting problems presented by the various combinations," id. at 276, and "must have a thorough understanding of the operating problems involved in working within an institution," id. at 277.

The description also contemplates that the Chief Chaplain will "give and exchange information regarding religious issues within prisons," and expects that the Chief Chaplain will "[i]nterface[ ] with all religious faiths groups regarding their advocacy issues of concern." Id. at 277–78.

In addition to his broader experience with different inmates from different religious backgrounds, Plaintiff also argues that he has more extensive supervisory experience than Kugler. He had supervised 18 staff members in a variety of positions including 10 chaplains, a program coordinator, a religious services assistant, and a mentor coordinator, as well as worked with more than 500 volunteers and 20 contractors over his career at BOP. Pl.’s Mot. at 9 (citing PEX 17 at 1–2; PEX 7 at 980). By contrast, Kugler had supervised only two employees in her field positions and an additional three employees in the Central Office of the...