Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Knight

299 Ga. 286

788 S.E.2d 421

Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc.

v.Knight et al.

S15G1278

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: July 5, 2016

Duane Morris, William D. Barwick ; Hawkins Parnell Thackston & Young, H. Lane Young, II, M. Elizabeth O'Neill, Robert B. Gilbreath ; J.D. Smith, for Appellant.

Buck Law Firm, Robert Cape Buck ; Kazan, Mcclain, Satterley & Greenwood, Denyse F. Clancy, for Appellee.

Hall Booth Smith, Mark W. Wortham ; Crowell & Morning, William Anderson ; Bryan Cave, William V. Custer IV, J. Phillip Boston, amici curiae.

Blackwell, Justice.

Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. is a textile manufacturer, and in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it produced dryer felts at a manufacturing facility in Waycross. Some of the pipes and boilers in that facility were insulated with material containing asbestos, and Scapa used yarn containing asbestos in some of its manufacturing processes. Between 1967 and 1973, Roy Knight worked on multiple occasions at the Waycross facility as an independent contractor. Almost forty years later, Knight was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a cancer most commonly associated with the inhalation or ingestion of asbestos fibers. After his mesothelioma was diagnosed, Knight and his wife sued Scapa, claiming that Scapa negligently exposed him to asbestos at the Waycross facility and caused his mesothelioma.¹ The case was tried by a Ware County jury, which returned a verdict against Scapa and awarded more than $4 million in damages to the Knights.² The trial court entered a judgment upon that verdict, and Scapa appealed.

Among other things, Scapa argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it admitted the expert testimony of Dr. Jerrold Abraham, a pathologist. In his testimony, Dr. Abraham opined that, if Knight actually was exposed to asbestos while working at the Waycross facility, that exposure was a cause of his mesothelioma, regardless of the precise extent of the exposure. Dr. Abraham explained that a small number of respirable asbestos fibers are naturally present in the air, but exposure to this background asbestos is not known to cause mesothelioma. When someone is exposed to respirable asbestos in excess of the background, however, his cumulative exposure may build to a point that it exceeds the capacity of the lungs to absorb the exposure, and at that point, the cumulative exposure may lead to mesothelioma. According to Dr. Abraham, the precise point at which cumulative exposure is sufficient to cause any particular person to develop mesothelioma is not scientifically knowable, and for that reason, when a person actually has mesothelioma, it can only be attributed to his cumulative exposure as a whole. Because each and every exposure to respirable asbestos in excess of the background contributes to the cumulative exposure, Dr. Abraham reasoned, each exposure in excess of the background is a contributing cause of the resulting mesothelioma, regardless of the extent of each exposure.

Objecting to the testimony of Dr. Abraham, Scapa argued at trial and on appeal that his theory of cumulative exposure is not reliable in a scientific sense, the theory does not comport in any event with the legal requirements for causation in Georgia, and an expert opinion about causation that is derived from that theory is inadmissible. The trial court rejected these arguments, and in Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Knight , 332 Ga.App. 82, 85–89, 770 S.E.2d 334 (2015), a divided seven-judge panel of the Court of Appeals rejected them and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.³ We issued a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals only with respect to the admission of the testimony of Dr. Abraham, and we now reverse.

To begin, we look to former OCGA § 24–9–67.1 (b),⁴ which sets forth the usual standard for the admissibility of expert opinion testimony in civil cases:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in any cause of action to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if:

(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data which are or will be admitted into evidence at the hearing or trial;

(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

Like most questions of admissibility, whether expert testimony ought to be admitted under former OCGA § 24–9–67.1 (b) is a question committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Toyo Tire North America Mfg. v. Davis , 299 Ga. 155, 158(2), 787 S.E.2d 171 (2016). But when a trial court exercises that discretion, former OCGA § 24–9–67.1 (b) “imposes a special obligation upon [the] trial judge.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael , 526 U.S. 137, 147 (II) (A), 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999).⁵ As we have explained before, “[t]he whole premise of [former OCGA § 24–9–67.1 ] is that a trial court must act as a ‘gatekeeper’ to ensure the relevance and reliability of expert testimony.” Dubois v. Brantley , 297 Ga. 575, 585(2), 775 S.E.2d 512 (2015) (citation omitted). See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

Generally speaking, a trial court must assess three aspects of proposed expert testimony—the qualifications of the expert, the reliability of the testimony, and the relevance of the testimony—to discharge its responsibilities as a gatekeeper under former OCGA § 24–9–67.1 (b). See HNTB Ga., Inc. v. Hamilton–King , 287 Ga. 641, 642, 697 S.E.2d 770 (2010) (“In determining the admissibility of expert testimony, the trial court acts as a gatekeeper, assessing both the witness'[s] qualifications to testify in a particular area of expertise and the relevancy and reliability of the proffered testimony.” (Citations omitted)). See also Seamon v. Remington Arms Co. , 813 F.3d 983, 988 (III) (A) (11th Cir. 2016) ; City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc. , 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998). As for qualifications, the trial court must examine the credentials of the expert to ascertain the extent to which he is “qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address,” Seamon , 813 F.3d at 988 (III) (A) (citation omitted), whether by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Former OCGA § 24–9–67.1 (b). As for reliability, the trial court must consider whether “the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable.” Seamon , 813 F.3d at 988 (III) (A) (citation omitted). To this end, the trial court must ask whether the conclusions of the expert “[are] based upon sufficient facts or data,” former OCGA § 24–9–67.1 (b) (1), whether the expert drew those conclusions by use of “reliable principles and methods,” former OCGA § 24–9–67.1 (b) (2), and whether the expert “applied [those] principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case,” former OCGA § 24–9–67.1 (b) (3). See also Daubert , 509 U.S. at 592–593 (II) (C), 113 S.Ct. 2786 (trial court must consider “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and ... whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue”). And as for relevance, the trial court must consider the “fit” between the expert testimony and the issues in dispute. Seamon , 813 F.3d at 988 (III) (A). To properly be admissible, expert testimony must “assist the trier of fact ... to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” former OCGA § 24–9–67.1 (b), and expert testimony is helpful to the trier of fact only to the extent that “the testimony is relevant to the task at hand and logically advances a material aspect of [the] case.” Boca Raton Community Hosp. v. Tenet Health Care Corp. , 582 F.3d 1227, 1232 (II) (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and punctuation omitted).

In this case, Scapa does not dispute that Dr. Abraham has adequate credentials to qualify as an expert. Scapa vigorously disputes, however, the reliability of his testimony, asserting that the cumulative exposure theory by which Dr. Abraham developed his opinions on causation is not scientifically valid and is, to the contrary, “junk science.” Scapa also disputes the relevance of his testimony, arguing that it simply does not “fit” the pertinent causation inquiry under Georgia law. In the circumstances of this case, we agree that the critical opinion conveyed by Dr. Abraham in his testimony—that any exposure to asbestos at the Waycross facility was a cause of Knight's mesothelioma, regardless of the extent of the exposure—does not “fit” the legal standard for causation, and for that reason, the admission of his testimony under former OCGA § 24–9–67.1 (b) was not helpful to the jury and amounted to an abuse of discretion.⁶

To prove causation as against Scapa under Georgia law, Knight and his wife had to show that exposure to asbestos at the Waycross facility was “a contributing factor in bringing about [his mesothelioma ].” John Crane, Inc. v. Jones , 278 Ga. 747, 748, 604 S.E.2d 822 (2004). See also Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Ferrante , 281 Ga. 273, 274, 637 S.E.2d 659 (2006) ; Gooch v. Georgia Marble Co. , 151 Ga. 462, 464, 107 S.E. 47 (1921). We previously have rejected the notion that the “contribution to the resulting injury [must] be ‘substantial’ ” to show legal causation. John Crane, Inc. , 278 Ga. at 748, 604 S.E.2d 822. At the same time, however, we cautioned that a “de minimis” contribution is not enough. See id. at 750, 604 S.E.2d 822 (“[T]he jury charge [on ‘contributing factor’] would not have misled the jury into believing that it could award damages for a de minimus exposure to asbestos.” (Citation omitted)). Put another way, although Knight and his wife did not have to prove that exposure to asbestos at the Waycross...