Sauter v. Integrity Cycles

236 N.E.3d 818

2024-Ohio-309

Thomas E. SAUTER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.INTEGRITY CYCLES, LLC et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23AP-313

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Rendered on January 30, 2024

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas (C.P.C. No. 23CV-0139).

On brief: Hrabcak & Company, L.P.A., Michael Hrabcak, Worthington, and Gregory A. Wetzel, for appellant. Argued: Gregory A. Wetzel.

On brief: Caborn & Butauski Co. L.P.A., and Joseph A. Butauski, Columbus, for appellees. Argued: Alyssa Wolf.

DECISION

MENTEL, P.J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Thomas E. Sauter, appeals from an April 25, 2023 decision and entry granting the motion for summary judgment of defendants-appellees, Integrity Cycles, LLC and Frank Anthony Ferri. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} This case arises from a June 22, 2018 motorcycle accident. On March 25, 2020, appellant filed a complaint against appellees asserting various claims of bodily injury and negligence. Sauter v. Integrity Cycles, LLC, et al., Franklin C.P. 20CV-2444.¹ On January 5, 2022, appellant filed a Civ.R. 41(A) notice of voluntary dismissal of the complaint without prejudice against appellees. On January 6, 2023, appellant refiled his complaint against appellees.² Sauter v. Integrity Cycles, LLC, et al. Franklin C.P. 23CV-139. On March 16, 2023, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the refiled complaint was time-barred under Ohio’s savings statute, R.C. 2305.19(A). On April 11, 2023, appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to appellees’ motion for summary judgment arguing that the refiled complaint was timely as the calculation of the savings statute began the day after the Civ.R. 41(A) notice was filed and concluded 12 months from the same numerical day that the period commenced. A reply brief was filed on April 19, 2023.

{¶ 3} On April 25, 2023, the trial court granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment finding that the refiled complaint was time-barred citing this court’s decision in Shue v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-432, 2017-Ohio-443, 2017 WL 495596.

{¶ 4} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on May 19, 2023.

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 5} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error:

The trial court erred when it granted Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment and held that Appellant’s refiled Complaint was time barred.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1–3] {¶ 6} An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment de novo. Kiser v. United Dairy Farmers, 10th Dist., 2023-Ohio-2136, 219 N.E.3d 465, ¶ 9. When reviewing a decision under a de novo standard of review, we undergo an independent review of the evidence without deference to the trial court’s decision. Id., citing Nazareth Deli LLC v. John W. Dawson Ins. Inc., 10th Dist., 2022-Ohio-3994, 200 N.E.3d 652, ¶ 22. Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates: (1) there are no outstanding genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, it appears that reasonable minds can only come to one conclusion that is adverse to the nonmoving party. Charley v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., et al., 10th Dist. No. 22AP-678, 2023-Ohio-4294, 2023 WL 8235811, ¶ 9, citing Civ.R. 56(C); State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183, 677 N.E.2d 343 (1997).

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Appellant’s Sole Assignment of Error

[4] {¶ 7} In appellant’s sole assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred by finding the refiled complaint was time-barred under Ohio’s savings statute, R.C. 2305.19.

[5] {¶ 8} Ohio’s general savings statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), directs in relevant part, "[if a] plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits" "[i]n any action that" the plaintiff "commenced or attempted to * * * commence[ ]," the plaintiff "may commence a new action within one year after the date of * * * the plaintiff’s failure otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later." To be sure, R.C. 2305.19(A) does not operate as a statute of limitations or function to toll the statute of limitations. Wilson v. Durrani, 164 Ohio St.3d 419, 2020-Ohio-6827, 173 N.E.3d 448, ¶ 18, citing Lewis v. Connor, 21 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 487 N.E.2d 285 (1985), citing Reese v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 6 Ohio St.3d 162, 163, 451 N.E.2d 1196 (1983). "Rather, it provides a plaintiff with a limited period of time in which to refile a dismissed claim by commencing a new action that would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations." Wilson at ¶ 18, citing Internatl. Periodical Distribs. v. Bizmart, Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 452, 2002-Ohio-2488, 768 N.E.2d 1167, ¶ 7.

{¶ 9} On the face of the complaint, the motorcycle accident at issue took place on June 22, 2018. There is no dispute that the claims based on bodily injuries and negligence expired on June 22, 2020. (Appellant’s Brief at 4-5); see R.C. 2305.10. There is also no dispute that appellant’s Civ.R. 41(A)(1) dismissal was not on the merits. Frysinger v. Leech, 32 Ohio St.3d 38, 512 N.E.2d 337 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus ("[a] voluntary dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1) constitutes a failure otherwise than upon the merits within the meaning of the savings statute, R.C. 2305.19."). The question becomes whether Ohio’s one-year savings statute preserves appellant’s claims.

[6–8] {¶ 10} When considering how to compute the one-year statutory period, we must look to applicable provisions of the Ohio revised code and rules of civil procedure for guidance. A reviewing court should interpret a word or phrase in a statute consistent with "‘their common, everyday meaning unless a contrary intent is expressed.’" State ex rel. Swanson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist., 2021-Ohio-338, 167 N.E.3d 604, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Wells, 91 Ohio St.3d 32, 740 N.E.2d 1097 (2001), citing R.C. 1.42. If a word or* phrase employed in a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply the statutory language as written. A statute is deemed ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. Swanson at ¶ 8, citing State v. Black, 142 Ohio St.3d 332, 2015-Ohio-513, 30 N.E.3d 918, ¶ 37-39, citing State v. Jordan, 89 Ohio St.3d 488, 492, 733 N.E.2d 601 (2000).

{¶ 11} R.C. 1.14 provides, "[t]he time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first and including the last day." Similarly, Civ.R. 6(A) states "[i]n computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by * * * any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included." Applying the above directives, we exclude the date the Civ.R. 41(A) notice of dismissal was filed, January 5, 2022, and begin the calculation of the one-year period under R.C. 2305.19(A) on the subsequent day, January 6, 2022.

[9] {¶ 12} Subject to conditions in R.C. 1.51, Revised Code sections 1.41 to 1.50 establish general provisions that apply to all statutes. Swanson at ¶ 12. The General Assembly defines "[y]ear" as "twelve consecutive months." R.C. 1.44(B). R.C. 1.45 directs the "number of months is to be computed by counting the months from a particular day, the period ends on the same numerical day in the concluding month as the day of the month from which the computation is begun." The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized these statutes may apply to the computation of a one-year statutory period. Cox v. Dayton Pub. Schools. Bd. Of Edn., 147 Ohio St.3d 298, 2016-Ohio-5505, 64 N.E.3d 977, ¶ 31, fn. 3, citing R.C. 1.44(B) ("a year may be computed by counting 12 months from a particular day."). Here, the one-year period prescribed in R.C. 2305.19 concludes after counting the number of months, 12, from the commencing date, January 6, 2022, and ends on the same numerical day in the concluding month, i.e., January 6, 2023. Because appellant refiled the complaint on the final day of the one-year period, appellant’s filing was timely under R.C. 2305.19.

{¶ 13} Appellees cite this court’s decision in Shue, 2017-Ohio-443, as controlling. In Shue, this court applied the "anniversary rule" when determining whether the refiled action was timely under the one-year savings statute. The "anniversary rule" calculates the period from the day after the act or event occurred and concludes at the close of the first anniversary of the day the act took place. Id. at ¶ 10. The Shue court held the refiled complaint was not preserved under the one-year savings statute because the filing date, March 3, 2016, was more than one year beyond the prior, voluntarily dismissed complaint on March 2, 2015. Id. at ¶ 14.

{¶ 14} The Supreme Court, however, has adopted a different approach when computing statutory periods of time. In Cox, the Supreme Court considered the requirements for invoking the jurisdiction of the trial court to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitration award under R.C. 2711.13. Id. at ¶ 1. "At the heart of this case is the question whether Cox timely served notice of her motion on * * * Dayton Public Schools Board of Education ([‘]the BOE[’])" within the three-month time limit under R.C. 2711.13. Id. The Supreme Court found, based on its calculation of the three-month statutory period, service of Cox’s motion was timely under R.C. 2711.13. Id. at ¶ 23. The Cox court explained that, pursuant to R.C. 1.14 and Civ.R. 6(A), the statutory period began after excluding the "day of the act," or the delivery date, and concluded after three months, in accordance with R.C. 1.45, "‘on the same numerical day in the concluding month as the day of the month from which the computation is begun.’" (Emphasis...