Sauve v. Hepp, Case No. 18-CV-932-JPS

FLOYD C. SAUVE, Petitioner, v. WARDEN RANDALL R. HEPP, Respondent.

Case No. 18-CV-932-JPS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

November 26, 2019

ORDER

Petitioner Floyd C. Sauve ("Sauve") brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge a state court conviction arising from Milwaukee County Circuit Case No. 2014CF004500. (Docket #1). In that case, a jury found Sauve guilty of using a computer to facilitate a child sex crime in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.075(1r). Sauve claims that his due process rights were violated during his jury trial and sentencing. Specifically, he contends that (1) the circuit court's decision to admit evidence of Sauve's "other acts," which included sexually explicit text messages that he sent to other girls who were not involved in Case No. 2014CF004500, violated his right to a fair trial; (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove an intent to have sexual contact with a minor; and (3) Sauve's sentence was excessive, wrongly imposed without the benefit of a presentence report, and failed to take into account mitigating factors.

Respondent acknowledges that Sauve has exhausted his claims and filed the habeas petition within the one-year statute of limitations. (Docket #18 at 2-3). The parties have fully briefed their respective positions on Sauve's asserted grounds for relief pursuant to Magistrate Judge William E. Duffin's scheduling order. See (Docket #8). For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that Sauve's petition is without merit and therefore must be denied.

1. STANDARD OF REVIEW

State criminal convictions are generally considered final. Review may be had in federal court only on limited grounds. To obtain habeas relief from a state conviction, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA")) requires the petitioner to show that the state court's decision on the merits of his constitutional claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). The burden of proof rests with the petitioner. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). The relevant decision for this Court to review is that of the last state court to rule on the merits of the petitioner's claim. Charlton v. Davis, 439 F.3d 369, 374 (7th Cir. 2006).

A state-court decision runs contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent "if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [those] cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court but reaches a different result." Brown, 544 U.S. at 141. Similarly, a state court unreasonably applies clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it applies that precedent to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner. Id.; Bailey v. Lemke, 735 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2013).

The AEDPA undoubtedly mandates a deferential standard of review. The Supreme Court has "emphasized with rather unexpected vigor" the strict limits imposed by Congress on the authority of federal habeas courts to overturn state criminal convictions. Price v. Thurmer, 637F.3d 831, 839 (7th Cir. 2011). It is not enough for the petitioner to prove the state courts were wrong; he must also prove they acted unreasonably. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2005); Campbell v. Smith, 770 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2014) ("An 'unreasonable application of' federal law means 'objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even 'clear error' will not suffice.'") (quoting White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014)).

Indeed, the petitioner must demonstrate that the state court decision is "so erroneous that 'there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court's precedents.'" Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1992 (2013) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102). The state court decisions must "be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002); Hartjes v. Endicott, 456 F.3d 786, 792 (7th Cir. 2006). Further, when a state court applies general constitutional standards, it is afforded even more latitude under the AEDPA in reaching decisions based on those standards. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) ("[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.").

As the Supreme Court has explained, "[i]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. Indeed, Section 2254(d) stops just short of "imposing a complete bar on federal-court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings." See id. This is so because "habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. at 102-03 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring)).

A federal court may also grant habeas relief on the alternative ground that the state court's adjudication of a constitutional claim was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The underlying state court findings of fact and credibility determinations are, however, presumed correct. Newman v. Harrington, 726 F.3d 921, 928 (7th Cir. 2013). The petitioner overcomes that presumption only if he proves by clear and convincing evidence that those findings are wrong. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Campbell, 770 F.3d at 546. "A decision 'involves an unreasonable determination of the facts if it rests upon factfinding that ignores the clear and convincing weight of the evidence.'" Bailey, 735 F.3d at 949-50 (quoting Goudy v. Basinger, 604 F.3d 394, 399-400 (7th Cir. 2010)). "'[A] state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.'" Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013) (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)). If shown, an unreasonable factual determination by the state court means that this Court must review the claim in question de novo. Carlson v. Jess, 526 F.3d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 2008).

2. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

In 2014, Sauve was charged with one count of using a computer to facilitate a child sex crime, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.075(1r). He was arrested after he messaged, and arranged meetings with, a fourteen-year-old who is known as "T.N.S." (Docket #18-4 at 2). Sauve knew that T.N.S. was only fourteen, but still sent her sexually explicit messages and arranged to meet with her. Police arrested Sauve when he arrived for their third meeting.

The case proceeded to trial. T.N.S. testified that she had met Sauve online. She explained that initially he pretended to be a teenaged boy, but later he told her that he was thirty-six. According to T.N.S., after messaging for two weeks, they met up at a library. During this meeting, Sauve suggested that she come to his house "if she felt comfortable enough." Id. at 3. She testified that Sauve hugged and kissed her goodbye at the end of their second meeting, which took place at a park.

The State presented evidence of the sexually explicit messages that Sauve sent to T.N.S. For example, one message stated, "if we meet and hang out, I won't try to grab your boobs or anything unless you let me, L-O-L." Another message read, "as long as you don't say anything and only do private stuff in private places, no one would get in trouble. I just have to trust you to keep our secret, secret."

The State also presented witness Detective Justin Landry ("Landry"), an investigative officer. Landry had worked on T.N.S.'s case, and had pretended to be T.N.S. in order to arrange the third and final meeting with Sauve. During the exchanges in which Landry pretended to be T.N.S., Sauve said he wanted to make out with her. When Landry arrested Sauve at the meeting place, Sauve was carrying a loaded handgun, knives, and a handcuff key.

Finally, the State presented five text message exchanges between Sauve and two other adolescent girls who were not involved in the charged conduct. These messages with the other girls (hereinafter, the "other acts" evidence) were sexually charged and explicitly discussed their young age. For example, one message read, "even at eleven you [will] still be my youngest kiss." Id. at 3.

Before admitting the messages, the trial court held a hearing on their admissibility, and ultimately concluded that although the messages were prejudicial, they were also highly relevant to the charged conduct and probative of Sauve's motive, plan, and intent to commit a child sex crime. (Docket #18-11 at 12:3-22). Specifically, the trial court found that the messages had "a tendency to prove that intent" in light of the "same communication system," the "similar content" of the messages, and the "similar direction to female children." Id. at 10:2-6. Later, the trial judge noted that "the communications were all near in time. . . using the same computer system," that the circumstances were very similar, and that the messages "certainly go toward showing intent, and it paints the picture in the context of someone who's basically trolling for victims." Id. at 12:13-17. The trial court concluded that the "probative value is not substantially outweighed by other considerations" such as prejudice that the other acts evidence would cause the jury to base its decision on emotion, disgust, or "something other than the established propositions of the case." Id. at 12:10-12; 12:18-20.

When Sauve took the stand to...