Sayonkon v. Beniecke

Johnson Sayonkon, Petitioner, v. Scott Beniecke, Field Office Director, Respondent.

Civ. No. 12-27 (MJD/JJK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

April 17, 2012

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Johnson Sayonkon, Carver County Jail, 606 East 4th Street, Chaska, MN 55318, pro se.

Erika R. Mozangue, Esq., Friedrich A. P. Siekert, Esq., and Gregory G. Booker, Esq., Assistant United States Attorneys, counsel for Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before this Court on the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241 from a Person in the Custody of the Immigration Custom and Enforcement Agency (ICE) (Doc. No. 1 ("Pet.")). For the reasons explained below, this Court recommends, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(b), that the Petition be denied as moot, and this action be dismissed.

BACKGROUND

This case involves issues that arise when an individual in the custody of the immigration authorities must be removed from the United States according to the immigration laws, but immigration authorities are unable to effect that removal. Until very recently, the United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") detained Petitioner pending his removal to Liberia, as authorized by a June 16, 2011 Warrant of Removal. (See Doc. No. 1-1, Pet'r's Mem. in Supp. of Pet. ("Pet'r's Mem.") at 1-2; Doc. No. 9, Administrative Record ("AR") at 12 (Warrant of Removal); Doc. No. 10, Decl. of Eric O'Denius ("O'Denius Decl.") ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. No. 14, Decl. of Friedrich A. P. Siekert ("Siekert Decl.") ¶ 3, Exs. A-C (showing ICE's recent decision to release Petitioner).) ICE issued the Warrant of Removal after an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed following his release from the custody of the Minnesota Department of Corrections, where Petitioner was serving a 33-month sentence for various criminal convictions and probation violations. (AR at 7-9; O'Denius Decl. ¶ 4.) However, since June 2011, ICE has been unable to obtain the necessary travel documents from Petitioner's native country, Liberia, and, consequently, ICE has been unable to deport him. (See O'Denius Decl. ¶¶ 6-9, 13-14; Pet'r's Mem. at 7-8.)

Because Petitioner had been in ICE's custody for approximately six months, and ICE still had not received the necessary paperwork from Liberia, on January 5, 2012, Petitioner sought relief through the Petition. (Doc. No. 1.) Specifically, Petitioner requested that the Court issue "an Order compelling respondent to release him from custody subject to appropriate [c]onditions imposed by this Court pending any further proceedings." (Pet'r's Mem. at 8.) Respondent initially opposed the Petition on the grounds that Petitioner failed todemonstrate how his continued detention, pending removal, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and that it was significantly likely that Petitioner would be removed to Liberia in the reasonably foreseeable future. (Doc. No. 8, Return to Habeas Corpus Pet. and Order to Show Cause at 6-10.) On February 22, 2012, this Court ordered Respondent to supplement this opposition and provide the Court with the following: (1) the status of the issuance of a travel document by Liberia; (2) the results of ICE's review of conditions of Petitioner's custody, which was scheduled to occur no later than March 14, 2012; and (3) any support for Respondent's position that Petitioner's removal was forthcoming. (Doc. No. 12.)

On March 30, 2012, Respondent informed this Court that ICE has now released Petitioner from its custody subject to certain supervisory conditions. (Doc. No. 13 at 1; Siekert Decl. ¶ 3, Exs. B & C.) Thus, Respondent argues that the Petition is now moot because Petitioner has obtained the very relief he seeks in this proceeding and no remaining Article III case or controversy exists. (Doc. No. 13 at 2-3.)

DISCUSSION

I. Mootness

"Article III mootness arises from the Constitution's case and controversy requirement: 'Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual, ongoing cases and controversies.'" Ali v. Cangemi, 419 F.3d 722, 723 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Haden v. Pelofsky, 212 F.3d 466, 469(8th Cir. 2000)).¹ "'When, during the course of litigation, the issues presented in a case 'lose their life because of the passage of time or a change in circumstances . . . and a federal court can no longer grant effective relief,' the case is considered moot.'" Id. at 723-24 (quoting Haden, 212 F.3d at 469 (quoting Beck v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 18 F.3d 604, 605 (8th Cir. 1994))).

Petitioner's release affects whether this Court can still grant effective relief because he has obtained the very outcome he requested through his Petition and supporting papers. See id. at 724 (noting the possibility that the release of a habeas petitioner under an order of supervision mooted his appeal in the Article III sense). However, because Petitioner was in custody when he filed his Petition, his release does not automatically render his Petition moot; whether it does depends on potentially applicable exceptions to the mootness doctrine. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). Under these exceptions, the Petition should not be dismissed as moot if: "(1) secondary or 'collateral' injuries survive after resolution of the primary injury; (2) the issue is deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review; (3) the defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly illegal practice but is free to resume it at any time; or (4) it is a properly certified class action suit." Riley v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 2002)(quoting Chong v. District Dir., INS, 264 F.3d 378, 384 (3d Cir. 2001)). Because none of these exceptions applies in this case, the Petition must be denied as moot.

II. Application of the Exceptions to Mootness

A. No Collateral Consequences

The first exception applies where there is "some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole—some 'collateral consequence' of the conviction—must exist if the suit is to be maintained." Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. Here, one might argue that the conditions placed on Petitioner's liberty by the Order of Supervision are collateral consequences different from his now-ended detention. But the collateral-consequences exception does not apply where such conditions follow from the final order of removal and not from the allegedly prolonged detention itself.² See Camara v. Comfort, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1176 (D. Colo. 2002) (cited in Ali, 419 F.3d at723); see also Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1132 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that release from custody mooted habeas petition where the only collateral consequences arose from the removal order rather than detention); cf. Mhanna v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Civil No. 10-292 (JRT/LIB), 2010 WL 5141803, at *12 (D. Minn. Dec. 13, 2010) ("To the extent that the Court could construe Mhanna's request for relief as a reviewable habeas claim relating to ICE detention, however, ICE's removal of Mhanna from the United States renders any such claim moot."). As in Camara, the conditions placed on Petitioner's freedom by the Order of Supervision flow from his final order of removal and are not "collateral consequences of Petitioner's detention." See Camara, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. As a result, there is no concrete and continuing injury on which this suit can be maintained. Nor does the record reflect any other non-speculative collateral consequences sufficient to sustain the Petition's justiciability under Article III.

In addition, this Court notes that the conditions ICE placed on Petitioner's release are reasonable. The following conditions apply to Petitioner's release:

- He must appear upon request for identification and for removal or deportation;

- He must appear upon request for psychiatric examination at the United States Government's expense;

- He must provide details regarding his nationality, circumstances, associations, and activities and complete travel document applications and provide ICE with a copy of correspondence with any Embassy or Consulate;- He must not travel outside of Minnesota without notifying his deportation officer;

- He must provide written notice within 72 hours of a change of residence;

- He must report in person every three months beginning in July 2012 as required by ICE;

- He must assist ICE in obtaining necessary travel documents; and

- He must obtain work authorization, commit no crimes, continue to follow any prescribed doctors' orders, respond to call-in letters, and appear for his deportation when required.

(Siekert Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. C at 1.) Courts have concluded that nearly identical conditions of supervised release for a removable alien satisfy due process because they are rationally related to the legitimate government interests of reducing the number of "absconding aliens" and "accounting for and being able to produce any alien who becomes removable." See Yusov v. Shaughnessey, 671 F. Supp. 2d 523, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Nguyen v. B.I. Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1115 (D. Or. 2006)); Zavalas v. Prendes, No. 3-10-CV-1601-K-BD, 2010 WL 4454055, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2010) (approving similar conditions of supervised release with additional conditions of electronic leg monitoring); see also Mahmoud v. Cangemi, No. Civ. 05-900 (DWF/FLN), 2006 WL 1174214, at *2 (D. Minn. May 1, 2006) (concluding that the petitioner provided no evidence or legal argument that demonstrated that post-removal-order release under an order of supervision violated due process and noting thatin Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696, the Supreme Court explicitly held that release on conditions is the appropriate alternative to detention).

B. Not Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review

The second exception to mootness—that the issue raised is one that is capable of repetition yet evading review—is a narrow one. "A case is...