Saunders v. N.J. Dep't of Corr.

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ALMUTAH SAUNDERS, Plaintiff, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-621

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

May 16, 2023

Not for Publication

OPINION & ORDER

JOHN MICHAEL VAZQUEZ, U.S.D.J.

Plaintiff alleges that while in the custody of Defendant the New Jersey Department of Corrections (“NJDOC”), he has been involuntarily medicated with psychotropic drugs for more than ten years. Plaintiff asserts numerous claims against Defendants, including negligence, product liability, a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and a Section 1983 civil rights violation. Currently pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by the NJDOC and Marcus Hicks (the “Moving Defendants”).^[1] D.E. 30. Plaintiff opposes the motion.^[2] D.E. 38. The Court reviewed the submissions made in support and opposition to the motion^[3] and considered the motion without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the foregoing reasons, the Moving Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff who suffers from “neurological, psychiatric, developmental, and educational disabilities,” has been in NJDOC custody since 2005.^[4] Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35-38. Plaintiff alleges that upon his initial entry into custody, Defendants misdiagnosed him, then forcibly administered Risperdal to him for years. Id. ¶ 42. Risperdal is an antipsychotic medication used to treat symptoms associated with schizophrenia. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. Risperdal use can lead to numerous adverse side effects. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff alleges that because of his prolonged ingestion of Risperdal, he developed gynecomastia (abnormal development of breasts in males), galactorrhea (lactation), and tumors, among other things. Plaintiff has undergone surgical procedures to counteract the side effects and alleges that further medical and surgical intervention will be necessary. Id. ¶¶ 33-34.

Defendants stopped prescribing Risperdal to Plaintiff on January 1, 2018 and substituted Remeron, an anti-depressant. Id. ¶¶ 56-57. Defendants' forced administration of Remeron to Plaintiff is on-going. Id. ¶ 60. Plaintiff pleads there is no factual basis for this on-going treatment. Id. ¶ 60. Plaintiff further pleads that the NJDOC facility where he resides fails to provide adequate mental health, psychiatric and psychological services, and that the NJDOC maintains other facilities, specifically the Ann Klein Forensic Center, that have sufficient mental health and psychiatric services. Plaintiff alleges that if he were transferred to such a facility, Defendants “would have been able to determine that [he] was no longer presenting with symptoms which warranted the continued involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs.” Id. ¶ 66.

Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint on February 7, 2022, asserting several state-law based claims, an ADA claim, and a Section 1983 claim alleging that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Plaintiff brought suit against the NJDOC; Hicks, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the NJDOC; and multiple John Doe Defendants. D.E. 1. The NJDOC and Hicks filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), D.E. 7, which the Court partially granted, D.E. 16, 17 (the “September 23 Opinion”). The Court dismissed Plaintiff's federal question-based claims without prejudice but did not consider Plaintiff's arguments as to the state law-based claims, as the Court lacked supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The Court, however, granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Id. Plaintiff subsequently filed the Amended Complaint. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against three additional defendants, and brings federal and common-law claims against all Defendants. For the four individual Defendants, Plaintiff asserts his claims against them in their official and individual capacities. D.E. 20. The Moving Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), on January 11, 2023. D.E. 30.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court must first determine whether the party presents a facial or factual attack, because the distinction determines how the pleading is reviewed. Elbeco Inc. v. Nat'l Ret. Fund, 128 F.Supp.3d 849, 854 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A facial attack “contests the sufficiency of the complaint because of a defect on its face,” whereas a factual attack “asserts that the factual underpinnings of the basis for jurisdiction fails to comport with the jurisdictional prerequisites.” Id. Here, the Moving Defendants assert the defense of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment based on the pleadings, thereby raising a facial attack.^[5] See Perez v. New Jersey, No. 14-4610, 2015 WL 4394229, at *3 (D.N.J. July 15, 2015) (“[T]he State Defendants' motion asserts the defense of sovereign immunity based on the facts as pleaded in the Second Amended Complaint and is thus a facial attack.”). Accordingly, “the Court must consider the allegations of the complaint as true,” much like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Bd. of Trs. of Trucking Emps. of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Caliber Auto Transfer, Inc., No. 09-6447, 2010 WL 2521091, at *8 (D.N.J. June 11, 2010) (quoting Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006)).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For a complaint to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it must contain enough factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Further, a plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, district courts must separate the factual and legal elements. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-211 (3d Cir. 2009). Restatements of the elements of a claim are legal conclusions, and therefore, are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The Court, however, “must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Sovereign Immunity

Plaintiff asserts a claim against Defendants pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 200d-7, in Count VII, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 105-10, and in Count VIII, Plaintiff asserts a Section 1983 claim, id. ¶¶ 111-16. The Moving Defendants maintain that both counts must be dismissed as to the NJDOC and Hicks, in his official capacity, because of sovereign immunity.^[6] Defs. Br. at 7-13. The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment's “fundamental principle of sovereign immunity” is a limit on a federal court's authority. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars all private suits against non-consenting States in federal court. Lombardo v. Pa., Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890)). The bar extends to state agencies, departments, and employees acting in their official capacities. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101; see also Fletcher v. Dep't of Corr., 856 Fed.Appx. 359, 361-62 (3d Cir. 2021) (stating that “the District Court properly dismissed the [DOC] because it is immune under the Eleventh Amendment from this § 1983 action”).

There are three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity. First, a state may waive sovereign immunity by consenting to suit in federal court, “invok[ing] [its] jurisdiction by bringing suit,” or making “a clear declaration that it intends to submit itself to [federal court] jurisdiction.” MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503-04 (3d Cir. 2001). Plaintiff does not argue, and there is no indication, that New Jersey waived its sovereign immunity for any claim Plaintiff asserts in this matter.

Second, “Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.” Antonelli v. New Jersey, 310 F.Supp.2d 700, 713 (D.N.J. 2004). As discussed in the September 23 Opinion, Congress did not abrogate States' sovereign immunity in enacting Section 1983. Sept. 23 Opinion at 6 (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)).

Plaintiff however, contends that Congress abrogated states' sovereign immunity for Count VII. Plf. Opp. at 6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 provides that “[a] State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment . . . for suit in Federal Court for a violation of,” amongst other things, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. §...