Savory v. Cannon

532 F.Supp.3d 628

Johnnie Lee SAVORY, Plaintiff,

v.William CANNON, Sr., as Special Representative of the Estate of Charles Cannon, Marcella Brown Teplitz, Beth Bell, as Special Representative of Russell Buck, Peter Gerontes, and John Timmes, John Fiers, Charles Edward Bowers, John Stenson, George Pinkney, E. Haynes, Walter Jatkowski, Glen Perkins, Allen Andrews, Harold Marteness, Mary Ann Dunlavey, Carl Tiarks, and City of Peoria, Illinois, Defendants.

17 C 204

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed March 31, 2021

Jonathan I. Loevy, Arthur R. Loevy, Julia Therese Rickert, Megan Colleen Pierce, Steven Edwards Art, Loevy & Loevy, Elizabeth N. Mazur, Hughes Socol Piers Resnick & Dym, Ltd., John Ladell Stainthorp, G. Flint Taylor, Jr., People's Law Offices, Locke E. Bowman, III, Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

James Gus Sotos, Jeffrey Neil Given, John J. Timbo, Joseph M. Polick, Lisa Marie Meador, Samantha J. Pallini, Sara J. Schroeder, The Sotos Law Firm, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Defendants William Cannon, Sr., Marcella Brown Teplitz, Stefanie Tarr, John Fiers, Charles Edward Bowers, John Stenson, George Pinkney, E. Haynes, Walter Jatkowski, Glen Perkins, Allen Andrews, Harold Marteness, Mary Ann Dunlavey, Carl Tiarks, City of Peoria, Illinois.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Gary Feinerman, United States District Judge

Johnnie Lee Savory brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois law against the City of Peoria and over a dozen of its police officers, alleging that they framed him for the 1977 murders of James Robinson and Connie Cooper. Doc. 1. This court dismissed the suit under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) on statute of limitations grounds. 338 F. Supp. 3d 860 (N.D. Ill. 2017). The Seventh Circuit reversed as to the § 1983 claims. 947 F.3d 409 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc). On remand, Defendants move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss on grounds other than those underlying the 2017 dismissal. Doc. 128. The motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Background

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court assumes the truth of the operative complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations, though not its legal conclusions. See Zahn v. N. Am. Power & Gas, LLC , 815 F.3d 1082, 1087 (7th Cir. 2016). The court must also consider "documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice," along with additional facts set forth in Savory's brief opposing dismissal, so long as those additional facts "are consistent with the pleadings." Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 714 F.3d 1017, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The facts are set forth as favorably to Savory as those materials allow. See Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc. , 818 F.3d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 2016). In setting forth the facts at the pleading stage, the court does not vouch for their accuracy. See Goldberg v. United States , 881 F.3d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 2018).

On January 18, 1977, an assailant murdered 14-year-old James Robinson and raped and murdered his 19-year-old sister Connie Cooper. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 20-21. Both victims sustained multiple stab wounds. Id. at ¶ 21. The defendant officers gathered physical evidence from the scene, including hairs from the hands of both victims, blood-stained clothing, vaginal swabs from Cooper, fingerprints, and a nightstick. Id. at ¶ 22. None of the physical evidence incriminated Savory, then fourteen years old, whose only connection to the victims was his close friendship with Robinson. Id. at ¶¶ 22, 27.

The officers initially considered several suspects—including an individual who owned the nightstick found at the scene. Id. at ¶ 24. Days later, the officers "suddenly and inexplicably" began to focus on Savory, even though he had a verifiable alibi. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29. On January 25, the officers took Savory into custody and began to interrogate him. Id. at ¶ 31.

The interrogation took place over the course of 31 hours. Id. at ¶ 32. "[I]n an effort to exhaust and disorient" Savory, the officers questioned him in "tag teams" at several different locations and deprived him of food and sleep. Id. at ¶¶ 35-37. The officers repeatedly accused him of murdering Robinson and Cooper, "despite [his] consistent denials of any involvement in the crime." Id. at ¶ 42. "As part of their plan to coerce [Savory] into incriminating himself," id. at ¶ 38, the officers lied to him, ibid. , "screamed at ... and threatened him," id. at ¶ 42, made false promises, id. at ¶ 45, and "stripped him naked and plucked hairs from all over his body," id. at ¶ 44. The officers also "improperly fed him facts of the crime and showed him pictures of the crime scene" to make his confession seem "more credible." Id. at ¶ 43. After forcing Savory to take a series of polygraph examinations, they falsely told him that the examinations proved his guilt. Id. at ¶ 38. All the while, the officers "knew [Savory] was innocent." Id. at ¶ 100.

At no point did the officers give Savory proper Miranda warnings, provide him with an attorney, or honor his many requests to remain silent. Id. at ¶¶ 40, 46-47, 49. After multiple hours of questioning, Savory "confessed falsely" to the murders. Id. at ¶ 51. The officers documented the confession in police reports, which falsely recounted the circumstances of the confession and interrogation. Id. at ¶ 52. Savory recanted and reasserted his innocence "[a]t the very next moment that [he] had the opportunity to talk with a police officer." Id. at ¶ 54.

Savory's false confession was "the reason" that he was prosecuted and twice found guilty of murdering Cooper and Robinson. Id. at ¶ 91. The false confession was used to convict Savory during his first trial in 1977 and, after that conviction was reversed due to a Miranda violation, People v. Savory , 82 Ill.App.3d 767, 38 Ill.Dec. 103, 403 N.E.2d 118 (1980), again during his second trial in 1981. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 91. Savory was sentenced to 40-80 years’ imprisonment, and his second conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Savory , 105 Ill.App.3d 1023, 61 Ill.Dec. 737, 435 N.E.2d 226 (1982).

Because Savory's false confession was the only purportedly "reliable" evidence connecting him to the murders, the officers took other steps to frame him. Doc. 1 at ¶ 58. They fabricated physical evidence, including blue pants belonging to Savory that they falsely asserted were stained with Cooper's blood. Id. at ¶ 63. They withheld exculpatory information obtained from individuals with direct knowledge of the murders. Id. at ¶ 67. They procured several false witness statements. Id. at ¶¶ 58-59, 62. And they pressured three witnesses—Frank, Tina, and Ella Ivy—to testify at the second trial that Savory told them that he had murdered Cooper and Robinson. Id. at ¶¶ 58-59. The Ivy siblings have since "stated unambiguously on multiple occasions that their testimony implicating [Savory] was a lie." Id. at ¶ 59.

Additionally, during the criminal proceedings and following the second trial, the officers destroyed physical evidence—including the victims’ hair and fingernail clippings—to prevent Savory from exonerating himself. Id. at ¶¶ 64-66, 70. Recent DNA testing on the physical evidence that was preserved ruled out Savory as the perpetrator. Id. at ¶ 75. For example, the "vaginal swabs taken from [Cooper] revealed the presence of seminal fluid and a DNA profile that definitively excludes [Savory] as the person who raped [Cooper]." Ibid.

All told, Savory spent thirty years in prison for crimes that he did not commit. Id. at ¶ 78. He was released from prison on parole in December 2006, Doc. 71-2 at 2, released from parole in December 2011, ibid. , and pardoned by the Governor of Illinois on January 12, 2015, Doc. 1 at ¶ 86. Savory filed this suit on January 11, 2017, less than two years after the pardon.

Discussion

The complaint's federal counts are: (1) a § 1983 claim against the officers for coercing Savory's false confession in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment; (2) a § 1983 claim against the officers for coercing a false confession from Savory in violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) a § 1983 claim against the officers for maliciously prosecuting and unlawfully detaining Savory, and thus depriving him of liberty without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) a § 1983 claim against the officers for depriving Savory of his right to a fair trial, his right not to be wrongfully convicted, and his right to be free of involuntary confinement and servitude in violation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments; (5) a § 1983 claim against the officers for failure to intervene; and (6) a § 1983 claim against the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 88-130. The complaint also brings state law respondeat superior and indemnification claims against the City. Id. at ¶¶ 145-151.

I. Group Pleading and Shotgun Pleading

Defendants argue that the complaint engages in impermissible "group pleading" because, by repeatedly referring to the officers as a collective ("Defendants"), it does not specify which officer(s) committed which allegedly wrongful act(s). Doc. 128 at 10-12. True enough, "[e]ach defendant is entitled to know what he or she did that is asserted to be wrongful," and "[a] complaint based on a theory of collective responsibility must be dismissed." Bank of Am., N.A. v. Knight , 725 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2013). But where, as here, the nature and circumstances of the alleged wrongdoing do not allow the plaintiff to know at the pleading stage who among "a collective body" did precisely what, failure to plead those specifics is "not by itself a proper ground for the dismissal of the suit." Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv....