Saunders v. N.J. Dep't of Corr.

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ALMUTAH SAUNDERS, Plaintiff, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-621

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

September 23, 2022

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

Plaintiff alleges that while in the custody of Defendant the New Jersey Department of Corrections (“NJDOC”), he was forced to take an antipsychotic medication for more than ten years. Plaintiff asserts numerous claims against Defendants including negligence, product liability, a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights violation. Currently pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants the NJDOC and Marcus Hicks. D.E. 7. Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition, D.E. 14, to which Defendants replied, D.E 15.^[1] The Court reviewed the submissions made in support and opposition to the motion and considered the motion without oral argument pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R 78.1(b). For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who suffers from “neurological, psychiatric, developmental, and educational disabilities,” has been in NJDOC custody since 2005.^[2] Compl. ¶¶ 35-38, 41. Plaintiff alleges that upon his initial entry into custody, Defendants forcibly administered Risperdal to him. Compl. ¶ 18. Defendants continued to prescribe and administer Risperdal to Plaintiff against his will, id. ¶ 43, until December 2016, id. ¶ 18, or January 1, 2018, id. ¶ 50.

Risperdal is an antipsychotic medication used to treat symptoms associated with schizophrenia. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. Risperdal use can lead to numerous adverse side effects. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff alleges that because of his prolonged ingestion of Risperdal, he developed gynecomastia (abnormal development of breasts in males), galactorrhea (lactation), and tumors (among other things). Plaintiff has undergone three surgical procedures to counteract the side effects and alleges that further medical and surgical intervention will be necessary. Id. ¶¶ 33-34, 48-49.

Plaintiff filed his seven-count Complaint on February 7, 2022, asserting several state-law based claims, an ADA claim, and a Section 1983 claim; the 1983 claim alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. D.E. 1. Plaintiff brings suit against the NJDOC; Hicks, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the NJDOC; and multiple John Doe Defendants. NJDOC and Hicks subsequently filed the instant motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). D.E. 7.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For a complaint to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Further, a plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, district courts must separate the factual and legal elements. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-211 (3d Cir. 2009). Restatements of the elements of a claim are legal conclusions, and therefore, are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011). The Court, however, “must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210.

III. ANALYSIS

1. Section 1983 Claim (Count VII)

In Count VII, Plaintiff asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Compl. at 21-22. Defendants maintain that Count VII must be dismissed because of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Defs. Br. at 5-6. Plaintiff counters that the Court should reject this argument because Eleventh Amendment immunity should only be addressed through a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), but Defendants only seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Plf. Opp. at 20-21.

Plaintiff is correct that Rule 12(b)(1) is procedurally the proper vehicle to assert a motion to dismiss based upon sovereign immunity because sovereign immunity implicates the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.”)). Defendants, however, rely on allegations in the Complaint to argue the sovereign immunity defense. Accordingly, Defendants present a facial attack to subject-matter jurisdiction. See Const. Party v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014). When presented with a facial attack, “the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein . . . in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). This is the same standard courts use to consider a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. Therefore, while Defendants technically should have moved under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court will still consider the merits of their Eleventh Amendment immunity defense. See, e.g., Garcia v. Richard Stockton Coll. of N.J., 210 F.Supp.2d 545, 548 n.1 (D.N.J. 2002) (“Although New Jersey describes its Motion as falling entirely under Rule 12(b)(6), . . . its [Eleventh Amendment] jurisdictional arguments are more properly brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Accordingly, I will treat them as such.”).

The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Courts interpret the Eleventh Amendment as affirming “the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity” as a limit on a federal court's authority. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 98. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars all private suits against non-consenting States in federal court. Lombardo v. Pa., Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890)). The bar extends to state employees acting in their official capacities, in addition to agencies and departments of the state, such as the NJDOC. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101; see also Fletcher v. Dep't of Corr., 856 Fed.Appx. 359, 361-62 (3d Cir. 2021) (stating that “the District Court properly dismissed the [DOC] because it is immune under the Eleventh Amendment from this § 1983 action”).

There are three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity. First, “Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.” Antonelli v. New Jersey, 310 F.Supp.2d 700, 713 (D.N.J. 2004). Congress did not abrogate States' sovereign immunity in enacting Section 1983, and Plaintiff does not attempt to argue otherwise. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (“Congress, in passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity”). Second, a state may waive sovereign immunity by consenting to suit in federal court by “invok[ing] [its] jurisdiction by bringing suit,” or making “a clear declaration that it intends to submit itself to [federal court] jurisdiction.” MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503-04 (3d Cir. 2001). Plaintiff does not argue, and there is no indication that New Jersey waived its sovereign immunity here.

Plaintiff maintains that the third exception, the Ex Parte Young doctrine, applies. Plf. Opp. at 24-25. Ex Parte Young only applies when a state official “commits an ‘ongoing violation of federal law.'” Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor v. Governor of N.J., 961 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 254-55 (2011)). If such a situation arises, an aggrieved person may “seek prospective relief by suing [the individual] in his official capacity.” Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff could only pursue a claim against Hicks under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, not the NJDOC.

“To plead a cause of action under Ex Parte Young, a plaintiff must establish a present violation of federal law” and seek “prospective injunctive relief.” Gregory v. Admin. Office of the Courts of N.J., 168 F.Supp.2d 319, 328 (D.N.J. 2001). Plaintiff fails to do so here. First, although Plaintiff arguably seeks only monetary damages, to the extent the Complaint could be construed as seeking injunctive relief, such relief would not be prospective. See Compl. ¶ 16 (“This suit is brought to recover damages and other relief . . . for the damages Plaintiff has sustained.”) (emphasis added). Second, although Plaintiff pleads different dates, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants stopped administering Risperdal to him by 2018 at the latest. Compl. ¶ 50. Consequently, Plaintiff does not plead that there is any ongoing violation of federal law. The Ex Parte Young doctrine, therefore, does not apply to Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim.

Finally Plaintiff argues that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for money damages against state officials acting in their personal...